



MINISTERSTVO VNITRA  
ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY

# **REPORT ON EXTREMISM IN THE TERRITORY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 2014**

**Ministry of the Interior  
Security Policy and Crime Prevention Department  
Prague 2015**

**The Report on Extremism in the territory of the Czech Republic was approved by the Czech Government on May .. 2015 by Resolution No ...**

The text has not undergone any linguistic or stylistic editing.

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# 1. Introduction

The Report on extremism and associated phenomena in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2014 is submitted on the basis of the Government Resolution No. 372 of 21st May 2014. The evaluation of the Conception in combating extremism in 2013 and the Conception in combating extremism in 2014 are included in separate documents.

The document does not capture all racist and xenophobic manifestations, which were attributed to individuals, who are not members or sympathizers of extremist groups. Capturing of all racist and xenophobic behaviours, actions or statements on a national or even a regional level is beyond the scope of both the document and the issue of extremism itself as it is perceived by the Ministry of the Interior.

The author of this report is the Ministry of the Interior. The source material was obtained via representatives of the intelligence services, the Police of the Czech Republic, other resorts of the government administration, Ministry of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office.

Spectators' violence, respectively hooliganism, is a separate topic on the agenda of the Ministry of the Interior. Relevant documents and reports on hooligans may be found on <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/kriminalita-146433.aspx?q=Y2hudW09Mg%3d%3d>. Despite that, there are notions of significant events related to hooligans in the report due to their active involvement in the extremist scene. The document on extremism does not focus on sects and pseudo-religious organisations since there were no records of significant activities related to a security risk of an infiltration into government structures, political or economic sphere, or threats to democratic structures of the state.

The document is processed annually. Its aim is to inform the public about developments on the scene on a regular basis. New measures are subsequently being adopted based on the findings, which are included in this document.

First passage, dedicated to the national scene, is based on data provided by the Security Intelligence Services and the Police of the Czech Republic; in particular, experts from the Unit for Combating Organised Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigations and the Regional Directorates of the Police of the Czech Republic.

The statistics have been provided by the Police, the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, Ministry of Justice and Probation and Mediation Services of the Czech Republic.

The third part is dedicated to foreign influences impinging on the Czech extremist scene. It was processed by experts from the Masaryk University in Brno with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via specifically selected foreign embassies in other European countries.

A list of abbreviations shall be found in the last section.

This paper includes photographs, which were taken by the employees of the Ministry of the Interior and the police. Photographs obtained from other sources, e.g. in the foreign scene section, are clearly referenced.

## 2. Definition of the term extremism

In this document, the term „extremism“ is defined identically to previous annual reports. Last time when such a comprehensive definition was published in full, was in the Report on the issue of extremism in the Czech Republic in 2002, with the Government Resolution No 699 adopted on 9th July 2003.<sup>1</sup> In this context, it is also possible to refer to the established case law of courts in relation to the interpretation of the term „movement“.<sup>2</sup>

Not all the entities that are included in the report have engaged in illegal activities in 2014. From a long-term perspective, they nevertheless possess features of extremism in a manner defined in previous annual documents.

The report still holds the concept of extremism; however, the Ministry of the Interior does not rule out a future complementarity with concepts of hate (bias) crime (i. e. offences motivated by hatred, bias, or crimes motivated by collective prejudice), and also considers that there is a scope for strengthening elements of hate (bias) crimes within the police or judicial units.

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See <http://www.mvcr.cz> (section „Security threats“, subsection „Extremism“ – „Strategy for combating extremism and Annual reports on extremism“).


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In particular the opinion of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court Tpjn 302/2005 (No. 11/2007 Coll.), and also the Supreme Court Resolutions 5 Tdo 79/2006, 5 Tdo 337/2002, 3 Tdo 1174/2004, and Resolution 4 T 98/2009 of the Regional Court in Brno.

## 3. Report on extremism in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2014

### 3.1. Summary

- **A series of anti-Roma demonstrations similar to 2013 was not repeated.** The public realised that extremist entities do not provide any plausible solutions. Both central and local government bodies have begun to develop a greater range of activities focusing on socially excluded areas.
- A crisis **within the right-wing extremist scene** continued. There was a **further fragmentation and a decline in activities in the public sphere.**
- The right-wing extremist scene was searching for new topics next to the typical anti-Roma mobilisation issue. It began **increasing its Islamophobia** and defence of the European, respectively national, traditions and culture. It reflected foreign trends to a greater extent. The Islamophobic scene began expressing itself more significantly.
- There was an increased **activity within the left-wing extremist scene.** The far left began to focus on local issues and topics to a greater extent; in some cases using contacts within the local government. Left-wing extremists also drew inspiration from abroad. Similarly as in the past, mobilisation campaigns have continued.
- There were records of a **greater number of the so-called direct actions**, i. e. attacks aimed mainly against property.
- There were **291 recorded events** organised by politically extremist entities, or events in which such individuals or entities participated. There was a slight increase in the amount of events in comparison with 2013 with the total of 272 events.



- Similarly to previous years, the highest amount of events and also other activities of both extremist scenes was recorded in Prague. It was followed by the South Moravian, Usti nad Labem, Olomouc and Moravian-Silesian regions. The activity of extremist groups in other regions was rather irregular. A recovery of activities within both extremist scenes was recorded in the South Bohemian region. Traditionally, the extreme right had a strong representation in the Moravian-Silesian, Usti nad Labem and Carlsbad regions; partly also in Olomouc and South Moravian regions. The extreme left is relatively well established in the Olomouc, Liberec, Usti nad Labem and Zlin regions.

### ***3.2. Main security threats and risks for the Czech Republic***

- In general, efforts of extremists to **break down the society and weaken the Czech Republic by creating antagonisms** based on ethnicity, religion, class or other factors.
- Further **increase of interethnic tensions** including demonstrations and acts of violence. Local triggering incidents still have the potential to mobilise the public.
- Possible occurrence of radicalised militant individuals, or small groups, who may use violence in order to promote their interests.
- **Acceptance of extremist elements into the political mainstream.**
- Possible **emergence of an extremist political entity with a charismatic leader**, who can unite the extremist scene and reach out to other potential supporters.

### ***3.3. Increased inter-ethnic tensions***

In 2014, there was a **decrease in the amount and frequency of demonstrations with an exclusive anti-Roma character**. The reasons for their occurrence continued to be mainly minor incidents between the Roma and majority ethnic group.

A trend from the second half of 2013 continued, i. e. after the increase in the amount of anti-Roma gatherings, which were mostly organised by right-wing extremists and had a rather confrontational character, **the amount of regular participating citizens decreased**. Local residents who formerly had the tendency to support anti-Roma gatherings realised that right-wing extremist entities, or other controversial activists, only wanted to raise their own profile, but were not able to solve any issue in question.

Several anti-Roma demonstrations were recorded. In comparison to 2013, these were considerably smaller, relatively peaceful and without any significant disruptions of public order. Their main actors were not local residents but rather right-wing extremists or various controversial activists, who wanted to use this topic in order to increase their own popularity.

**Two of the largest demonstrations took place in Decin during August.** Their cause was primarily the assault on a representative of the majority group by a group of Roma individuals. Among the first individuals who attempted to use this situation for their own

benefits, was a well-known mystifier Lukas Kohout, whose gathering was attended by about 200 local residents. On 23rd August, the chairman of the Worker's Party of Social Justice („WPSJ“), Tomas Vandas, made efforts to promote himself on an event, which was attended by about 120 individuals; two-thirds of them were local residents. On 23rd August, the chairman of the Worker's Party of Social Justice („WPSJ“), Tomas Vandas, made efforts to promote himself during an event, which was attended by about 120 individuals; two-thirds of whom were local residents. Even though the atmosphere in Decin was escalating after the incident and several human rights initiatives protested against the events, the demonstrations proceeded in peace and without any major disruptions of public order.

Among other anti-Roma events, which were organised by the WPSJ, there was also a gathering **in Duchcov** on 29th March, which was attended by about 160 individuals, half of whom were local residents.

A relatively large demonstration was also the gathering of about 100 – 140 individuals **in Pilsen** on 1st March, which was co-organised by a right-wing extremist Pavel Bittmann.

An alleged incident between the majority population and Roma ethnic groups was also behind the organisation of an anti-Roma gathering in **Budisov upon Budisovka**, where a local youth died accidentally. A blame for his death was attributed to local Roma residents and it was used subsequently by the right-wing extremists, particularly by Pavel Matejny – the main representative of the Czech Lions extremist group. His memorial event was supported by about 60 participants (about 20 right-wing extremists and 40 locals). His other events in various regions of the Czech Republic did not gain any public interest.

**The WPSJ also used the anti-Roma rhetoric in its campaign for the elections to the European Parliament and municipal councils.** It, therefore, managed to acquire a seats in the municipal councils of Duchcov (where it entered the ruling coalition) and Vetrni<sup>3</sup>; however, the overall election results represented a significant failure for the WPSJ. The election results showed that while extremists' public anti-Roma speeches have a particular electoral potential, they do not reach such a level, which could gain greater public support. One of the reasons may be the fact that other populist groups also addressed the Roma issue and, therefore, took over potential far-right voters.

### ***3.4. Right-wing extremism***

#### **3.4.1. Structure and entities of the scene**

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An assault on a married couple in Duchcov in 2013 took place, which was recorded on the camera system of the municipal police. Its publication was an impulse for several anti-Roma demonstrations. Similarly case occurred in Vetrni, where an assault on a school teacher by Roma parents took place and a subsequent anti-Roma petition by local residents was signed.

**In 2014, the right-wing extremist scene remained atomised** and, from a broader perspective, did not represent any significant security risk for the democratic constitution of the Czech Republic. Despite efforts to find a unifying and mobilising ideology, the right-wing extremists were not able to change this situation. They failed to reach the public even though they **tried to use relatively attractive media topics such as the interethnic tension or the attitude of the Czech population towards the Muslim community.**

The **Workers' Party of Social Justice** remained the largest representative of right-wing extremists<sup>4</sup>. From a socio-political point of view, this entity has only a marginal character. It was also confirmed by its election results in 2014. **Apart from its minor success in the municipal elections, which meant the entry into the coalition of the municipal council in Duchcov, the WPSJ failed completely.** Active branches operated mainly in Prague, Usti nad Labem, Carlsbad and Moravian-Silesian regions. Regional organisations were less active in comparison with previous years.

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It is necessary to highlight that not all the members of the WPSJ may be labelled as right-wing extremists. The members' base is formed by a wide range of individuals – not only right-wing extremists, but also regular citizens, who are not satisfied with the government policy regarding the Roma minority.

In the elections to the European Parliament on 23rd and 24th May, the **coalition of the WPSJ and the Party for Europe**<sup>5</sup> gained only 0,52 % (7 902) of the votes cast. The party, therefore, did not exceed the 1% threshold necessary for obtaining a financial contribution to cover election expenses, which was its primary objective.

The party also **did not succeed** in the municipal elections on 10th and 11th October and despite an intensive campaign gained only 6 posts in municipal councils in Duchcov, Vetrni and Dolni Nivy. Although the party presented the result as positive (it increased the number of its representatives in comparison with previous municipal elections), it was evident that it stands at the absolute end of interest as regards Czech voters. There were more than 62 000 councillors elected in the municipal elections; 6 mandates, therefore, mean, that the party was able to gain only about one-tenth per mille of all the possible seats.

Particularly in connection with its electoral campaigns, the WPSJ organised several anti-Roma demonstrations; e. g. in Duchcov on 29th March (approximately 80 supporters of the WPSJ and 80 local residents), or in Decin on 23rd August (about 1/3 out of 120 individuals belonged to right-wing extremists; it was protested against by activists from the Connections civil movement and Socialist Solidarity left-wing extremist movement).

In addition to the anti-Roma rhetoric, the WPSJ made efforts to gain support of the public also by targeting other topics. It, therefore, focused its attention on anti-Muslim speeches, which culminated by the demonstration in Teplice on 27th September with the attendance of about 100 individuals. The primary aim of the event was to gain an interest of voters, but the WPSJ efforts were practically ignored. The activity of the WPSJ in this field was not reflected in any higher electoral support in given district. Despite this, the WPSJ leadership did not leave this topic and continues to consider it as potentially promising.

The biggest WPSJ event was its **1st May demonstration in Usti nad Labem**, which was organised together with its subsidiary Workers' Youth („WY). This event was attended by about 300 – 350 individuals from the WPSJ, WY, German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland („NPD“), Junge Nationaldemokraten („JN“), or Italian Blocco Studentesco (attendance only in individual numbers). There were also several dozens of local residents among the demonstrators. There were about 200 individuals protesting against this event, however, due to the presence of the police there were no significant disruptions of public order.

The WPSJ also participated in other demonstrations; from the more significant ones it is possible to mention the „**Day of National Unity**“ (organised by the WY) in Brno on 17th November. This event was attended by about 50 – 100 individuals, including several members of the JN. It was protested against by about 500 opponents.

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The party was created by members of the Workers' Party as a back up entity in relation to the dissolution of the Workers' Party in 2010 (this role was taken over by the WPSJ subsequently). Eventually, the Party for Europe was registered in 2011.

The WPSJ tried to maintain contacts with ideologically similar entities from both the Czech Republic and abroad. On a national level, it, therefore, entered into a project called the National Congress (or Congress of National Forces) in July 2014, whose establishment was initiated by the National Democracy political party (see below).

As regards the international cooperation, the **WPSJ further maintained contacts mainly with German partners from the NPD and JN**. Their cooperation was in the form of reciprocity visits and participation in events of the other side, both public and private. As an example of good relations between the WPSJ and NPD should have served an otherwise marginal demonstration, which was organised by activists from the WPSJ and WY in front of the German Embassy in Prague on 13th May. Its aim was to express support to the NPD in its fight against the efforts of German authorities to prohibit the entity.

The youth organisation of the WPSJ, the Workers' Youth, acted more and more as an entity independent on its parent organisation during 2014. The WY participated in the organisation of several events, which were formerly under the auspices of the WPSJ. These were, for example, the traditional 1st May event or demonstration in Brno on 17th November 2014 (see above).

The WY activists also organised a traditional **demonstration „Kosovo is Serbia“**, which took place in **Ostrava** on 15th February. The event proceeded in peace and without any public disturbances with the attendance of about 100 individuals, among others, also activists from Poland (Front Narodowy) and Slovakia (Slovak Solidarity).

A significant event for the WY was its representation at the European Congress of Youth National Organisations, which was organised by the youth organisation JN in a German city of Kirchheim on 22nd March. There were also records of an involvement of the WY representatives in the electoral agitation of the NPD during the first half of April and their participation during the „Day of German Future“ in Dresden on 7th June.

The WY cells were active mostly in the Moravian-Silesian, South Moravian and newly also Carlsbad regions. Some WY members joined the campaign in support of the Ukrainian Right Sector at the beginning of the year.

The attention was also focused on members of the new nationalist party, the National Democracy („ND“), which was established by a transformation of the Law and Justice political movement in Prague on 11th January.<sup>6</sup> The head of the ND is a controversial chairman Adam Bartos.

The party is strongly eurosceptic, which was evident from its former title „No to Brussels – National Democracy“. Nevertheless, its primary aim was to run in the elections to the European Parliament on 23rd and 24th May. The party was not successful and gained only 0,46% (7 109) votes.

On the initiative of the ND, an entity named the National Congress („NC“ or the Congress of National Forces) was established; its objective was to establish cooperation with other, ideologically related, parties. The first entity, which joined the project, was the WPSJ. Under the auspices of the NC, the ND and WPSJ stood together as candidates in municipal elections in some districts and also organised several events. The most significant protest in Prague, which was directed against the "Prague Pride" gay and lesbian festival, was attended by about 60 on 16th August. Another joint event was the anti-Israeli gathering „Mourning for victims of wars“ in front of the Israeli Embassy in Prague on 11th September, which was attended only by about 20 individuals. In November, other far-right entities joined the NC project – the Republican Party of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, the Conservative and Social Movement, and the National Prosperity.

The ND also organised its own events, such as a demonstration on 17th November 2014 or a gathering against the US interference in the internal affairs of the Czech Republic in front of the US Embassy in Prague on 26th November 2014.

**The ND was quite intensively involved in a support of Russia during the conflict in Ukraine.** Its members, among others, also attended pro-Russian demonstrations in Prague. In this context, the media attention was concentrated at the ND member Ladislav Zemanek when he took over a role of a foreign observer during the elections in Donbas region in Ukraine in October 2014.

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The change was registered at the Ministry of the Interior on 23rd January 2014. From this date onwards, the title of the party was No to Brussels – National Democracy. However, a change of the party's name was again registered on 22nd December to the National Democracy.

Relatively active were members of the Generation of Identity („GI“). From their point of view, the biggest and most successful event of the GI was a socio-cultural gathering in Pisek on 28th September 2014<sup>7</sup>. It did not have an openly extremist character, even though it included the promotion of the GI itself.

A significant event of the GI was a meeting with representatives or supporters of foreign identity groups in Prague on 5th April, which was attended by about 60 individuals. It also included a presentation of French identity group Bloc Identitaire representatives, Phillipe Vardon and Jean-David Cattin; in addition it was also attended by individuals from Austria, Italy and Poland. The meeting was followed by a concert of bands In Memoriam (France) and All Bandits (Poland) for about 50 – 100 individuals.

Members of the GI also engaged in other activities such as, for example, various charitable and donor events, during which they made donations of several thousands CZK to socially disadvantaged families or animal shelters. A part of the GI activists supported the Right Sector and Ukrainian nationalists.

Popularity among some right-wing extremists was gained by activists from **Pro-Vlast**, who allegedly stole more than a hundred EU flags in 2014, which they wanted to burn at their demonstration in Prague on 1st May. In the end, the organisers cancelled the event on the spot due to measures adopted by the police.

Supporters of Pro-Vlast were also linked to a provocative event, during which they **spilled four litres of pork blood on the gate of the Islamic foundation and a mosque in Prague**.

Platforms GI and Pro-Vlast symbolised the efforts, made by a part of activists from the neo-Nazi scene, to distance themselves from the traditional neo-Nazism. They made efforts to gain new, particularly young, sympathizers via accentuating patriotism and civil activism. They made efforts to gain new, particularly young, sympathizers via accentuating patriotism and civil activism. Some activists from these two platforms tried to engage in mobilisation groups the European Solidarity Front for Syria and the European Solidarity Front for Kosovo<sup>8</sup>.

The **Czech Lions** (CL) right-wing extremist group organised several smaller anti-Roma demonstrations in 2014. These events were always attended by a very small amount of people. One of the biggest events was a demonstration in Budisov upon Budisovka on 7th

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This gathering was a modification of formerly organised St Wenceslas manifestations, which used to take place under the auspices of the Autonomous Nationalists.

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Both „European Solidarity Fronts“ focused on the organisation of discussion and lecture events and served, among others, also to the acquisition of financial resources. The European Solidarity Front for Syria was not very active towards the end of the year.

June, which was attended by about 20 right-wing extremists and about 40 local residents. It was protested against by several Roma and civil activists; however, there was no disruption of public order. The significance of the CL declined during the year. A similarly focused group, the West bohemian Wolves, also ceased to exist.

In 2014, a considerable proportion of the right-wing extremist scene was made of activists, who are not organised in any formally established entities. Their main attention was concentrated on various social gatherings linked to alcohol consumption, trips to football matches (given the interdependency between such groups and the hooligans scene), right-wing extremist concerts, etc. These activists, who formerly quite willingly participated in various right-wing extremist demonstrations, gradually refrained from their engagement in public events and preferred rather less visible and less controllable activities.

There were records of **contacts between the Czech and foreign right-wing extremists**. Probably the most significant manifestation presented by the media was the „**Light for Dresden**“ **demonstration** in Carlsbad on 15th February, which was attended by about 160 individuals, out of which about 100 were from Germany<sup>9</sup>. Some cooperation also took place in the form of trips to various international events (e.g. March of Independence in Poland on 11th November 2014) or concerts (primarily in Slovakia).

**One of the topics of the Czech right-wing extremist scene in 2014 was the situation in Ukraine.** The topic itself was divided depending on the support for either party of the conflict; a greater part supported Ukrainian nationalists; however, a range of right-wing extremists sided with pro-Russian separatists.

Pro-Ukrainian oriented extremists' interests were reflected in several areas. Several smaller events, in support of the Ukrainian nationalists from the Right Sector group, were organised, as well as several fundraising campaigns; few individuals even travelled to Ukraine. Generally, it is possible to state that the activity of Czech activists in this area was marginal and, therefore, did not influence the nature of the Czech right-wing extremist scene significantly.

In relation to the development of the security situation in the Middle East, the **Islamophobic scene** further mobilised. In the virtual and, in the second half of the year, also public environment, it was represented mainly by the **Czech Defence League** („CDL“). The given group has mobilised against the existence of the Muslim community in the Czech Republic and considered its occurrence as a security threat. In terms of their activities, members of the CDL often used populist and greatly simplified statements; deliberately spreading both incomplete and misinterpreted information and, in some cases, there were records of elements of activities bordering with criminal offences – e. g. forms of the so-

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
This gathering was a follow-up to a similar event, which took place in Ostrava on 16th February. The organisation of the Carlsbad event was provided by representatives of German nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations Der Dritte Weg and Freies Netz Süd. The event was moved from its traditional setting in Dresden to the Czech Republic, particularly due to annual large-scale demonstrations and blockages of its opponents.

called cyberbullying, intimidation, incitement, etc. In addition to members of the Muslim community, the attention of the CDL was also focused on individuals supporting the idea of the so-called multicultural society, or individuals who criticised the CDL. The CDL made active efforts to find out information about their ideological opponents.

The internet continues to play a dominant role in the promotion and communication regarding the area of right-wing extremism.

### 3.4.2. Activities of the scene

In 2014, there were 133 events, which were directly organised, or attended by, supporters of the extreme right; often with their active participation. Out of the given number, about 49 events were public gatherings, 8 were concerts of the so-called **White Power Music** („WPM“) and 76 events were other concerts, meetings, discussions and partly public or



private<sup>10</sup> events. In an annual comparison, there is a significant decrease in public gatherings - from 68 to 49, and an annual change in the amount of WPM concerts. The above-mentioned decrease of concerts from 36 in 2013 to 8 in 2014 may be partly explained by the developments on the music scene, which has long abandoned an organisation of secret and obvious neo-Nazi concerts. „Commercial“ concerts are in the category of other events with the total of 33 music productions.

In the monitored period, there were records of **49 public events such as gatherings and demonstrations**. In comparison with 2013, it represents a significant decrease caused mainly by the absence of a series of protest demonstrations. In addition, there were two elections in 2013; most of the public gatherings were, more or less, organised as political meetings. Given the relatively low average attendance (around 30 individuals), it is possible to state that the extreme right is unable to convene and mobilise its supporters on public gatherings and demonstrations. Practically none of the public events organised by the right-

<sup>10</sup>

An event is announced publicly or on the website, however, the access of public is either limited or excluded.

wing extremists proceeded without protest gatherings of their opponents; although, the amount of protesting opponents was often marginal.

During the year, there were records of some form of an organisation of 8 White Power Music concerts, with 5 concerts eventually taking place. Apart from these, there were 33 concerts of apolitical or commercial bands; these concerts were, however, mainly intended for right-wing extremists. In addition, 43 meetings, lectures, discussions, workshops and other events took place.

WPM concerts organised in the territory of the Czech Republic were generally private musical productions for a very limited amount of people. These concerts were held in secrecy; eventually, a conspiratory venue was published. For example, one of the concerts was announced in „central Germany“, however, in reality took place in Usti nad Labem.<sup>11</sup> Some bands renewed their repertoire and lyrics of their songs and focused rather on a commercial performance. The audience was still mostly made of right-wing extremists; however, bands performed in music clubs and commercial venues. The usual attendance was between 100 and 150 visitors. The course of the concerts was adjusted according to the presence of the police in a close proximity of the venue. Opponents of right-wing extremists often made efforts to disrupt concerts in cases the venue was known; for example, they contacted the owner or manager of the facility and tried to discourage them from letting their venue.

The main attraction for the domestic scene, however, continued to be concerts abroad, particularly in Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Italy. In 2014, there were also records of participation at concerts in France and the UK. In the case of some concerts, domestic activists engaged in the organisation of the events directly.

The decrease in the number of demonstrations was also linked to the decrease in the criminal activity with extremist overtones. **Extremist criminal activity further moved to the internet environment, which served as the main communication and mobilisation agent. Virtual networks** played a key role during the organisation of demonstrations and other events. Activists used **foreign domains and specific instruments** in order to enhance anonymity and lower the risk of detection by security forces. There were several records of **hacker attacks or identity thefts**, the so-called cyberbullying via social networks, which were, in most cases, linked to the activist xenophobic, racist and Islamophobic group **White Media**.

### **3.5. Left-wing extremism**

#### **3.5.1. Structure and entities of the scene**

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From the point of view of some German right-wing extremists, it is possible to understand Usti nad Labem as a city belonging to central Germany.

**In terms of the left-wing scene, there was an evident division to partial ideological streams. The most numerous was the anarchist scene.** Among individual groups, apart from the Marxist-Leninist organisations, there were personal ties allowing their coordination.

With the gradual radicalisation of a part of the scene, a division to **moderate and radical groups and individuals** occurred. Radical groups demand the route of confrontation with the state and other institutions instead of engaging in a dialogue.

The left-wing extremist scene was **mostly active in Prague, Usti nad Labem, South Moravian, Zlin and Olomouc regions.**

**The Anti-authoritarian scene recorded a partial mobilisation in 2014.** In addition to the traditional fight against the right-wing extremists, a part of the militant anarchoautonomous individuals concentrated on **direct actions** against the system and the state repression. **The squatter movement also intensified its activity.** The anti-authoritarians, however, fought with long-term issues. Despite the partial mobilisation there was no significant individual, who would unite the scene.

**Local cells, collectives and individuals remained** the fundamental elements in activities and functioning of the scene. One of the mobilisation tools were **campaigns**, which were announced via internet websites. Coordination of activities, planning and preparations of events took place via the so-called coordination meetings. A significant role was also played by the so-called **autonomous cultural and information centres**, which provided background for these activities.

A real danger for the democratic establishment of the Czech Republic, however, remained minimal. The highest risk resulting from activities of left-wing extremists in 2014 were **direct actions**, which were under the auspices of the **Network of Revolutionary Cells** ("NRC"). The network claimed five confirmed and one unconfirmed attack in the period from January to August 2014. It did so via communications that were published on several left-wing extremist internet websites.

Attack targets were usually material targets with the aim to **cause a material damage.** There were no direct actions against physical individuals.

**Three arson attacks were directed against vehicles of the PCR.** During the first and second attack, from Litvinov on 19th January and Prague in 13th February, the ignition of Molotov cocktails was avoided and, therefore, no damage to property was caused. The attack in Usti nad Labem on 30th August caused ignition of a vehicle of the PCR and a damage of about 500 000 CZK.

Also, next two attacks **directed against CCTV systems** were conducted via arson attacks. NRC activists caused an ignition of toll gate in the Kromeriz region with a damage of

about 3 500 000 CZK on 8th May. On 24th May, they also carried out an attack on a company that sells CCTV systems, during which they burnt the entrance door to its shop and caused a damage of about 50 000 CZK.

An unconfirmed direct action, which was claimed by the NRC, presumably took place in Prague on 1<sup>st</sup> May; there was supposed to be a sabotage of a development of a residential house via damage to the facade of the building. There was no other evidence apart from the published communication.

In the published **communication**, the attackers highlighted the **revolutionary removal of capitalism** via destructive methods, **expressed solidarity** with the similarly thinking individuals in the Czech Republic and abroad (for example, with squatters or anarchist prisoners in Greece, Belarus and Italy). They also criticised the moderate part of the anarchoautonomous spectrum for their organisation of public events, which were due to their duly announcement predictable and lacked a subversive character. They also appealed to other radically thinking antiauthoritarians to fight against the system via unannounced events and caused damage to perceived enemies.

Supporters of the anarcho-autonomous spectrum were divided in their attitude towards the NRC's events. The moderate anti-authoritarians further preferred a possibility of an autonomous way of life inside the current democratic establishment of the Czech Republic. **A part of the militantly minded supporters, on the other hand, supported and agreed with the NRC's activities** against the system.

**The continuing mobilisation was also possible to record among the squatting supporters**, when attempts of the occupation of empty buildings took place. The police intervened against squatters, for example, in Neklanova street on 7<sup>th</sup> February or Halkova street on 7<sup>th</sup> June (both in Prague). These were mostly short occupations of buildings with the aim to point out at real estate speculations and at the issue of dilapidation of unused buildings, and on the other hand, to point out at thousands of homeless people.

Supporters of squatting also organised protests on support of individuals arrested during the occupation actions. About 40 individuals protested in front of the court for Prague 2 against the arrest of squatters in Neklanova street on 10<sup>th</sup> February.

Various **happenings to honour significant squatts** were not an exception (both existing or perished). The initiative Occupy and live, for example, organised a series of events on the occasion of the second anniversary of a renewal of the squatt Cibulka in Prague during 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> April and an event on commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the violent clearance of vila Milada on 29<sup>th</sup> June.

At the end of 2014, the **anarcho-autonomous individuals supported the efforts of the initiative Klinika** to establish the autonomous centre in the building of a former health centre in Jeseniova street in Prague. They participated on a demonstration in Prague on 13th

December as a support of the Klinik's activists expelled from the premises by the PCR. On 14th December, there was an **arson attack on a vehicle of the PCR**, which was claimed by the Anarchist Solidarity Action as **a reaction to the clearance of the building**. Activists from the initiative Klinika distanced themselves from this act.

A profiling theme for the supporters of the anarcho-autonomous spectrum remained the **fight against right-wing extremists**. Despite the evident decrease in events of their ideological opponents, the anti-authoritarians made efforts to **organise their own blockades** through which they wanted to gain supporters from the public and mobilise their power, or efforts to **participate on protest gatherings of various human rights activists**.

About 50 individuals protested against the event "Light for Dresden" **in Carlsbad** on 15<sup>th</sup> February without any efforts to disrupt the public order. About 150 opponents including several representatives of the anarcho-autonomous scene attended an event against the march of right-wing extremists; the protest was organised by local residents and a human-rights group in Pilsen on 1<sup>st</sup> March.

Between 200 and 300 individuals, among whom there were also antifascists from the Czech Republic and Germany as well as local residents and human-rights initiatives and local Roma, protested against the 1<sup>st</sup> May celebrations of the WPSJ and the WY in **Usti nad Labem**. Three opponents from the supporters of the anarcho-autonomous scene were arrested by the police for an attack on members of the anti-conflict team.

There were two anti-Roma demonstrations in **Decin** on 13th and 23rd August, which were organised as a result of the attack on a local resident by a group of Roma. It was protested against by several local residents including the representatives of the antiauthoritarian scene.

Anarcho-autonomous supporters also organised an event against their ideological opponents in **Teplice** on 27<sup>th</sup> September, where an anti-Islamic gathering of the WPSJ were taking place. The event of opponents was attended by about 50 to 100 people and the PCR had to intervene as regards intrusions to the demonstration. Several individuals were arrested.

Left-wing activists organised a protest against the gathering of the WPSJ and WY in **Brno** on 17<sup>th</sup> November. In addition to the representatives of the anarcho-autonomous scene, it was attended by several hundreds of students and local residents.

Representatives of the moderate part of the antiauthoritarian spectrum organised a range of events in 2014, which were, however, directed more towards the inside of the movement. Rather than mass demonstrations, they organised various **concerts, lectures, discussions, fundraising and memorial events, happenings with cultural and educational overtones or film productions**. Most of these events were smaller, had a rather regional character and were carried out with a small interest of the public and the media.

The **anarchist literature festival** took place during 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> April during which several presentations and lectures took place. There were also presentations of several extreme left groups such as the **Antifascist Action** ("AFA"), the **Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation** ("CSAF")<sup>12</sup> or **Alerta**.

The anarcho-autonomists traditionally used **1<sup>st</sup> May** to their promotion. First, several sympathizers met on the Strelecky island in Prague. Later on, the "Black-red 1<sup>st</sup> May" with a motto "Better world is possible" took place and was attended by about 150 to 180 individuals. These events took place in peace and without any disturbances to public order. The main reason was the fact that the right-wing extremists organised their 1<sup>st</sup> May gathering in Usti nad Labem and, therefore, the anarcho-autonomists could not convene their event as confrontational.

Without any disturbance to public order also took place the event **Veggie Parade** on the Wenceslas' Square in Prague with the subsequent march to Stromovka on 21<sup>st</sup> June. It was attended by about 400 – 500 people including supporters of the anarcho-autonomous scene. Its aim was to introduce the attendants with an ethical relationship towards animals.

Several extreme right entities (among others the CSAF and AFA) engaged in the **international week of anarchist prisoners**, which took place during 23rd and 30th August 2014. Its aim was to express solidarity to the imprisoned counterparts via writing letters, pasting of posters or hanging of various banners for their support. It also included a direct attack on a vehicle of the PCR in Usti nad Labem on 30th August, which was claimed by the NRC.

Supporters of the anarcho-autonomous scene also contributed to the organisation of a **street festival called "Do It Yourself"** with a motto "Recycle or die", which took place in Prague on 27th September. Five people were arrested by the police during the march; it was attended by several thousands of people.

Anti-authoritarians organised a promotional event with the title "**Protest against social unrighteousness**" on the Republic square in Prague on 17th November. They wanted to point out at the negative development in the Czech Republic post-1989. The total attendance was about 150 people. The protest did not have a violent character and there were no significant disturbances to the public order.

A range of groups, collectives and initiatives, which were often personally interconnected and operated mostly at a regional level, were active within the anarcho-autonomous scene in 2014.

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The CSAF officially changed its name to Anarchist Federation (AFED) in January 2015.

New groups such as the **Most Solidarity Network** or **Solis Prague** also promoted their existence. The given entities engaged in the support of employees against their employers or directed their campaigns against the activity of institutions of the public administration. The aim of organised events was mainly the escalation of pressure against particular entities. As regards their activities, both platforms were inspired abroad.

**Ecological extremist entities the Animal Liberation Front and Animal Rights Militia** were also active and claimed several direct actions. Twice, their target was a mink farm in Dolni Cerekev. First, activists released the breeding minks on 9<sup>th</sup> June, which later died. They also damaged the equipment and machines inside the farm on 19<sup>th</sup> June. Breaking and entering to the venue of a company involved in breeding minks in Velky Ratmirov took place on the same day; the equipment of the company was damaged.

**The Marxist-Leninist part of the extreme left spectrum was considerably fragmented in 2014. Personal disputes and ideological differences** of many supporters continued to cause issues. The scene stagnated and was divided to many marginal groups with a very weak members base. Due to its small mobilisation potential and a marginal number of its own events, it did not manage reach a greater amount of new supporters.

The **activity** of Marxist-Leninist supporters was **evident particularly on the internet**, where they published a relatively large amount of articles. In some, they **rejected the democratic establishment in the Czech Republic or adored the pre-November regime** in the former Czechoslovakia in the period of 1948 – 1989. To a greater extent, they **reflected on the events abroad**, mostly in Ukraine, whose representatives they criticised and supported pro-Russian separatists in the east of Ukraine as well as the actions of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, despite the considerable opinion radicality, representatives of the Marxist-Leninist groups did not represent a direct threat to the democratic system of the Czech Republic in 2014.

The youth communist movement was further represented by the **Communist Youth Union** ("CYU") and the **Union of Young Communists of Czechoslovakia** ("UYCC"). Personal disagreements between them continued. The CYU was more active in 2014. This considered both the national and international coverage.

The criticism **of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia** ("CPBM"), particularly its current leadership and liberal direction, was common for both unions.

**The CPBM was, nevertheless, a party, whose events were mostly used by the Marxist-Leninist entities for their own promotion.** The organisation of gatherings, demonstrations or memorial events of young communists was not so frequent. They mainly attended **memorial meetings or commemoration gatherings of the CPBM**, which were organised on the occasion of various anniversaries that are linked to communism. They attended, for example, a meeting on commemoration of the "Victorious February" anniversary at the Olsany Cemetery in Prague on 24th February or a gathering on the occasion of the International Women's Day by a statue of Jozka Jaburkova at the Olsany Cemetery on 6th

March. Their presence was also recorded during the traditional 1st May gathering in the Prague Exhibition Hall on 1st May, the 24th "Friendly gathering of Bohemians, Moravians and Slovaks on the land border" in Lazek u Cokytle on 2nd August, the "International gathering of citizens" in Horni Mala Upa on 30th August, the "24th gathering of left-minded citizens" by the Kunetice Mountain near Pardubice on 6th September, and the "Celebration of Halo newspapers" in the Prague Exhibition Hall on 20th September.

To a lesser extent, **young communists also participated in events of the Club of Czech borderland and the Company of the Cuban-Czech Friendship**. They, for example, participated in the memorial gathering on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the victory of the Cuban revolution" in Prague or in the "demonstration for the release of five Cuban national heroes" in front of the US Embassy in Prague on 12th September.


Participation of the UYCB and the CYU was also evident at **gatherings on support of separatists in the east of Ukraine or at anti-Ukraine demonstrations**. Several of them also engaged in events directed against the conflict in the Middle East, during which they criticised Israeli actions.

**The Trotskyist part of the Marxist-Leninist scene was mostly represented** by the Left Perspective ("LP") and the Socialist Solidarity ("SocSol") in 2014. Supporters of the LP and SocSol attended several gatherings directed against demonstrations of the right-wing extremists, or anti-Israeli oriented demonstrations as well as several CPBM events. Together, these groups with the support of others, organised a traditional camp in Hermanice v Podjestedi from 31<sup>st</sup> July to 3<sup>rd</sup> August.

Its members often criticised the official representatives of Ukraine on the internet and, on the other hand, praised the separatists in the east of Ukraine. They also expressed support for squatters.

### **3.5.2. Activities of the scene**

There was a total of **158 events** in the field of the extreme left in 2014, which represents a slight increase in comparison with 2013 (140 events). From the given number, there were **62 public gatherings, 40 concerts and 56 other events**. With the exception of the latter category, it shows a slight increase.



In 2014, the organisation or participation on **protest gatherings against the RWE** were significant. In comparison with the RWE, the extreme left managed to organise public gatherings with a relatively greater attendance. A mobilisation topic was also the **criticism of the Israeli** cause of action against the Palestinians or the **support of the squatters' scene**. Not all the attendants of these gatherings were left-wing extremists.

One of the main mobilisation tools of the left-wing extremist scene were campaigns **and linked promotional events**. From a long-term perspective, these were, for example, musical productions within the campaign **Good Night White Pride (GNWP)** defining itself against RWE, campaign Food not Bombs (FNB) or the so-called solidarity campaigns supporting various platforms such as the Anarchist Black Cross<sup>13</sup>. Concerts serve not only as a **source of financial means** but also as a **possible tool for radicalization** through lyrics of songs, distributed products, etc. In addition, it is possible to mention **campaigns against the elections** both municipal and to the European Parliament. Billboards of candidates and political parties were relabelled, or various posters and banners against the elections were hanged. A part of the domestic scene also joined international campaigns, i. e. against NATO and armed forces in general.

**A part of the anarchist scene has radicalised.** It is evident from a **series of arson attacks** directed against both the state institutions, particularly the police, and private entities and attacks against the so-called fur farms. This criminal activity bears a significant sign of **inspiration from abroad**, particularly by organisations such as the Informal Anarchist Federation or the Conspiracy of Fire Cells. Attacks on particular individuals cannot be excluded in the future.

An important role regarding direct actions is played by the **internet**. In terms of the radical and militant scene, some internet websites are used as a tool for sharing statements on attacks, communications, in which the message of the attack is included and it functions as a source for inspiration for the possible followers.

<sup>13</sup> The Anarchist Black Cross (ABC) is a platform for the support of imprisoned anarchists. Members of Italian and Greek militant organisations are also supported.

Within the internet, there was a wide use of trolling at the discussion forums, chats or blogs of the right-wing extremists, particularly with the aim to disrupt their conveying on public gatherings. There was an evident effort to encrypt communication or to prefer personal meetings as regards the radical and militant individuals.

### **3.6. *The right to association agenda***

From 1st January 2014, there has been a change in the Ministry's competencies in the area of the right to association. According to the new legislative regulation of the right to association included in the Civil Code and the Act No. 304/2013 Coll. On public registers of legal and natural persons, the agenda of existing civic associations and other legal entities established in order to exercise the right to association, excluding political parties and political movements, was transferred from the Ministry to competent courts. Records, kept by the Ministry until then, pursuant to the Act No. 83/1990 Coll. and 116/1985 Coll. on conditions for the activity of organisations with an international element in the CSSR as amended, are deemed as the association register kept by Registration courts since 1st January 2014. Political parties and political movements continue to be guided by the Act No. 424/1991 Coll. on the association in political parties and political movements as amended. Pursuant to § 268 of the Civil Code, the court has the right to intervene in the position of associations in relation to exerting illicit activities defined in § 145 of the Civil Code. In this relation, it is also possible to mention the Act No. 418/2011 Coll. on the criminal liability of legal persons as amended by the Act No. 105/2013 Coll.

The Ministry of the Interior did not receive any incentive regarding activities of political parties and political movements linked to extremism, racism and xenophobia in 2014.

### **3.7. *Statistics regarding criminal activity with extremist overtones***

#### **3.7.1. Introduction**

Police statistics are processed on the basis of the Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium („SRSC“). Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office, as well as the court statistics (processed by the Ministry of Justice), have a different horizon of reporting than the police statistics. The decisive element is not the timing when a crime was committed, but rather the time when a prosecutor prepared an indictment, decided to cease a prosecution, etc. The absence of an interconnectedness of these three statistics is a great handicap; however, it is not technically possible to solve this issue at the moment.

By 2009, police statistics were governed by the Act No. 36/1960 Coll. on the territorial division of the state as amended. Statistics were, therefore, formerly distinguished into 7 regions and the capital of Prague. Since 1st January 2010, the breakdown of statistics is identical to the higher territorial units; they, therefore, distinguish 14 regions. This change makes a year on year comparison of data in terms of regions before and after 2009 impossible.

Detailed statistics on perpetrators (according to other indicators, sex, age, etc.) are based on the so-called non-standard configurations. It means that it reflects all the proven criminal activity of a particular perpetrator. Regarding standard configurations, which are the basis for national and regional statistics of an extremist criminal activity, only the most serious offences are recorded. Between the two statistics discrepancies may, therefore, arise. The standard configuration reports 246 offenders and the non-standard configuration reports 252 offenders in 2011.

Within the statistics relevant to perpetrators by education pursuant to Act No. 561/2004 Coll., about pre-school, primary and secondary, high, tertiary professional and other (the Education Act) there is a compliance with a new terminology – alumni of primary and secondary schools with a vocational certificate are newly termed as alumni of high schools with a vocational certificate, and perpetrators with a high school education are newly known as perpetrators with a high school education completed with a graduation exam (see § 58 of Act No. 561/2004 Coll.).

In the past, statistics of crimes committed by the police officers were processed by the Inspectorate of the Police of the Czech Republic, which was later substituted by the General Inspectorate of Security Forces from 1st January 2012. Data is, therefore, provided by the General Inspectorate since 2011.

Within the non-standard statistical outcomes, the Police of the Czech Republic have been processing statistics related to detected criminal offences with anti-Semitic overtones since 2005<sup>14</sup>. Since 1st January 2005, classifications of extremist crime were extended in the Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium of the Czech Republic (ESSK) in terms of codes allowing identification of crimes motivated by religious and ethnic hatred against Jewish people and the Jewish fate, including assaults on buildings of Jewish Communities and their equipment, synagogues and Jewish cemeteries.

Criminal offences motivated by hatred against Roma have been provided in the reports since 2011. It is necessary to add an explanatory commentary to these statistics. There is no distinction between victims of crimes by ethnicity or nationality in police statistics. It is only possible to detect that the victim was a foreigner. On the other hand, criminal offences motivated by racial hatred or hatred against Bohemians, Moravians and Silesians, Polish, Germans, Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Hungarians, Russians and Ruthenians, Roma, Jewish, Arabs, Chinese, and other nationalities, are recorded in the Statistical Recording System of Crime. For a crime motivated by hatred against Roma to be recorded in the police statistics, following conditions must be met: 1) when filling a form about a relevant criminal offence, the police officer must evaluate the act as a crime with extremist overtones; 2) victims should clearly identify that they are Roma or that the crime targeted an object, which has clear ties to

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In the period prior the expansion of statistics, there was an increase in criminal offending with an anti-Semitic overtones all across Europe. The topic of anti-Semitism became a priority for both the European Union and for international organisations.


the Roma ethnicity (e.g. spraying of a racist inscription on a Roma holocaust memorial, or a museum of Roma culture, etc.). Crimes against Roma are not included in the statistics if it is not possible to prove that they had anti-Roma overtones (e.g. a car-theft when the perpetrator does not know ethnic origins of its owner). In addition, many Roma individuals do not avow their Roma ethnicity. Figures in such statistics are indicative and have limited predictive value.

### 3.7.2. National statistics

There was a total of 288 660 criminal offences committed in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2014. **Criminal offences with extremist overtones accounted for about 0, 07 % of the total amount. The Police of the Czech Republic detected 201 criminal offences with extremist overtones in 2014.** There was a decrease in the detected extremist acts in the cross-annual comparison by 10 (- 4, 7 %).

There were 66, 7 % of the criminal offences given above detected, i. e. 132 (it was 68,3% in 2013, i. e. 144). As regards these criminal offences, criminal proceedings were initiated in case of 157 individuals in 2014.

**Graph 1: Criminal activity with extremist overtones according to regions in 2014**



Source: PCR, 2015

**Table 1: Total amount of criminal offences with extremist overtones recorded in the CZ in the period of 2006 - 2014**


(based on the Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium of the CZ – ESSK)

Year	Crimes recorded	Contributing to	Crimes solved	Persons prosecuted
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		the total of crimes (%)		and investigated
2006	248	0,07	196	242
2007	196	0,05	119	181
2008	217	0,06	126	195
2009	265	0,08	186	293
2010	252	0,08	168	231
2011	238	0,08	157	246
2012	173	0,06	116	208
2013	211	0,06	144	198
2014	201	0,07	132	157

Source: PCR, 2015

**Graph 2: Proportion of individual types of crime on the overall detected crime in the CZ in 2014**



Source: PCR, 2015

### 3.7.3. Statistics according to regions

**Most criminal offences with extremist overtones were recorded in the capital of Prague** (40) and represent about 19, 9 % of the total amount of such crimes perpetrated in the territory of the Czech Republic. It is followed by the Moravian-Silesian region (34 - 18, 4 %), Usti nad Labem region (28 - 13, 9 %) and Central Bohemian region (20 - 10 %). On the other

hand, the lowest amount of such criminal offences was recorded in the Pardubice region (2 - 1, 0 %), the Highlands (3 - 1, 5 %), Carlsbad and Liberec regions (4 - 2, 0 %).

In the cross-annual comparison, the greatest change in the amount of detected criminal offences occurred in the Moravian-Silesian region (-11) followed by South Moravian region (-5) and the Pilsen and Pardubice regions with an identical decrease by 4 detected offences.

In some regions, on the other hand, there was an increase in detected extremist criminal offences. The most significant increase was recorded in the Usti nad Labem region with 8 more crimes than in the previous year. It was followed by the Carlsbad region (+6) and the capital of Prague (+5).

**Table 2: Criminal activity with extremist overtones according to regions in 2014**

Region	Detected crimes			Solved crimes		Detected perpetrators	
	abs.	z celku (v %)	annual difference (14-13)	abs.	from total (in %)	abs.	from total (in %)
<b>Prague</b>	40	19,9%	5	24	18,2%	30	19,1%
<b>Central Bohemian</b>	20	10,0%	2	11	8,3%	9	5,7%
<b>South Bohemian</b>	13	6,5%	-1	10	7,6%	9	5,7%
<b>Pilsen</b>	7	3,5%	-4	4	3,0%	4	2,5%
<b>Carlsbad</b>	4	2,0%	0	3	2,3%	3	1,9%
<b>Usti nad Labem</b>	28	13,9%	8	19	14,4%	26	16,6%
<b>Liberec</b>	4	2,0%	-2	2	1,5%	2	1,3%
<b>Hradec Kralove</b>	10	5,0%	6	9	6,8%	13	8,3%
<b>Pardubice</b>	2	1,0%	-4	1	0,8%	1	0,6%
<b>Highlands</b>	3	1,5%	-2	2	1,5%	2	1,3%
<b>South Moravian</b>	16	8,0%	-5	12	9,1%	16	10,2%
<b>Olomouc</b>	12	6,0%	-2	8	6,1%	9	5,7%
<b>Moravian-Silesian</b>	37	18,4%	-11	23	17,4%	27	17,2%
<b>Zlin</b>	5	2,5%	0	4	3,0%	6	3,8%
<b>CZ</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: PCR, 2015

### 3.7.4. Statistics by acts

- The biggest group of **criminal offences falls under § 403** (establishment, support and promotion of movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms), **§ 404** (expression of sympathy towards a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms), **§ 405** (denial, questioning, approval, justification of genocide) of the No. 40/2009 Coll. of the CC. These criminal offences represent 48, 8 % (100 criminal


offences) of the total amount of crimes with extremist overtones. There were 73 cases solved and 82 perpetrators prosecuted.

- **Criminal offences pursuant to § 355** (defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or another group of people) represent the second largest group. They contribute to the total amount by 13, 4 % (27 criminal offences). There were 20 cases solved and 27 individuals prosecuted in 2014.
- **Compared to 2013, there was a more significant representation of criminal offences pursuant to § 356** (incitement to ethnic and racial hatred) in 2014. There were 17 criminal offences detected (9 %) and 3 cases solved and 5 perpetrators detected.
- **Criminal offences pursuant to § 352** (violence against a group of residents and against an individual) represent 6 % (12 criminal offences) out of the total volume of extremist crime. There were 11 solved cases, which fall under § 352 and 12 prosecuted perpetrators.
- **Criminal offences pursuant to § 323, 4, 5, 6** (violence against a public official) represent 5 % (10 criminal offences) out of the total volume of extremist crimes with 8 cases solved and 8 perpetrators prosecuted.
- **Criminal offences pursuant to § 145 and § 146** (intentional bodily harm) contribute to the total amount of crimes by 3, 5 % (7 cases). Out of these, 4 criminal offences were solved and 7 perpetrators are prosecuted.
- There was also a lower representation of **criminal offences, § 228** (damage to property), **§ 228/2** (spraying) and **§ 329** (abuse of authority powers).
- There was **one case of murder** in the statistics from 2014 (**§ 140**)<sup>15</sup>.

### **Graph 3: Composition of detected extremist criminal offences according to paragraphs of the Criminal Code in 2014**

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<sup>15</sup> The incident from Bystrice pod Hostynem from 20th July gained a wide media coverage, when two attackers assaulted two men in a bar. One person was considered as being Roma, due to his darker skin colour. One of the victims suffered serious injuries. The investigation resulted in an indictment against M. V. (attempted murder and disorderly conduct) and M. U. (attempted grievous bodily harm and disorderly conduct). The case was not classified as a racially motivated criminal offence.



Source: PCR, 2015

**Table 3: Overview of extremist criminal offences in which attacks on a nation, nationality or race or an affiliation to them, or the proclamation of nationality or racial hatred took place – total figures in the period of 2007 – 2014 according to crime categories**

(based on the Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium of the CZ)


Year/§	196 para.2 /	198/ /	198a /	219 para.3g	221 para.2b/	222 para.2b/	235 para.2f/	257 para.2b/	260/ /	261/ /	261a/ /
	352	355	356	140 para.3g	146 para.2e	145 para.2f	175 para. 2f	228 para.3b	403	404	405
2007	18	28	13	1	7	4	0	2	47	63	2
2008	25	41	11	1	4	2	2	1	42	68	1
2009	23	25	16	1	2	2	1	6	92	72	4
2010	43	43	15	1	9	1	0	2	35	74	3
2011	40	33	15	0	17	0	0	7	21	70	6
2012	20	33	5	0	11	3	2	16	6	65	8
2013	19	37	13	0	19	0	0	3	9	63	8
2014	12	27	18	1	5	1	0	5	9	85	7

Source: PCR, 2015

### 3.7.5. Perpetrators

In terms of education, there were no significant changes related to the composition of perpetrators of criminal offences with extremist overtones compared to previous years. There was only a slight increase in the proportion of individuals with an apprentice certificate of the total amount of perpetrators. **The first place is represented by 62 individuals, i. e. 39, 5 %, who are graduates of primary and secondary schools with apprentice certificates** (66 individuals, i. e. 33, 5 %, in 2013). Second place belongs to graduates of primary and secondary schools without any certificate. This category is represented by 46 individuals, i. e. 29, 3 % (60 individuals in 2013, i. e. 30, 5 %). There are 27 individuals with high school education, i. e. 17, 2 % (37 individuals, 18, 8 %, in 2013)<sup>16</sup>. Total of 16 individuals (10, 2 %) belong to categories "foreigners", "children", and "education not determined".

**Graph 4: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the CZ in 2014 according to education**




Source: PCR, 2015

There was no significant change regarding perpetrators categorised by age groups. The most perpetrators still belong to the category of 21 – 29 years of age; however, there is a **constant decrease in their statistical proportion** in recent years. There is a total of 53 individuals and 33, 8 % out of the total amount (77 individuals in 2014, i. e. 39,1 %).

**Graph 5: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the CZ in 2014 according to age**

<sup>16</sup>


According to the Act No. 561/2004 Coll. about pre-school, primary and secondary, high, higher vocational and other education (Education Act) are, in accordance with the new terminology, graduates of secondary schools with an apprentice certificate newly "graduates of high schools with an apprentice certificate, and perpetrators with high school education newly perpetrators with a high school education with a leaving exam (see § 58 of the Act about pre-school, primary and secondary, high, higher vocational and other education).



Source: PCR, 2015

Similarly to previous years, the majority of perpetrators of criminal offences with extremist overtones are males. Compared to 2013 there was a decrease in female offenders to 8, 3 % (14,2 % in 2013). There was a decrease in the total amount of investigated males and females in comparison with the last year. There were 144 male perpetrators (169 in 2013) while there were 13 female offenders (28 in 2013).


**Graph 6: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the CZ in 2014 according to gender**



Source: PCR, 2015

As regards criminal history, there was a 50 % share of recidivists, i. e. 78 individuals (38 %, i. e. 75 individuals in 2013). Perpetrators who were already investigated in the past represent 9 %, i. e. 14 individuals (8 % in 2013) and the remaining 41% are perpetrators who do not exhibit any of the characteristics given above (53 % in 2013).


**Graph 7: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the CZ in 2014 according to criminal**



Source: PCR, 2015

As regards the **proportion of foreigners** on the recorded criminal activity with extremist overtones, there was a decrease from 6, 6 % to 5, 7 % in 2014. There were 9 foreigners detected, out of which 3 were Slovak citizens, 2 Ukrainians, 1 Vietnamese, 1 German, 1 Austrian and 1 Egyptian.

**Graph 8: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the CZ in 2014 according to nationality**



Source: PCR, 2015

**Table 4: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the CZ in 2014 according to employment**

Employment	male	female	Total
administration	2		2
metallurgical workers	1		1
construction workers	5		5
production workers	17	1	18
pensioners	1		1
pensioners - disabled	8		8
individuals from orphanages and youth homes	1		1
mechanics and assemblers, janitors, servicemen	9		9
unemployed/person registered at the Labour Office	19	4	23
persons without employment status	21		21
persons without employment data	7		7
persons on maternity leave		4	4
persons serving a prison sentence	1		1
other intellectual workers of non-production sector	1		1
other workers of non-production activities	2		2
education professionals		1	1
business, entrepreneurs, self-employed and other podnikatelé, živnostníci osoby SVČ a ostatní	16		16
municipal and housing economy workers	1		1
protection or security personnel	2		2
storage workers	1		1
catering and hotel staff	5	1	6
drivers of road vehicles	4		4
high school and vocational school students	5		5
technicians – infrastructure, post office, telecommunications	1		1
apprentices and persons preparing for manual professions	5		5
apprentices and persons preparing for service professions	2	1	3
university students	1		1
security and detective agency personnel	3		3
healthcare personnel	2		2
elementary school students	1	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>157</b>

Source: PCR, 2015

The table below represents types of termination of a phase in criminal proceedings defined by the police investigation of crimes with extremist overtones and their perpetrators.

**Table 5: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences according to types of termination and their criminal history in the Czech Republic in 2014**

Criminal history	Type of termination	male	female	Total
<b>Investigated in the past</b>		<b>14</b>		<b>14</b>
	Termination by proposal to indictment to public prosecutors pursuant to dle § 166/3, § 175a	6		6
	Termination by a proposal for an indictment to a public prosecutor pursuant to § 179c	5		5
	(empty)	3		3
<b>Recidivists</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>78</b>
	Suspended pursuant to § 172/1d(excluding amnesty),e,f,2a,b,c	1		1
	Conditional cessation of prosecution pursuant to §§ 307,309	1		1
	Termination by proposal to indictment to public prosecutors pursuant to § 166/3, § 175a	38		38
	Termination by a proposal for an indictment to a public prosecutor pursuant to § 179c	17	3	20
	In proceedings against youth offenders by a proposal to indictment to public prosecutors § 166/3 a § 175a	3		3
	Suspended pursuant to § 159a/2,3 – excluding amnesty	2		2
	(empty)	13		13
<b>Exhibits none of the given</b>		<b>55</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>65</b>
	Conditional cessation of prosecution pursuant to §§ 307,309	1	1	2
	Termination by a proposal to indictment to public prosecutors pursuant to § 166/3, § 175a	23	2	25
	Termination by a proposal for an indictment to a public prosecutor pursuant to § 179c	17	4	21
	Termination by a proposal for indictment to public prosecutors pursuant to § 179c	2	1	3
	Suspended pursuant to § 159a/2,3 – excluding amnesty	2		2
	(empty)	10	2	12

<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>157</b>
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Source: PCR, 2015

### 3.7.6. Criminal activity perpetrated by members of the security forces

In the area of extremism, the **General Inspectorate of Security Forces** ("GISF") investigated **2 cases** in 2014. As regards the first case, an investigation of the evidence of the alleged demonstrative attitude of one member of the Prison Services presented on a website of an interest group of citizens was initiated. This attitude was supposed to be related to a presentation of an opinion denying positive discrimination, highlighting the need to adapt to the majority society with regard to Roma citizens, and other statements linked to the so-called Roma question.

Whereas the investigations did not reveal any facts that would suggest that a member of the Prison Services committed a criminal offence or engaged in any other unlawful behaviour, the file case was stored for possible future reference. In the monitored period, an investigation of the case of a **member of the Police of the Czech Republic** was also initiated; the inducement, which was received by the GISF, contained information that this member participates in the activities of sympathizers of the right-wing extremist scene. These alleged activities and manifestations of racism are being investigated by the respective police authority GISF and are processed in terms of a monitored issue of extremism while the investigation is still ongoing. There were no other cases of illegal behaviour, respectively criminal activity, in the field of extremism in 2014, which would be detected by GISF.

In terms of balance in the previous years and the trend linked to the monitored issue in 2014, it is possible to clearly identify the **decline of investigated cases of extremist crimes** within the security forces. In absolute terms and parameters of the determination of objective facts not a single case fulfilled the conditions for an initiation of criminal proceedings in 2014. In comparison with 2013, where 4 cases were investigated, there was a decrease by half of recorded cases.

It is also necessary to mention that in comparison with 2013, none of these cases met the statutory requirements for initiating criminal proceedings pursuant to § 158 para. 3 of the CC. In the context of this comparison, it can be added that in 2013, criminal proceedings were initiated in one case regarding unlawful behaviour of a member of the police while racial overtones were not proved during the proceedings. The criminal case was completed by the GISF police authority by an indictment pursuant to § 166 para. 3 of the Criminal Code against five officers involved in a criminal offence of a "misuse of public official powers" pursuant to § 329 of the CC and a criminal offence of a "torture and other inhumane and cruel treatment pursuant to § 149 of the CC.

### 3.7.7. Criminal activity committed by members of the Army of the Czech Republic

The situation in the area of extremism was relatively stable in the defence resort during 2014 and the **Military Intelligence did not record any significant variations in the activity of extremist entities**. In the RWE field, there is a continuing effort of all the identified supporters to avoid manifestations within the defence resort that could demonstrate a direct link of these individuals to the promotion of extremist ideas and lead to a confrontation of extremists with the Czech law. Forms of **using a hidden symbolism** confirming the conspiratorial behaviour of individuals were detected and confirmed. In addition, a **shift in the activities** of right-wing extremists to stadiums, where manifestations of violence during football matches take place, was also confirmed. The RWE in the Army of the Czech Republic („ACR“) continues to be the domain of individuals which, nevertheless, does not lower risks arising from this phenomenon, particularly within the armed forces. In relation to the increasing nation-wide activity of the left wing extremist scene against the state administration and entities symbolizing the state authority in 2014, the **Military Intelligence recorded an interest of the LWE in the facilities of the defence resort**. The results of this phenomenon are currently marginal. In the future, however, it is not possible to rule out attacks against military targets, particularly in the context of events taking place within the society and their perception by the left-wing extremist scene. Extremism brings risks to the defence resort regardless of the current stagnation or increase in activities of individuals or groups. Infiltration of the army by new adherents of the RWE is directly proportional to the manifestations in society and recruitment activities of the MoD.

In 2014, **the Military Police recorded two cases of illegal behaviour with extremist overtones**. Both were linked to social network activities and were forwarded to the Police of the Czech Republic due to their subject jurisdiction for a reasonable suspicion that the perpetrators stand outside of the scope of the Military Police.

In the first case it was a reasonable suspicion of offences of the establishment, support and promotion of movements aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms, and approval of crime in concurrence with an offence of suppressing human rights and freedoms, which were allegedly committed by an individual acting on Facebook, who - in response to a suicide attack during which 4 soldiers of the ACR were killed - posted a comment between the 9th and 10th July, which stated: „We would like to express our support for Taliban. Go on guys. Next time you'll get more than just four!“. The Military Police initiated the criminal proceedings in this case. In the sense of an instruction of the supervising prosecutor, the case together with the file documentation was passed on to the materially and locally competent police authority of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service of the Czech Republic for further investigation.

As regards the second case, the Military Police has received a criminal complaint regarding an unknown individual about their possible illegal activity characterised as the so-called Facebook trolling. Since 14 July, this so far unknown individual keeps posting inappropriate texts, which target members of the ACR, who are serving in the international mission in Afghanistan and also inappropriate comments regarding the killing of these soldiers (so-called posthumous trolling). The Military Police initiated cooperation with the Cybercrime Department of the Bureau of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service of the Police Presidium of the Czech Republic in regard to this matter in order to determine the further procedure. Based on the obtained information, it was detected that the Police of the Czech Republic is in a possession of an identical criminal complaint and that they have

already initiated an investigation while using the same legal qualification as in the first case. The Military Police have terminated their own investigation based on this finding.

### 3.7.8. Court statistics

In 2014, courts in the Czech Republic sentenced a total of 72 584 individuals (77 976 in 2013, 71 471 in 2012, 70 160 in 2011, 69 953 in 2010, 73 752 in 2009, 75 751 in 2008, and 75 728 in 2007) which represents a decrease by 5 392 individuals, i. e. by 6, 91%, in comparison with 2013. From this amount, there were **52 individuals convicted of 52 criminal offences with racial overtones in 2014**. This figure represents only 0, 07 % from the total amount of convicted individuals during the given year.

In comparison with 2013, there is a record of the **decrease in the number of offenders convicted of crimes with racial overtones** (by 19 individuals, i. e. approximately 26,8%, while there were 71 individuals convicted for such offences in 2013; 83 in 2012; 111 in 2011; 96 in 2010; 103 in 2009; 97 in 2008 and 72 in 2007). From the given data, it is evident that the share of these offences on the total amount of convictions in the Czech Republic remains relatively low. In absolute numbers, it then oscillates between approximately 70 to 100 offenders in the period of previous 7 years.

In 2014, most offenders were convicted of the following offences:

Criminal Offence	Provision of Criminal Code (CC)	Number of persons	Total 2014
		2014, (CC 40/2009)	
Support and promotion of movements aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms	§§ 403, 404	42	42
Defamation of a nation, race, ethnicity and beliefs	§ 355, 356	8	8
Violence against a group of citizens or against an individual	§ 352	2	2
Disorderly conduct	§ 358	24	24
Bodily harm	§ 146	4	4
Attack on a public official	§ 325	1	1
Extortion	§ 175	0	0
„Dangerous threatening“	§ 353	2	2
Inciting hatred towards a group of people or restriction of their rights and freedoms	§ 356	1	1
Grievous bodily harm	§ 145	0	0
Theft	§ 205	2	2
Attack on a public official		0	0
Obstructing justice and expulsion		0	0
Endangerment under the influence of addictive substances	§ 274	1	1
Endangerment of youth education	0	0	0
Violations of property freedom	§ 178	0	0
Support and promotion of movements aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms	0	0	0

Damage to property	x	§ 228	7	7
Illegal possession of weaponry	x	§ 279	1	1
Unauthorised production and other handling of narcotic and psychotropic substances and poisons	x	§ 283	0	0
Threats to influence a public official	x	§ 326	1	1

In 2014, perpetrators of such delicts were **most often convicted of the support and promotion of movements aimed at suppressing an individual's rights to freedom** pursuant to § 403 and § 404 CC (42 individuals). These are followed by offences pursuant to § 358 CC – a **disorderly conduct** with racial overtones (a total of 24 individuals). Third most common delict is an **offence of a defamation of a nation, ethnic group, race and beliefs** pursuant to § 355 and § 356 of the CC (8 individuals).

**Seven individuals were sentenced to imprisonment for criminal offences with racial overtones**, given above. **Three** out of the total convicted individuals for crimes with racial overtones were **identified recidivists**. Three perpetrators were sentenced to imprisonment with a maximum custodial sentence of 1 year; other 5 perpetrators were sentenced to **imprisonment with a custodial sentence** ranging from 1 to 5 years. A **sentence of imprisonment, with a conditional suspension** of a sentence, was given to 36 **individuals**. In comparison with previous years, the numbers of the alternative community service sentence have decreased – there were 8 cases in 2014, 4 cases in 2013, 19 cases in 2012, 11 cases in 2011 and 16 cases in 2010. **Four youth offenders and two women** were convicted of this offence.

### 3.7.9. Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office

#### Statistical data

**Table No. 1: Overview of crimes committed from racial, national and other types of hatred during 1995 - 2014**

Crimes motivated by racial, ethnic and other similar hatred reasons	Total prosecuted person	Total charged persons
1995	508	461
1996	616	552
1997	569	495
1998	535	439
1999	580	510
2000	535	451
2001	529	369
2002	467 (+51 ZPRT)	435 (+50 ZPRT)

2003	325 (+44 ZPŘT)	286 (+44 ZPŘT)
2004	351 (+48 ZPŘT)	326 (+47 ZPŘT)
2005	294 (+46 ZPŘT)	264 (+45 ZPŘT)
2006	221 (+52 ZPŘT)	192 (+51 ZPŘT)
2007	204 (+36 ZPŘT)	197 (+36 ZPŘT)
2008	200 (+41 ZPŘT)	185 (+40 ZPŘT)
2009	194 (+34 ZPŘT)	183 (+32 ZPŘT)
2010	225 (+63 ZPŘT)	213 (+58 ZPŘT)
2011	218 (+66 ZPŘT)	209 (+59 ZPŘT)
2012	224 (+65 ZPŘT)	213 (+61 ZPŘT)
2013	120 (+81 ZPŘT)	115 (+77 ZPŘT)
2014	139 (+45 ZPŘT)*	129 (+43 ZPŘT)*

\* These are preliminary data

The proportion of all crimes, which were committed on the basis of racial, ethnic or other types of hatred, on the total volume of crime in 2014 was relatively minimal. Similarly to previous years, it has not reached even 1%. Nevertheless, it is evident that the total amount of prosecuted and charged individuals has slightly increased in comparison with the previous year.

**Table No. 2: Data on the amount of prosecuted or charged individuals with regard to offences committed from racial, national and other types of hatred during 1995 – 2014**

CZ	§ 196/2 old CC § 352/2 CC		§ 196/3 old CC § 352/3 CC		§ 198 old CC § 355 CC		§ 198a old CC § 356 CC		§ 219/2g old CC § 140/3g CC		§ 221/2b old CC § 146/2e CC	
	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged
	1995	177	162	18	17	112	108	28	22	0	0	13
1996	210	179	18	17	74	66	30	29	1	1	90	82
1997	150	119	29	19	107	103	25	20	0	0	56	55
1998	126	111	3	0	124	90	7	6	3	2	40	36
1999	139	123	24	24	103	91	12	11	2	2	42	42
2000	98	84	24	24	150	129	19	14	0	0	22	13
2001	95	92	0	0	127	118	19	16	0	0	28	27
2002	85	81	3	3	105	98	4	3	2	2	21	20
2003	64	56	0	0	81	77	8	7	0	0	28	27
2004	67	63	8	8	105	101	5	5	1	0	21	21
2005	74	67	0	0	85	78	3	2	3	3	14	14
2006	48	45	0	0	58	50	3	1	0	0	11	11
2007	33	31	0	0	37	35	24	24	0	0	24	24

2008	31	30	0	0	36	35	7	7	1	1	5	5
2009	33	32	6	6	19	19	7	4	0	0	19	19
2010	46	44	40	37	39	38	6	4	0	0	7	7
2011	41	39	38	37	35	35	5	5	1	1	17	16
2012	41	40	29	28	34	31	8	7	0	0	23	22
2013	15	15	5	5	27	25	2	2	0	0	21	21
2014	13	12	3	3	23	18	6	6	2	2	8	8
CZ	§ 222/2b old CC § 145/2f CC		§ 235/2f old CC § 175/2f CC		§ 257/2b old CC § 228/3b CC		§ 260 old CC § 403 CC		§ 261 old CC § 404 CC		§ 261a old CC § 405 CC	
	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged	prosecuted	charged
1995	23	23	0	0	6	5	13	11	118	101	0	0
1996	42	41	1	1	27	25	30	27	93	84	0	0
1997	45	43	5	5	18	15	29	18	105	98	0	0
1998	28	28	6	6	16	16	27	15	155	129	0	0
1999	30	28	1	0	16	16	52	37	159	136	0	0
2000	12	12	0	0	7	6	79	67	124	102	0	0
2001	6	6	3	3	2	2	51	41	198	164	1	0
2002	24	24	2	2	3	3	75	67	143	132	1	1
2003	13	13	0	0	6	4	28	17	96	84	1	1
2004	9	5	4	4	1	1	31	25	96	90	3	3
2005	7	7	0	0	2	2	23	18	72	65	1	1
2006	3	3	0	0	2	2	16	11	78	69	2	0
2007	3	3	0	0	5	5	14	12	63	62	1	1
2008	9	9	0	0	2	2	29	29	72	61	8	6
2009	21	21	0	0	1	1	25	24	66	60	4	4
2010	1	1	1	0	1	1	39	38	42	40	2	2
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15	62	57	4	4
2012	2	2	2	2	1	0	27	27	52	49	5	5
2013	3	3	0	0	1	1	18	18	27	24	1	1
2014	3	3	1	1	3	3	15	15	57	53	5	5

There were 139 individuals prosecuted and 129 individuals charged in 2014. These figures represent a slight increase in both categories compared to the previous year with a record of the most significant decrease in both prosecuted and charged individuals in the monitored period, i.e. by almost a half. Nevertheless, the total amount of prosecuted and charged individuals still does not reach the level registered before given breakthrough point.

Such a positive statistical shift is mainly caused by the decrease in the amount of offences regarding manifestations of sympathy for a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms pursuant to § 404 of the Criminal Code. Compared with the previous

year, it shows an increase by 30 prosecuted and 29 charged individuals. Once again it becomes the most represented criminal offence; the second place belongs to a defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other groups of people pursuant to § 355 of the Criminal Code. Numbers of prosecuted and charged individuals are even higher than in 2012. The most striking rise may be seen in relation to the offence of a denial, questioning, approval and justification of genocide pursuant to § 405 of the Criminal Code (1 prosecuted/charged individual in 2013; 5 prosecuted/charged individuals in 2014); however, the amount is relatively marginal as regards the total volume of extremist crimes.

In comparison with the previous year, there is also a record of a **decrease in the amount of prosecuted and charged individuals**; namely in terms of 5 categories of the merits of the case: violence against a group of residents and against an individual pursuant to § 352 para. 2 of the Criminal Code, violence against a group of residents and against an individual pursuant to § 352 para. 3 of the Criminal Code, defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other groups of people pursuant to § 355 of the Criminal Code, establishment, support and promotion of a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms pursuant to § 403 of the Criminal Code and bodily harm pursuant to § 146 para. 2 point. e) of the Criminal Code. The decrease is not very significant, apart from the last case with 38 % of prosecuted and charged individuals in the previous year. Nevertheless, none of the criminal offences perpetrated out of racial, national or other hatred motivations had a zero value.

In 2014, **criminal offences motivated by racial, national or other types of hatred have been dealt with in a simpler form of proceedings**, which is represented by a shortened preliminary proceedings; however, in a much lower amount. In 2014, motion to punish was submitted in cases of 43 individuals, which represents the highest figure ever for the entire twelve-year period since the establishment of this institute in the Criminal Code. The total amount of individuals settled in terms of the shortened preliminary proceedings for any of the criminal offences perpetrated out of racial, national or other hatred motivations, was 45.

### **Analytical data**

In contrast to 2013, there were virtually no anti-Roma marches and demonstrations, respectively, the amount of these events, were marginal in comparison with 2013. Most common information given in terms of art. 1 para. 1 point a) of the general instruction of the Supreme Public Prosecutor No. 10/2011 were cases of the so-called **hailing, presentation of „improper” symbols on clothing or their spraying on buildings, respectively public presentation of such tattoos, anti-Roma statements published on the Internet, racially motivated insults** (among which also statements of some Roma individuals addressed to members of the so-called majority society could be found – statements such as „white swine“, etc.). **Physically motivated racial assaults were mainly directed against Roma, fortunately, without any serious consequences.** There were also records of hate speeches; respectively, calls for violence on the Internet, often on social networks, which do not only target Roma, but also Muslims and rarely also old people – pensioners and homeless individuals.

As regards individual selected cases:

## „Statements of M. S.“

Criminal proceedings were initiated by the record of the police authority pursuant to § 403 para. 3 of the CC for a suspicion of criminal acts linked to the establishment, support and promotion of movements aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms pursuant to § 403 of the CC, manifestation of sympathies towards a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms pursuant to § 404 of the CC, and denial, approval and justification of genocide pursuant to § 405 of the CC, which was supposed to commit M. S. In the Hyde Park TV show by stating that Milada Horakova confessed to her activity and M. S. had doubts that the confession was enforced and that the numbers of victims of the communist regime are greatly exaggerated.

For reasons of doubts regarding the initiation of criminal proceedings, a department of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office initiated an incentive to exercise supervision, in which it was stated that it is not clear how the suspect could possibly establish, support or promote movement provably aiming at suppressing human rights and freedoms or expresses racial, ethnic, national, religious or class hatred or hatred against other group of individuals pursuant to § 403 of the CC or publicly express sympathies towards such a movement pursuant to § 404 by her statements. From the description of the facts of the case, there is no implication that the suspect established, supported or promoted such movements or that she publicly expressed her sympathies by her statements. In relation to § 403, the provision of § 404 is subsidiary and, therefore, the joinder of these criminal offences shall be excluded. To the possible qualification of the described behaviour as a criminal offence of denial, questioning, approval and justification of genocide pursuant to § 405, it is necessary to mention the following:

The statement of M. S. is possible to divide into three parts by the way given above. The statement given under point 3, that a number of the regime's victims was lower than it is reported, is so general and vague and therefore it is not possible to deduce that it would bring the crimes against humanity of communists into question. The statement given under point 1, that Milada Horakova confessed to her behaviour, can be problematic in the relation to the statement under point 2, that the accused had doubts that the confession was enforced. As a historical fact, the process with Milada Horakova was staged, she was forced to confess and her execution was a murder. First, it is necessary to evaluate, whether this judicial murder was the only communist crime against humanity pursuant to § 405 of the CC (since it is evident that it was not a communist genocide). Crimes against humanity are defined by the international criminal law and include, for example, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed on civil citizens or persecution for political, racial or religious reasons, when it is committed as a part of any crime against peace or war crimes or in relation to them (comparison in Samal, P. and coll. Criminal Code, Commentary, II., Prague: 2012 p. 3508). In this case, it should be carefully considered whether the murder of Milada Horakova falls into this category of crime against humanity pursuant to § 405 of the CC. In the professional literature, there are doubts about the facts, whether the crimes, which were committed in Czechoslovakia during the 1950s, meet the definition of genocide, respectively crimes against humanity and, for example, Jiri Herczeg excludes the possibility

of criminal sanctions for statements denying crimes by the communist regime in Czechoslovakia (comparison in Herczeg, J., Crimes from hatred, Prague: 2007, pp. 122 -123).

Even if the law enforcement authorities based on a thorough analysis found that the murder of Milada Horakova is possible to categorise as a crime against humanity by the communist regime pursuant to § 405 of the CC, the question remains, whether the statements of doubts that Milada Horakova was forced to confess, deny, doubt, approve or attempt to justify this crime.

By the resolution of the police authority, the case was postponed pursuant to § 159a para. 1 of the CC with regard to the conclusions of the constitutional expert opinion of the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, according to which there are no movements that can be categorised as left-wing extremist aiming at suppressing of human rights and freedoms operating in the Czech Republic. Based on this expert conclusion, the police authority deduced that for the non-existence of such movement pursuant to § 403 or § 404 shall be excluded. To a possible qualification pursuant to § 405 of the CC, the police authority states that the judicial murders and political processes cannot be considered as genocides or crimes against humanity as defined in relevant international treaties, and their questioning is, therefore, not illegal.

#### **„Stop to Czechs“**

By the resolution of the police authority, a suspicion of the criminal offence of a defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other groups pursuant to § 159a para. 1 of the CC, which was supposed to be committed by K. G. via establishment of a website [www.stopcechum.cz](http://www.stopcechum.cz) was postponed. On the website, he also states that the Czech people are not able to live regular lives, a criminal activity is innate for them and it is not possible to change them, etc. The police authority reached a conclusion, that the aim of these articles was not the defamation of any particular group, but the author used hatred articles on ethnic groups published by other persons and inserted the term "Czech", while the meaning of his activity was, however, anti-racist.

#### **„Promotion of Salafism“**

In the case of V. S., the criminal proceedings were originally initiated by the resolution of the police authority, however, this has been cancelled by the resolution of the public prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor's Office for Prague 1 based on the complaint of the accused; the public prosecutor via the same resolution initiated criminal proceedings for the criminal offence of the establishment, support and promotion of a movement aiming at suppressing human rights and freedoms pursuant to § 403 para. 1, 2 point a) of the CC, which was supposed to be perpetrated by the accused via arranging for translation, publishing and distribution of the book of A. A. B. Philips The Basis of Tauhid, the Islamic concept of God, which promotes the Salafi direction of Islam expressing intolerance and hatred toward other religions.

Even though the case is clear as regards its facts (that the accused participated in the edition of the book), it will be necessary to evaluate the results of the expert evidence, particularly regarding the fact whether the book promotes Salafi direction of Islam and whether this direction may be considered as a movement pursuant to § 403 of the CC. In case the findings are positive, it is necessary to identify, which ideas included in the book aim at suppressing of human rights and freedoms or express racial, religious (or other) hatred. In the resolution on the initiation of criminal proceedings, there are no citations from the published book, which would demonstrate the appropriateness of the chosen legal qualification.

From the previous cases, which were investigated in 2014, it is possible to mention, for example:

#### **„Organisation of training camps“**

The investigation of the case is still ongoing; in addition to the already used qualification of an illegal possession of firearms pursuant to § 279 of the CC, a qualification pursuant to § 403 of the CC may be in question as regards one of the prosecuted persons, while waiting for the results of the expert evidence.

#### **„Edition of the speeches of Adolph Hitler“**

By the judgment of the Municipal Court in Brno were P. K., L. N., S. B. and the company G. Ltd., pursuant to § 226 letter b) of the CC, acquitted for the crime of the establishment, support and promotion of a movement aimed at suppressing of human rights and freedoms pursuant to § 403 para. 1, 2 letter a) of the CC and the offence of a denial, questioning, approval and justification of genocide pursuant to § 405 of the CC, which were supposed to be committed by the participation on publishing the book Adolph Hitler: Speeches in the publishing company G. Ltd., which was complemented by commentary approving opinions of Adolph Hitler, or the national socialism, including the Nazi genocide and other crimes against humanity. The court of first instance reached a conclusion, that these were manifestations without evaluative judgments and it is, therefore, a historical document. It was also not possible to prove, which movement was supposedly promoted by the edition of this book pursuant to § 403. The public prosecutor of the Municipal Court in Brno filed an appeal to the detriment of the defendant on 15th October 2014, which was dismissed by the Regional Court in Brno on 23rd January 2015 on the basis of its inadequate justification.

### **3.7.10. Statistics of the Probation and Mediation Service**

Of the total number of cases, which were handled by centres of the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic („PMS“) since its establishment, it is evident that the proportion of cases of the PMS related to extremist motivated crimes is, in a long-term, low; since 2002, it relates to about 0, 2 % to 0,7 % of the total number of newly recorded files in the given year. The estimation for 2014 is about 0, 25 % of such files. In comparison with the previous year, it may be considered as a decrease of both the proportion and a number of files.

A number of criminal files with extremist overtones documented in individual judicial regions during 2010 – 2014 (PMS)\*:

soudní kraje	2010** celkem spisů	z toho s rasisti ckým podtextem	2011 celkem spisů	z toho s rasisti ckým podtextem	2012 celkem spisů	z toho s rasisti ckým podtextem	2013 celkem spisů	z toho s rasisti ckým podtextem	2014* celkem spisů	z toho s rasisti ckým podtextem
Praha	1 846	**	1 832	7 (0,4%)	2 237	14 (0,6%)	1 964	3 (0,2%)	2 593	12 (0,5%)
Středočeský	2 993	**	3 109	3 (0,4%)	3 486	10 (0,9%)	3 090	14 (0,5%)	3 793	5 (0,1%)
Jihočeský	1 896	**	2 033	5 (0,2%)	2 359	15 (1,1%)	1 794	12 (0,7%)	2 211	4 (0,2%)
Západočeský	2 926	**	2 838	7 (0,6%)	3 318	9 (0,6%)	2 557	2 (0,1%)	3 038	4 (0,1%)
Severočeský	3 988	**	4 412	2 (0,5%)	5 000	16 (0,9%)	4 178	20 (0,5%)	5 619	18 (0,3%)
Východočeský	2 979	**	3 088	8 (0,6%)	3 435	4 (0,4%)	2 844	7 (0,2%)	3 000	4 (0,1%)
Jihomoravský	4 210	**	4 237	1 (0,3%)	5 097	3 (0,3%)	4 228	9 (0,2%)	4 966	8 (0,2%)
Severomoravský	4 983	**	5 601	1 (0,4%)	6 197	7 (0,8%)	5 373	9 (0,2%)	6 317	4 (0,1%)
<b>celkem ČR</b>	<b>25 821</b>	<b>**</b>	<b>27 150</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>31 129</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>26 028</b>	<b>76 (0,3%)</b>	<b>31 537</b>	<b>59 (0,25%)</b>

Source: PMS

\* data from 2014 are preliminary, subsequent changes are possible

\*\* the formula for the calculation regarding data from 2010 was wrongly programmed

From the perspective of the criminal law classification, most of the cases dealt with by the PMS concerned an offence of a defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other groups of people pursuant to § 355 of the Criminal Code. In 2014, about 54 % of all recorded cases were linked to extremist motivated crimes.

Furthermore, it was a criminal offence of a manifestation of sympathy for a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms pursuant to § 404 of the Criminal Code. In 2014, there were about 24 % of these cases out of all recorded files related to extremist motivated crimes.

Other criminal offences appeared in the records of the PMS minimally.

### 3.7.11. Criminal activity with anti-Semitic overtones

There were 45 criminal offences with anti-Semitic overtones recorded in 2014. It represents a significant increase in comparison with the previous years. In 2013, there were records of 15 such criminal offences and, therefore, the annual increase is 200 %<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>17</sup> The statistics of criminality also include cases of criminal complaints. In some cases in 2014, there were records of several criminal complaints as regards one event or one entity, which subsequently influences the statistics. The case is represented in a particular qualification during the initiation of the criminal investigation, until the investigation is finalised, postponed, or until the court judgment is passed. From the long-term perspective, there were no records of increased manifestations of anti-Semitism and related criminal activity. A significant part of individual cases is linked to the manifestations of anti-Semitism in the internet environment, particularly on social networks.

Criminal offences with anti-Semitic overtones represented 22, 3 % of the total amount of crimes with extremist overtones in 2014, i. e. an increase by 15, 2 % in comparison with the previous year. Considering the composition of a criminal activity, predominantly offences pursuant to § 404 (manifestation of sympathy for a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms) were evident; there were records of 35 cases regarding this type of an offence.

### 3.7.12. Criminal activity motivated by hatred against Roma

**There were 53 criminal offences motivated by hatred toward Roma citizens recorded in 2014.** This figure represents an increase in comparison with the previous year when 42 criminal offences were recorded. Such criminal offences contribute to the total volume of crimes with extremist overtones with 26, 3 %.

With regard to offences according to their composition, these are mostly crimes pursuant to § 404 (manifestations of sympathy towards a movement aimed at suppressing of human rights and freedoms), § 355 (defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or other group of individuals), §356 (incitement to hatred towards a group of individuals or restriction of their rights and freedoms) and § 352 (violence against a group of citizens and against an individual). This is also consistent with the distribution of criminal offences according to their composition from last year; there were no significant changes.

**Table X: Detected criminal offences motivated by hatred against Roma in the Czech Republic in 2014**

Paragraph	Amount
140	1
145	1
146	2
228	1
352	6
353	1
355	14
356	9
358	1
404	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>

Source: PCR, 2015

The highest amount of the given criminal offences was committed in the Usti nad Labem (17) and Moravian-Silesian (10) regions.

### **3.7.13. Criminal activity motivated by hatred against Muslims**

Similarly to other categories, information about the amount of detected extremist crimes motivated by hatred against Muslims in this section has an informative character only.

In 2014, the Police of the Czech Republic recorded 2 such criminal offences. One case was qualified pursuant to § 352 (violence against a group of citizens and against an individual) and one case pursuant to §356 (incitement to hatred towards a group of people or restriction of their rights and freedoms).

## **3. Foreign influences impacting on the Czech extremist scene**

Manifestations of extremism are no longer purely a national matter concerning individual states. Due to the ease of communication (particularly via the internet), extreme political movements are becoming increasingly internationalised. Such cross-border operation is manifested through a cooperation of individual groups, taking over activities of affiliated foreign organisations, mutual support (including expressions of solidarity with the repressed individuals), establishment of Czech branches of international networks, etc. Currently, the essential part of monitoring of the extremist scene at the national level is therefore also an analysis of manifestations of extremism abroad.

In 2014, it was possible to record diverse manifestations of extremism both in the field of the extreme right and extreme left. Prior to the analysis of events that belong to these streams, the attention will be given to the situation in Ukraine, hence Russia. As such, it also became the key element within the extreme political streams environment in 2014. The situation was in fact noticed by far right and far left entities across Europe and occurring events (including the operation of extremist groups) were also significantly reflected in the media coverage. After the evaluation of the situation in Ukraine and Russia, the attention will be moved to the most important aspects of the functioning and manifestations of the European extreme right and left.

### **3.1. Situation in Russia and Ukraine**

In 2014, the situation in **Ukraine** radically escalated. Local events severely influenced the extremist scene in many countries. Generally, it is possible to state that the Ukrainian crisis stimulates extremist tendencies on both sides of the conflict. According to the Geneva Agreement of 17th April 2014, all the manifestations of racism, extremism and religious intolerance, including anti-Semitism, should be condemned; however, it is not yet happening.

The Ukrainian crisis was also reflected in many countries via the emergence of a conflict line in the right-wing extremist scene, particularly among pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian forces. In relation to the pronounced pro-Russian activity of a part of the European extreme right, there were speculations about the influence of the Russian secret services on this part of the political spectrum.

In January and February, demonstrations linked to the so-called Euromaidan continued in Kiev and other cities and culminated in violent clashes between the regime's forces (represented mainly by Berkut troops) and protesters. Representatives of right-wing extremism, grouped particularly in the **Right sector**, became visible among the protesters. This organisation was established at the end of 2013, when **Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self-defence, Ukrainian Patriot, Belyj Molot** and other smaller groups were integrated with the organisation. **The Social-National Assembly (SNA)** also cooperated with the Right Sector. Gradually, the core of the Right Sector became a totally independent organisation, while, for example, the SNA implemented its own policy. A range of groups without a supervision of the central leadership started operating under the title Right Sector. Branches or groups of sympathizers were also established abroad, including the Czech Republic. Foreign sympathizers of the Right Sector travelled to the Ukrainian territory in order to support this entity in street clashes, and also to provide moral and financial support.

After the victory of the forces that opposed to president Viktor Yanukovich, strong, right-wing extremists attempted to gain influence in the Ukrainian political structures. The Right Sector was registered as a political party; nevertheless, it did not succeed in the elections. The **All-Ukrainian Freedom Union** with its right-wing extremist roots, however, had a political representation due to its electoral gains from February to November 2014. In relation to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the separatist violence with the Russian support in the east of Ukraine militant neo-Nazi groups, particularly the **Misanthropic Division (Töten für Wotan)**, were activated. This group gradually also attracted foreign supporters and its branches were established in several countries (at least on social networks), including the Czech Republic.

Many Ukrainian right-wing extremists joined volunteer units under the auspices of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior after the outbreak of hostilities in the east of Ukraine. In this respect, the most significant one is the **Azov Battalion**, which was set up at the beginning of May 2014. Since September 2014, it was transformed in the „Regiment of special purpose Azov“. Right-wing extremist volunteers from abroad worked alongside Ukrainian combatants within this group. Other members of the Ukrainian extreme right fought in battalions **Donbas and Ajdar**.

The Ukrainian left-wing extremism found itself in a general defensive under the influence of events in 2014. The Communist Party of Ukraine was also subjected to repressive state measures. The extreme left organisation Borotba made efforts to be active on the international field and in principle supported the separatist goals. Several anarchist organisations, however, objected to its activities.

The Ukrainian crisis is strongly linked to Russian interests and it also has a significant impact on the Russian political extremism. Right-wing extremism in Russia, however, should be seen not only according to the official concept of local government authorities but also in the wider context of the influence of some pro-regime and officially recognised political forces. From this perspective, it is possible to state that right-wing values rejecting a liberal democratic system have also been expressed by supporters of the so-called Eurasian movement headed by **Alexander Dugin**; they are also very active on the international scene via the **International Eurasian Movement** and the **Eurasian Youth Union**. They also have some influence in the European Organisation for Free Monitoring, which organised an observation mission linked to the Referendum in Crimea regarding its connection to Russia. Belgian extremist Luc Michel is also involved in this organisation; several exponents of the European extreme right were also among the observers.

The Eurasian movement gained strong positions within the **Russian Spring** movement, which seeks to create the so-called Novorussia from the current territories of Eastern Ukraine. A great part of the Russian extreme right, which maintains imperial traditions, also expresses its support to separatists. Some separatist leaders were or still are linked to the **Russian National Unity** (RNE) organisation. Several divisions with a strong representation of Russian far-right volunteers also operate in the territory of Eastern Ukraine, among others, for example, battalions **Prizrak** and **Varyag** or the **Russian Orthodox Army**. Various political orientations from Russia and abroad, and right and left-wing extremists from European countries (part of which moved to Prizrak) fought next to the pro-separatist volunteers in the **Vostok** battalion. A range of volunteers, however, does not have a deeper ideological background and their motivation lies in a social dissatisfaction within the domestic environment, pro-Russian attitudes and sometimes also financial gains.

Less numerous Russian neo-Nazis already opposed the official Russian politics during the Maidan events and also supported the Right Sector when several Russian neo-Nazis joined the conflict on the side of the pro-Ukrainian forces. Under the influence of anti-extremist measures of the Russian Federation, the activity of some neo-Nazi groups was inhibited significantly in 2014 (e.g. the National Resistance). The **Wotan Jugend** organisation began to gain significance.

Combatants and veterans from the Ukrainian conflict began to play a significant role within the Russian nationalist spectrum, among others also the former military commander of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic **Igor Girkin – Strelkov**. This was, above all, evident by the division of the annual significant event of the right-wing extremism in Russia - the so-called Russian March. Two such events were organised on 4th November 2014. Traditional organisers linked to the „Russian“ movement together with its leader Dmitry Demushkin organised the march by the Lyublino station. Strelkov and his supporters organised their own Russian March for Novorussia by the Oktyabrskoe field station. Attendance at both Moscow events and marches in other Russian cities was, nevertheless, lower in comparison with previous years.

Left-wing extremism in Russia was in the shadow of events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. Marxist-Leninist organisations mostly supported separatist tendencies and the Russian regime's policy. Anarchists were facing repression and stood up for activists in

Crimea. International anarchist networks, particularly the Anarchist Black Cross, pursued activities for the benefit of persecuted anarchists in Russia.

### **3.2. Extreme right in Europe in 2014**

The extreme right environment continued to be observed widely in most European countries, mainly by governmental agencies, NGOs and the media. In this chapter, political successes of the extreme right in 2014 will be discussed followed by significant extreme right ideological projects with cross-border aspects, which were active in 2014; in addition, serious incidents committed by sympathizers of the extreme right will be presented and last, the attention will also be focused on some measures adopted against the extreme right.

In 2014, a significant topic was the strengthening of extreme right political parties. It is necessary to mention that the spectrum of parties, which are commonly classified as extreme right, is very broad. There is a tendency to include both rather populist political parties, which are mostly characterised by criticism of immigration in Western Europe, but which do not, in principle, seek to eliminate democracy (e. g. the French National Front, the Dutch Party for Freedom, the True Finns or rarely the British UKIP), and open anti-system parties, which are characterised by their resistance towards current democracy and their desire to replace it with a new political order (see, for example, the Golden Dawn in Greece, National Democratic Party in Germany, or Ataka in Bulgaria).

A common test of the strength of extreme right political parties was the spring elections to the European Parliament. In individual countries, these parties succeeded with various results; however, the overall election results were evaluated as a confirmation of an increase in popularity of extreme right (or rather populist) political parties. A common topic of these parties was a resistance towards immigration (both outside and within the EU), rejection of a deeper (also current) integration of the EU including an emphasis on increasing the role of Member States, or a criticism of current political parties and the political system (reinforced mainly in areas where repressions against extreme right parties or their supporters take place).

The first „**success**“ was already recorded by some extreme right parties prior the elections when they, primarily on **social networks**, managed to attract a considerable attention and even surpassed established political entities.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, they have also attracted „negative attention“ due to some of their controversial statements and actions. Besides the radical Golden Dawn, whose representatives were subjected to repeated court proceedings during 2014, it is, for example, possible to mention the resignation of Andreas Mölzer from the candidate list of the Free Party of Austria (FPÖ) after his statement that the EU is a „conglomerate of Niggers“ (he addressed his forced resignation by saying that the Third Reich was much more liberal than the EU). Similarly to the Czech Republic, some

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Based on the survey by the Faculty of Social Sciences conducted for the Czech Television, the NPD, Polish Nowa Prawica or the Slovak People's Party gained the most "unique likes" (specific expressions of support on Facebook) before the elections.

foreign public media refused to broadcast election spots due to their hatred content directed against immigrants (see for example withdrawal of a spot of the Maltese party Imperium Europa from the local public television).

The elections were particularly successful for **populist parties in Western Europe**. From three current representatives in the European Parliament the French National Front increased its numbers to 24 representatives due to 24, 95 % of votes, which made it the most successful political party in the country. The party followed its own success in the local elections from the beginning of 2014 when it managed to win in 12 cities (surpassing its success from 1997).<sup>19</sup> Surprising was the success of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which managed to win the elections in the Great Britain (although this party is characterised by a radical rhetoric, it is not possible to consider it extremist). Likewise, similarly oriented parties, such as the Danish People's Party (26, 6 %, 1st place), the Party for Freedom from Holand (13, 3 %, 3rd place that is a loss compared with the previous elections by 3, 5 %) or the True Finns (12, 9 %, 3rd place), experienced success. In 2014, a significant increase in popularity was also recorded by the Swedish Democrats who gained 9, 7 % in the EU elections and then (according to political scientists very surprising with regard to their radicalism) 13 % in the parliamentary elections in September.

As regards countries and parties geographically close to the Czech Republic, the elections were successful for the **Nowa Prawica Janusza Korwin-Mikkeho party**,<sup>20</sup> which gained 7, 15 % of votes and therefore 4 chairs in the European Parliament (in comparison with the parliamentary elections in 2011 - the party was voted for by only 1, 06 % of voters). Similarly, the party is also rather national-populist without overt extremist manifestations. This entity was, nevertheless, partly building on former successes of the Polish right-wing parties, which have rather stood in the background in recent years (for example, the former government party Samoobrona gained only 0, 04 % of votes in the European elections). After the split in the party and the departure of its controversial leader at the end of 2014, it is possible to predict an increase of its influence. A significant success was gained by a more radically oriented Ruch Narodowy (1, 39 % of votes). Also, other Polish radical nationalist movements associated in entities such as Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (ONR), Młodzież Wszechpolska and Obóz Wielkiej Polski were mobilised.

On the other hand, the extreme right in Slovakia cannot speak about a success. Even though the **support of Kotleba's People's Party** – Our Slovakia exceeded 7 % according to some surveys at the beginning of the year, it gained only 1, 3 % of votes in the elections. Nevertheless, the People's Party and, particularly, activities of Marian Kotleba - the current

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The French National Front gained attention by many actions directed against Arab (Muslim) immigrants; in autumn, for example, it launched a campaign directed at the growing popularity of kebabs, which it understands as one of the signs of the cultural Islamization of the country. Selling of kebabs was, therefore, linked with the criticism of immigration and the integration of immigrants in France.

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The New Right party is mainly characterised by an emphasis on traditional values and is linked with its former chairman – Janusz Korwin-Mikke, whose name it also bears in its title. Korwin-Mikke is labelled as monarchist and became "famous" for his views that women should not have the right to vote and for using terms such as Jewish communism, fight against minorities (ethnic, sexual), etc.

Banska Bystrica district administrator, continued to gain a strong attention in Slovakia. Hanging of a derogatory banner against NATO on the Regional Office building at the end of August may be mentioned as an example (attention was also directed at Kotleba's support of the Ukrainian ex-president Yanukovich, whom he openly supported via a letter<sup>21</sup>). Stagnation of the Slovak National Party was confirmed in the European elections, when it lost a chair in the European Parliament with 3, 61 % of votes.

An ambiguous success was gained by the German extreme right in the European elections. The **National Democratic Party** (NPD) received 1, 00 %, which may be considered as a failure (similarly, the Republicans did not follow their former success in the elections to the European Parliament because it received only 0, 40 % of votes). It is necessary to mention, that with regard to the German electoral system for elections to the European Parliament, this gain was sufficient for the NPD to receive one chair in the European Parliament that was won by Udo Voigt (a long-term leader of the party in the period of 1996 – 2011). In general, the NPD cannot talk about 2014 as a successful year because the party did not defend its posts in the Saxon Parliament in the elections in September; it, therefore, lost the right to a financial contribution, which until then consisted of about 2, 5 million EUR a year. This financial loss could be significantly mirrored in the functioning of the party, because the party was able to fund its activities also in other part sof Germany due to its successes in Saxony. Perhaps also due to a partial retreat of the NPD the attention was shifted to **Die Rechte** (the Right Ones) party, in particular, due to an event during which it asked the German authorities to communicate information about the amount of Jews living in Dortmund including their numbers in individual neighbourhoods, which it needed for „political work“ according to their own words. The authorities, however, rejected this request and identified it as a manifestation and revival of anti-Semitism. Yet, speculations began whether Die Rechte can replace the NPS to some extent as a relatively successful extremist party.

The usual support remained to the Freedom Party of Austria, which became the third strongest party with the gain of 19, 70 % of votes. On the other hand, the Alliance for the Future of Austria experienced a significant failure in the elections; it was not able to record any significant electoral successes after the death of Jörg Haider (it received only 0, 5 % of votes in the European elections).

The same result as in 2009 was gained by **Hungarian Jobbik** (14, 67 % of votes) and won 3 chairs in the European Parliament. The greatest attention from all the elected candidates was gained by Béla Kovács, against whom an investigation for espionage in favour of Moscow was initiated. For this reasons, the Hungarian Supreme Public Prosecutor addressed an official letter to the head of the European Parliament, which concerned dangerous activities of Kovács. In general, Jobbik may consider 2014 as a successful year, because it succeeded in the parliamentary elections with 20,3 % votes and, therefore, strengthened its position as the sekond strongest political party in Hungary (it forms the largest opposition against the leading Fidesz movement). Jobbik also succeeded in the

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Similarly, a chairman of the Bulgarian extreme right-wing party Ataka was one of the international observers during the fall elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic.

municipal elections in October (it also succeeded in larger cities, however, its low popularity was confirmed in Budapest). Fourteen of its candidates for the post of mayor won, another six won as independent candidates, however, with its support.

A success in the European elections was recorded by the **Golden Dawn**, which may be considered as the most clear-cut political party of the above-mentioned parties; it gained 9, 38 % of votes and 3 chairs in the European Parliament (compared with the previous elections to the European Parliament, it represents an increase by almost 9 %).<sup>22</sup> This situation occurred despite the fact that the Golden Dawn was allowed to stand in the elections only due the decision of the Greek Supreme Court at the beginning of May (out of the concern regarding possible ban of its participation in the European and local elections, its supporters established new alternative parties with titles such as the Hellenic Dawn or also National Dawn). Concurrently, various repressive measures were adopted against many members of the Golden Dawn (see below). This fact, however, did not entice its supporters away and the party continues to have a significant support in the Greek population despite its pronounced rhetoric<sup>23</sup>. New political parties were also established in other countries bearing the same title and programme; for example, a branch of the Golden Dawn was registered in Spain in autumn.

Even though the Bulgarian **Ataka** only just crossed the threshold to enter the Parliament with 4, 52 % in the elections in October 2014, the populist-extremist voting base sent two other entities to the Parliament – the Patriotic Front (renegades of the Ataka, who committed to providing their votes to the government coalition) with a gain of 7, 28 % of votes, and a party called Bulgaria without censorship with 5, 69 % of votes.

In spite of the mentioned success of the extreme right (or populist) political parties, they did not manage to find a common language in the European Parliament and, therefore, did not establish a joint fraction. Although it was possible to register the initiative of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders for the establishment of a joint block with the title European Alliance for Freedom prior the elections, their mutual disagreements had a stronger effect. While these parties manage to agree on the criticism of the EU or the requirements for restrictions on immigration, they have different views on economy (some are liberals, others conservatives), gay rights, or the relationship towards Israel (in both cases some parties support the given as a form of a protest against the Arab immigrants). Above all, the British UKIP refers to the National Front as radical due to its repeated manifestations of anti-Semitism, and, therefore, refuses to cooperate with it. It was therefore shown that even though these parties can be relatively strong in their own territory, any mutual cooperation (although declared) is difficult.

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At the same time, the Golden Dawn also recorded a relative success in the local elections, when its candidate gained 16 % of votes during the direct mayor elections in Athens in 2014.

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The party gained 6, 28 %, i. e. 17 chairs in the parliamentary elections in January 2015.

### **3.3. Significant ideological projects of the extreme right in 2014**

Apart from political parties, their activities and successes, it is also necessary to monitor political initiatives. Although they do not have the ambition to participate in the elections, they may have a significant influence on manifestations of the extreme right movement. In addition, for the reason of a great internationalisation of the extreme right movement, similar or identical projects may also be established in the Czech Republic. Some projects, which are mentioned below, were already established in recent years and followed their previous activity, others were newly established in 2014.

One of the most active, among the formerly established movements, was the **Generation of Identity** that also found a response in the Czech extreme right environment in 2014. The main topic of this originally French movement is the protection of the European identity while it is in contrast with Islam and Arab immigration do European countries. It currently represents a pan-European project, which is characterised by a strong autonomous nature, whereby smaller groups, which are not linked to other groups, join this project via organised actions. The given actions such as the distribution of leaflets or organisation of lectures are so far not characterised by a significant radicalism; their particular aim is to highlight the risks linked to the Islamisation of Europe. For example, the activity attributed to the local "identitarians" (with whom also the Czech sympathizers of the Generation of Identity were establishing contacts) gained attention in Austria in 2014; in this relation, activists glued over street names slogans against radical Islam (some streets were, therefore, given names such as Sharia-Gasse or IS Rekrutierung). Apart from these "autonomous actions", there are also pan-European gatherings of the supporters of the Generation of Identity; for example, the "Identitarian thoughts VI" in Stockholm at the end of June.<sup>24</sup> From other wider European projects it is possible to mention the so-called "defence leagues", which operate in individual countries under a similar title (see Polish Defense League or British Defense League, or also Czech Defence League). Their mutual interconnectedness or a degree of cooperation is, however, on a lower level than in the case of the Generation of Identity. From the significantly riskier and extreme ideological groups, it is then possible to find cells of neo-Nazi militant groups, typically Blood & Honour, which essentially operate in isolation and it is impossible to record their closer cooperation.

As regards newly established projects, it is necessary to mention two, which received attention in Germany during the second half of the year. Both activities mentioned below were directed against Islamism, respectively against immigrants arriving from Arab countries and reflected the rising xenophobic or Islamophobic attitudes, not only in Germany.

The first group operating since the beginning of September<sup>25</sup> is **HoGeSa** (Hooligans gegen Slafisten, i. e. Hooligans against Salafis). It merged football hooligans, who are close to

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From other "conferences" of the extreme right in 2014, it also gained attention the conference of the European Congress of the National Political Institute held in Budapest in early October; the event was banned by the Hungarian Prime Minister (it was supposed to be attended, for example, by the Russian ideologist Athe event was to participate, for example, also Russian Eurasianism ideologist Alexander Dugin).

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the extreme right (not a new phenomenon; e. g. indications about hooligans joining anti-Islamic protests in Germany since February). During quite a short period of time, Hogesa gained tens of thousands of supporters on the Internet and social networks and managed to mobilise its supporters on public events. Assembly held on 26 October in Cologne was attended by several thousands of people (according to some sources, 3000, according to other 5000). During the protest, there has been an escalation of the situation (especially after a conflict with people dressed in Turkish colors) and subsequent large-scale clashes with police units. Total of dozen police officers and protesters were injured (also from the extreme left, which called an anti-demonstration against the Hogesa march).

An even greater support was gained by the **Pegida** movement (an abbreviation of the German *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*, translated as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) operating in Dresden since about October. Similarly to Hogesa, Pegida was also established as a reaction to an incident related to the creation of the so-called Sharia patrols and its main aim was to highlight the risks linked to the Islamisation of Europe. Pegida gained great acceptance, particularly (and to some extent in 2014 only) in Dresden, where its organised gatherings, which were repeatedly attended by about thousands to tens of thousands of people (the biggest event was supposedly attended by about 17 500 protesters in 2014 right before Christmas). At the same time, an issue arised on how to react to the Pegida events since right-wing radicals form only a fraction of the protesters and the gatherings are not openly xenophobic or violent (from „bigger“ parties, Pegida was supported by, for example, the Alternative for Germany; on the other hand, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) initially expressed sympathy for some of the requirements of the movement and raised a demand for a faster removal of failed assylum seekers; later, it expressed resistance towards Pegida's actions). The Chancellor Angela Merkel, however, rejected the Pegida movement as xenophobic and inciting violence; later on it was more often accused of incitement of hatred attitudes and publicly refused. According to reports of the German Intelligence Service, right-wing extremists did not have any influence on Pegida's leading structures in 2014. Nevertheless, a part of them appeared at events of this group, which, on the other hand, has distanced itself from them.

Both of these projects gained attention also in the field of the Czech extreme right because information about its events were regularly available. It was also possible to record voices calling for the organisation of similar events in the Czech Republic. No relevant Czech „branches“ of these initiatives were established in 2014 (its supporters continued to merge in terms of other projects); at the ideological level, however, the given projects had at least some influence on the Czech extreme right environment.

### ***3.4. Serious incidents caused by sympathizers of the extreme right***

Similarly to previous years, there were records of various incidents, which were caused by supporters of the extreme right. Even though there were differences in vigor, attack

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The immediate impetus for the emergence of this movement was the creation of so-called "Sharia patrols" in the streets of Wuppertal, which brought together a group of Muslims in reflective vests, who claimed to be protectors of order in the Muslim quarter by the most orthodox interpretation of the Koran.

targets or consequences, it is, in general, possible to state that among the most serious attacks still belong attacks on chosen hated targets (particularly minorities or supporters of the extreme left) and disturbances during organised events.

**Slovakia** was outraged by the reports about repeated and several months ignored **attacks of neo-Nazis on a student bar Mariatchi in Nitra** in 2014. After the media coverage of the whole case, the police arrested several attackers, whose activity is still under investigation. The arrested individuals were also supposed to be linked to the People's Party – Our Slovakia. The detection of this case was followed by a general discussion on the attitude towards right-wing extremists and their elimination.

**In Poland**, the greatest attention was traditionally earned by the „**March of Independence**“ held on the occasion of the Polish national holiday on 11 November, which is annually attended by tens of thousands of people. Greatest clashes took place near the Poniatowshiego Bridge, respectively the Narodowego stadium, behind the Wisla River, when a separate group of protesters (mainly consisting of football hooligans) attacked the police. There were 32 people injured during this clash – out of whom 12 police officers. The police then arrested over 200 people during the day (the organisers, however, labelled the attacking individuals as police provocateurs, whose aim was to discredit the event). In comparison with previous years, there were no significant clashes with sympathizers of the extreme left, nor were attacks on objects linked to their activities; there was also no significant damage to the city mobiliary, vehicle arson or any attack on the diplomatic mission (such as the Embassy of the Russian Federation in 2013). Apparently, it was the result of a change in a the traditional and quite a problematic march route. Repeated protests of national to radically national demonstrators complemented also by physical attacks were recorded in the context of the development of the situation in Ukraine on the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Warsaw and a clash among pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian activists in front of the Ukrainian Embassy.

It is also worth mentioning that the Polish politically clear-cut groups operate also in the foreign Polish communities (particularly in Britain), where, for example, a group called **Zjednoczeni Emigranci** attacked a concert, which was organised by locals belonging to the opposite political spectrum, at the end of June (the protest march against this attack was later organised by a group called Dywizjon 161, i. e. antifascist group formed by associated Poles). On the other hand, it is necessary to mention that also Polish citizens became a target of racist assaults by British right-wing radicals.

The **German extreme right** made efforts to use the escalated tension in relation to the Arab community (see also projects Hogesa and Pegida mentioned above). With the raised wave of xenophobic attitudes, there may be links to the arson of newly built houses for refugees near Nuremberg in December. Three buildings in Vorra, which were supposed to be used as the asylum houses for refugees, were set on fire. The political motive behind this attack is evident from the fact, that swastikas and other xenophobic symbols were found on one of the neighbouring buildings. Indeed, other NGOs that monitor the issue of the right-wing extremism informed repeatedly about the increase in numbers of criminal offences with xenophobic overtones during the year.

In the whole European continent, it was possible to record an **increased amount of anti-Semitic attacks** in 2014, which was to a great extent linked to the summer Israeli military offensive in the Gaza Strip. It is, however, necessary to mention that some of the anti-Semitic attacks are not committed by the extreme right's supporters, but by members of the Muslim communities (often, the perpetrators are not found and, therefore, it is only possible to speculate about the possible perpetrator). From particular actions, it is possible to mention, for example, the attack by a Molotov cocktail on a door of the synagogue in German Wuppertal from the end of July; at the same time, there was a similar attack on the synagogue in Aulnay-sous-Bois near Paris, or an arson of the synagogue in Anderlecht in September. Anti-Semitic attacks were also recorded in Austria; one of the most serious attacks was the physical assault of a member of the Israeli football team during a match by a person expressing support for the Palestinian people from the middle of July. There was an incident in front of a Viennese synagogue in October, where the attacker endangered other present individuals by a knife and shouted out anti-Semitic mottos.

Similarly, there were **many attacks against the Muslim minorities in Europe**. In addition to symbolic or verbal attacks, the attention was also gained by violent acts. It is possible to mention the February attack of Bulgarian right-wing extremists and hooligans on a mosque in Plovdiv. After the court proceedings, during which the court was deciding on the renewal of an old mosque in the city centre, a gathering which spun out of control took place and about 200 people started throwing stones on the local mosque and broke several windows (about 120 people were arrested). A significant attention was then gained by three arson attacks on Swedish mosques from the end of the year; these took place in Eskilstuna, where the perpetrator committed his attack during the afternoon prayer (5 persons were injured), then in Eslöv and Uppsala, where the attacker accompanied the arson attack by defamatory writings directed against Muslims and urged them to leave Sweden. The attacks have not yet been investigated, but it is possible to expect that they are linked to the raised wave of xenophobia in Sweden.

There were many clashes between extreme right groups and their opponents in Sweden during the year. One of the most serious incidents was the violence during the demonstration in Malmö in August, where 10 people were injured during clashes between the security forces and the protesters (including people attending a demonstration against the extreme right). Similarly, there were 2 individuals injured during protests in Jonköping on 1 May and about 20 people arrested.

### ***3.5. Measures adopted against the extreme right***

Activities of the extreme right were obviously responded to by governmental or non-governmental organisations. While the first applied various repressive measures against groups or individuals, the NGOs made efforts to come up with new ideas leading to the marginalisation of the extreme right or maintained already „tested“ alternatives to combat the extreme right.

From the repressive measures against the representatives of the extreme right, it is possible to highlight the **criminal proceedings** initiated against members and sympathisers of

the Greek **Golden Dawn**. Apart from the given, there were, for example, 70 members of this party charged, including its leader and 17 legislators for a participation in an armed criminal group functioning according Nazi idols and perpetrating criminal acts in the middle of October. At the beginning of November, new court proceedings were initiated with a group of neo-Nazis, who stood behind a range of violent or arson attacks against Roma, committed in 2012. At the same time, laws which criminalise the denial of the Holocaust were adopted as well as punishments for hatred manifestations which were toughened again as a reaction of some manifestations of the Golden Dawn.

It was also possible to record significant repressive measures in other countries. In Germany, the attention was gained by the continuing trial with the **NSU** (its end is not yet in sight), during which a repeated discussion about the role of German secret services on the functioning of this group took place. In July, the French court found **Kristian "Varga" Vikernes** guilty of incitement to racial hatred by publishing racist contributions directed against Jews and Muslims (Vikernes is also known to the supporters of the Czech extreme right and his former arrest evoked a response by Czech right-wing extremists). He was sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment and a fine of 8 000 EUR. Significant trials with right-wing extremists also took place in Austria. First, the Austrian court sentenced two persons involved in the functioning of **Objekt 21** website (until recently, one of the most significant Austrian extreme right servers, which was also known to Czech activists) to several years of imprisonment for a carried out arson attack. In September, a trial with seven football hooligans, who attacked a building of the Turkish-Kurdish cultural association was initiated. In addition (from geographically distant countries), it is possible to mention the intervention of the Spanish police against a neo-Nazi gang, which was supposedly committing extortion and violently gaining finance, which were later used for costs of trials concerning other members of this groups for violent criminal offences. During the house searches, the police found a range of weapons and fascist evidence. Similarly in Sweden, there were records of tougher measures against the extreme right, particularly with regard to its strengthening.

Poland makes efforts to limit primarily public manifestations of radical right-wing entities by repeated amendments to the Act on assembly from 5 July 1990 (Prawo o zgromadzeniach, as amended), whose provisions, however, were pronounced as unconstitutional by the Polish Constitutional Court on 18 September 2014, which led to its another amendment published in the Polish Collection of Acts on 3 October 2014.

From the perspective of **extremism on the internet**, worth mentioning is the arrest of the Hungarian extremist Béla Varga in the USA in May, who owns and Internet website kuruc.info (one of the most significant Hungarian right-wing extremist servers). Varga was arrested for stalking and threats to a lawyer, who reached the summons of Varga to the investigating authorities for the above-mentioned Internet websites. After his release on bail, Varga fled to Canada (he owns both Canadian and Hungarian citizenship).

In addition to the repression against individuals, other measures against right-wing extremist groups were adopted. The most significant act may be the Romanian ban on groups, which are, inter alia, also linked to the Hungarian Jobbik (Movement of 64 Districts, Army of Outlaws, or the New Hungarian Guard). The reasons were, particularly, the increasing disturbances at events of these groups, which seek **autonomy of the Székely Land** (the

Romanian land with a significant Hungarian minority). In this manner, Romania justified its ban on these groups as a matter of „national security and ethnic cohesion“.

From the perspective of **NGOs' activities**, it is worth mentioning, for example, an act of the German anti-extremist activists, who developed a new mobile application at the end of the year, which monitors the extreme right gatherings in Berlin. The application should monitor when and where a right-wing extremist gathering takes place and gives an opportunity to either thwart the march, or gather a group of their opponents close to the RWE gathering (at the same time, there were voices that warned before a misuse of this application by right-wing radicals). From a number of other anti-extremist activities, it is possible to mention the campaign against the traditional gathering in Wunsiedel located by the grave of Rudolf Hess, the former head of the Auschwitz concentration camp. Residents of this city decided to donate money for every step the neo-Nazis take to the NGO helping members of the extreme right associations to leave this environment (the so-called exit programmes) so, in essence, marching supporters of the extreme right support the organisation fighting against them via their each step.

### ***3.6. Events in the field of the extreme left***

From the perspective of the extreme left the main attention was earned by the militant anarchist movement in 2014 and, eventually also by the activity of radical left-wing (communist) political parties, which, on the other hand, did not reach any significant success in the elections in 2014 (e. g. 6, 11 % of votes of the radical Communist Party of Greece in the elections to the European Parliament).

The international militant anarchist movement remained very active in 2014. It continued to be marked by a strong international, but strictly informal, interconnection which was manifested by the organisation of various solidarity actions, publishing of support material in various European countries, establishment of individual cells of wide informal groups, etc. Activists could have received information about individual events via virtual channels and, therefore their acts could have gained an international acclaim and could be understood as a part of a wide anarchist struggle (see also actions of the Czech militant anarchists). From particular organisations, the most visible and important was still the International Anarchist Federation (FAI), the International Revolutionary Front, the Revolutionary Struggle or the Conspiracy of Fire Cells. The anarchist movement was often linked to radical environmental groups (such as the Animal Liberation Front or a group called Earth First!).

In comparison with 2013, the **activity of Greek militant activists has increased again**. Among the most serious incidents belongs an explosion of a vehicle containing 75 kg of explosives in front of a bank in Athens at the beginning of April. The explosion caused a significant material damage to the surrounding buildings; no one was hurt (the explosion was preceded by two warnings in the form of phone calls). The bomb attack was associated with ongoing trials related to Greek anarchists; concurrently it was supposed to support the anarchist struggle in general. The action was claimed by a generally known group - the

Revolutionary Struggle, particularly the Commando of Lambros Foundas<sup>26</sup> (an arson attack on a police station in March was also dedicated to this man). Other militant actions took place already prior and also after this attack; for example, a grenade attack on a vehicle of a member of the Greek prison guards, a grenade attack on the headquarters of the SKAI media group perpetrated by a group calling itself the „nihilistic cells“ in the middle of July (the assault grenade was modified so as to avoid personal injuries; however, the perpetrators released a statement that they will carry out a mass attack next time), an arson attack on the café of the Golden Dawn in Athens at the end of October or a number of other arson attacks on various targets. In early December, there was a terrorist attack on the Israeli Embassy building in Athens consisting of a gunfire from a submachine gun, however, without injuries and a greater material damage. The attack was claimed by a militant terrorist organisation „Group of People’s Fighters - OLA in February 2015, which also carried out a similar attack on the residence of the German Ambassador in December 2013. A great attack on a prison facility was supposedly planned by a prison runaway Christodulos Xiros<sup>27</sup>, who belonged to a group called the Movement of 17th November and who was apprehended again at the beginning of 2015.

Many attacks (not only in Greece) were carried out in relation to the surging wave of the „traditional“ **holding a protest hunger strikes by imprisoned activists** (among the most famous hunger-strikers belong Nikos Romanos and Yannis Michailidis). The hunger strikes not only raised the attention to the amount of imprisoned or prosecuted anarchist activists but also managed to support and mobilise the whole anarchist movement. The first significant wave of hunger strikes was announced by the Greek prisoners at the end of June and was joined, for example, also by German anarchist prisoners (the hunger strike was perceived as a manifestation of solidarity with the Greek imprisoned counterparts). The second wave of protest hunger strikes was announced at the end of the year. As a support of these hunger-strikers free anarchists committed other violent actions; it is possible to mention arson attacks on cash machines in Athens at the beginning of December, an arson attack on a vehicle in London (security agency) and Bristol (a vehicle of one of the leading representatives of a multi-national company), setting fire to three vehicles belonging to members of the European Parliament in Brussels and a range of other actions, which caused smaller or larger damage (most of them carried out in Greece). Concurrently, there were several demonstrations,<sup>28</sup> which became violent and turned into clashes with police forces (again mainly in Greece).

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26 Lambros Foundas was a member of the Revolutionary Struggle organisation, who was killed by the police during a car-theft (his death was, however, considered within the anarchist movement, as a „police murder“). His death was regularly reminded during carried out militant attacks (such as the attacks on a toll gate in the Czech Republic in 2011).

27 Christodulos Xirox was convicted of the involvement in six murders, including the murder of the American military attache. He was given six life sentences and another 25 years of imprisonment.

28 In addition to these demonstrations, there were also other violent gatherings in Greece, often in relation to some significant individuals linked to the anarchist movement (prisoners or previously killed). After the violence, both participants and the police forces mutually accused each other from their provocation. In Athens, for example, there were wide riots on the occasion of a solidarity demonstration during the anniversary of the killing of Alexandros Grogoropoulos in December. The protesters began to attack the police, bank headquarters and shops after the end of the commemoration event (the police arrested about 100 individuals).

A significant activity was also developed by the **British militant anarchist movement** in 2014; in particular, in the area of Bristol and Brighton (in the surroundings of these cities there were many anarchist arson attacks; it is possible to mention, for example, setting fire to four luxury cars the broadcasting transmission system in June or 3 police vehicles in January and September). Not far from Bristol, there was also a bombing attack on a court building in Yate, which was claimed by a branch of FAI – conscience & fury (the attack caused significant material damage, however, it was carried out in early morning hours so it will not hurt any bystanders). An attack against the BAE Systems company was carried out at the end of August and was perceived both as a protest against this armament company and the ongoing NATO summit in Newport. In relation to the summit there was also an arson attack on a vehicle belonging to a cadet school in Bristol, while attacks on military objects were carried out repeatedly – in February, there was an arson attack on the British navy base located in the same district. Anarchist movement in London also remained active.

Anarchist groups also developed activities in **Germany**. As a manifestation of ecological struggle there was an attack on several vehicles of the 'Bayer AG' company since the end of July; as a manifestation of struggle against the international capitalism and extortion of workers there was an arson attack on a vehicle of the Sodexo company from September. Concurrently, it was also possible to record several attacks on embassies in the German capital Berlin. Germany belongs to countries that currently play the main role in the international anarchist movement. In this manner, a vehicle belonging to the Greek Embassy was burnt at the beginning of June as a manifestation of solidarity with imprisoned and tried Greek anarchists. The Berivan Sason commando then claimed the October arson attack on two vehicles belonging to the Greek Embassy in Berlin, whose attackers later in their statement linked themselves to the solidarity movement with Kurd fighters (see below).

A violent anarchist attack was also recorded in **Polish Warsaw** at the end of November, where the attackers, who made themselves known as members of FAI and called themselves „Queer Meinhof“, set fire to a municipal police vehicle (reportedly in response to its previous actions when it, according to the attackers, intervened too strictly against the homeless people). An antifascist march with the title „Together against nationalism“ took place on 8 November; it was attended by several hundreds of people from among the anarchists and other members of the radical left. The event was also attended by a group of young communists posing with flags of the USSR, which caused an indignation among the anarchists and an intervention by the police was necessary. In September, publications linked to the international anarchist struggle (particularly to the Greek Conspiracy of Fire Cells) and the realization of direct actions were published.

In contrast with the previous year, there was a **decrease in violent attacks in Italy**, that would normally cause a dramatic material damage. The above-mentioned may be primarily linked to the ongoing judicial proceedings with representatives of various anarchist groups, some of whom are also accused of committing terrorist acts or a support of terrorist groups and terrorism itself. Particularly worth mentioning is the November wave of vandalism attacks (against banks, state institutions, churches, justice palaces) in the name of anarchist ideology, which presumably also took place as a support of tried and imprisoned activists (these solidarity actions were also organised in other European countries). In addition, the NO TAV movement remained active in Italy; it opposes the high-speed railway in northern Italy. Four of its members were found guilty of terrorism (for carried out sabotage actions) in the

middle of December, which led to further solidarity militant actions (similarly in 2014, many of its followers were arrested and charged with various criminal offences).

Similarly, in **Spain**, the third of southern European countries, where militant anarchism traditionally occupies a significant position, there was a lower amount of militant activities of the extreme left recorded in 2014. From the most serious actions, it is possible to mention an arson attack against the extreme-right squat in Madrid from the end of August. Yet the militant anarchist movement remained ideologically active, despite the fact that the Spanish police arrested 11 persons within the operation Pandora for their participation in an anarchist terrorist organisation at the end of the year (this police intervention again caused an international response within the anarchist movement; as an example of a solidarity manifestation it is possible to mention an attack with paint colours on the Spanish Embassy in Amsterdam)<sup>29</sup>.

Individual militant actions were also noticeable in other European countries. The anarchist movement in Spain was relatively active in 2014, when as an example of carried out actions there was a solidarity arson attack on a police vehicle in Basel (as a support of refugees in Berlin) from the beginning of October. From actions of French anarchists, it is possible to mention the February arson on a vehicle belonging to the SPIE company committed for the reason of its involvement in the production of surveillance cameras.

Apart from this, there were active individual communities in various countries which mainly concentrated on the ideological struggle and only occasionally participated in events, during which disturbances to the public order occurred. For all the examples, it is possible to mention the „traditional“ February protest (in relation to the annual „bursacky“ ball), which was directed primarily against the parliamentary party FPÖ. Damage calculated to 1 million EUR was caused during the disturbances; on top of that there were 20 people injured, 11 police vehicles damaged and 15 people arrested.

In the second half of the year, it was possible to record an **increased support of Kurdish freedom fighters** by the extreme left in several European countries (also in the Czech Republic). The above-mentioned is particularly related to the involvement of the Kurdish troops in the fight against the Islamic State, which to some extent restored the previously established links between some Kurdish and extreme left groups. Apart from manifested solidarity with Kurds and their fight against the Islamic State, but also their fight for independence, in general, their individual combat successes were relatively widely monitored and also occasionally some solidarity events organised (see the above-mentioned attack on the Turkish Embassy in Berlin). Supporters of the extreme left also joined some clashes between Arabs and Kurds in western European cities; again in relation to the ongoing events in the Middle East (e. g. in Hamburg at the beginning of October).

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Subsequently, 7 persons were released and the cases of 4 remaining individuals were handed over to the court.

## 4. List of used abbreviations

- ABC – Anarchist Black Cross – Anarchistický černý kříž
- ACR (AČR) – Army of the Czech Republic (Armáda ČR)
- AFA/Antifa – Antifascist action (Antifašistická akce)
- CDL – Czech Defence League
- CL (ČL) – Czech Lions (Čeští lvi)
- CSAF (ČSAF) – Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation (Československá anarchistická federace)
- WPSJ (DSSS) – Workers' Party of Social Justice (Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti)
- WY (DM) – Workers' Youth (Dělnická mládež)
- ESSK – Statistical Recording System of Criminality (Evidenčně statistický systém kriminality)
- FAI – Informal Anarchist Federation (Neformální anarchistická federace)
- GI – Generation of Identity (Generace identity)
- GISF (GIBS) – General Inspectorate of Security Forces (Generální inspekce bezpečnostních sborů)
- JN – Junge Nationaldemokraten
- RPD (KŘP) – Regional Police Directorate (Krajské ředitelství policie)
- CPBM (KSČM) – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy)
- CYU (KSM) – Communist Youth Union (Komunistický svaz mládeže)
- LWE (LEX) – left wing, left-wing extremism, left-wing extremists (levicově extremistický, levicoví extremisté)
- LP - Left perspective (Levá perspektiva)
- MoD (MO) – Ministry of Defence (Ministerstvo obrany)
- MoJ (MSP) - Ministry of Justice (Ministerstvo spravedlnosti)
- MoI (MV) – Ministry of the Interior (Ministerstvo vnitra)
- MoFA (MZ) – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo zahraničí )
- NAL – New Anti-Capitalist Left (Nová antikapitalistická levice)
- ND – National Democracy (Národní demokracie)
- NC (NK) – National Congress (Národní kongres)
- NPD – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
- SPPO (NSZ) – Supreme Public Prosecutor' s Office (Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství)
- RWE (PEX) – right wing, right-wing extremism, right-wing extremists (Pravicově extremistický, pravicoví extremisté)
- PMS – Probation and Mediation Service (Probační a mediační služba ČR)

CPIS (SKPV) – Criminal Police and Investigation Service (Služba kriminální policie a vyšetřování)

CYCU (SMKČ) – Czechoslovak youth communist union (Svaz mladých komunistů Československa)

SocSol – Socialist Solidarity (Socialistická solidarita)

NRC (SRB) – Network of Revolutionary Cells (Síť revolučních buněk)

CC (TZ) – Criminal Code (Trestní zákoník)

TD (ÚO) – Territorial Department (Územní odbor)

UCOC (ÚOOZ) – Unit for Combating Organised Crime (Útvar pro odhalování organizovaného zločinu)

WPM – White Power Music