

MINISTERSTVO VNITRA  
ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY

# **REPORT ON EXTREMISM IN THE TERRITORY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 2015**

**Ministry of the Interior  
Security Policy and Crime Prevention Department  
Prague 2016**

**The Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2015 was approved by the Czech Government on May ... 2016 by Resolution No. ...**

The text has not undergone any linguistic or stylistic editing.

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# 1. Introduction

The Report on extremism and associated phenomena in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2015 (hereinafter referred to as „the Report“) is submitted on the basis of the Government Resolution No. 389 of May 25, 2015. The Evaluation of the Conception in combating extremism in 2015 and the Conception in combating extremism in 2016 are included in separate documents.

The document does not capture all racist and xenophobic manifestations registered in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2015. The Report concentrates on members or sympathizers of extremist groups. Capturing of all racist and xenophobic behaviours, actions or statements on a national or a regional level is beyond the scope of both the document and the issue of extremism itself as it is perceived by the Ministry of the Interior. The primary objective of the document is the description of activities of entities, which are considered extremist by the Ministry of the Interior.

The author of this Report is the Ministry of the Interior. The source material was obtained from representatives of the intelligence services, the Police of the Czech Republic, other resorts of the state administration, the Ministry of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Spectators’ violence, respectively hooliganism, is a separate topic on the agenda of the Ministry of the Interior. The document on extremism does not focus on sects and pseudo-religious organizations since there were no records of significant activities related to a security risk of an infiltration into government structures, political or economic sphere, or threats to democratic structures of the state.

The document is processed annually. Its aim is to inform the public about developments on the domestic extremist scene on a regular basis. New measures are subsequently being adopted based on the findings, which are included in this document.

The first passage, dedicated to the domestic scene, is based on data provided by the Security Intelligence Services and the Police of the Czech Republic; in particular, experts on extremism from the Unit for Combating Organised Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigations Service and the Regional Directorates of the Police of the Czech Republic.

The statistics have been provided by the Police of the Czech Republic, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic.

The third part is dedicated to foreign influences impinging on the Czech extremist scene. It was processed by experts from the Masaryk University in Brno with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via specifically selected foreign embassies in other European countries.

A list of abbreviations shall be found in the last section.

This paper includes photographs, which were taken by the employees of the Police of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of the Interior. Photographs obtained from other sources, e.g. in the foreign scene section, are clearly referenced.

## 2. Definition of the term extremism

In this document, the term „extremism“ is defined identically to previous annual reports. Last time when such a comprehensive definition was published in full, was in the Report on the issue of extremism in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2002 with the Government Resolution No. 699 adopted on July 9, 2003.<sup>1</sup> In this context, it is also possible to refer to the established case law in relation to the interpretation of the term „movement“.<sup>2</sup> The full wording of the definition of extremism is available at <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/co-je-extremismus.aspx>.

Not all the entities that are included in the Report have engaged in illegal activities in 2015. From a long-term perspective, they nevertheless possess features of extremism in a manner defined in previous annual documents.

The Report still holds the concept of extremism; however, the Ministry of the Interior cooperates with institutions which use the concept of hate (bias) crimes (i.e. offences motivated by hatred, bias, or crimes motivated by collective prejudice) and believes that the concepts of extremism and hate crimes may be complementary, and there is a scope for strengthening the elements of hate (bias) crimes within the law-enforcement and judicial units.

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<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.mvcr.cz> (section „Security threats“, subsection „Extremism“ – „Strategy for combating extremism and Annual reports on extremism“).

<sup>2</sup> In particular the opinion of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court Tpjn 302/2005 (No. 11/2007 Coll.), and also the Supreme Court Resolutions 5 Tdo 79/2006, 5 Tdo 337/2002, 3 Tdo 1174/2004, and Resolution 4 T 98/2009 of the Regional Court in Brno.

### 3. Report on extremism in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2015

#### 3.1. Summary

- In 2015, there were records of 307 events organized by politically motivated extremist entities or with the attendance of individuals active in extremist entities. This figure represents a slight increase compared to 2014 with 291 recorded events. From the total, 106 events may be attributed to the extreme right and 141 events to the extreme left. Anti-Islamic and anti-migration groups organized a total of 60 events. A total of 175 criminal offences with an extremist subtext were recorded.
- The main highlighted topic of all politically motivated extremist groups was migration.
- In the context of the extreme right, the Workers' Party of Social Justice was marginalized. On the other hand, the **National Democracy**, which collaborated with other anti-Islamic and anti-migration entities, **recorded a growth of support**. Other entities expressed themselves only sporadically.
- The most active within the extreme left remained the **anarchist movement**. It mobilized in 2015, not only against the growing popularity of anti-Islamic and anti-migration entities but also against the police operation "Phoenix" directed against persons suspected of the involvement in a militant group called the **Network of Revolutionary Cells**. The group claimed responsibility for a total of 8 arson attacks during the last year.
- **Anti-Islamic and anti-migration entities** represented rivals of the extreme right groups, and, at the same time, they also contributed to the polarization within the society by their activities.

#### 3.2. New trends, manifestations a movement transformations

A significant topic, which was exploited without exception by all politically motivated extremist entities during the last year, was mainly the widely and universally debated **migration crisis**. Migration strongly influenced the extreme right political spectrum. On the one hand, the potential of former „traditional“ groups was weakened, however, on the other hand, groups expressing anti-Islamic and anti-migration attitudes in a populist manner emerged. The social dangerousness of the latter category may be much greater

Unlike the publicly-known extreme right entities that also attempted to use the topic of migration to their popularization and the gain of wider support, these **new groups** distanced from the traditional extreme right movement relatively strictly. Nevertheless, they **enjoyed the support of members and supporters of extremist groups**. Besides, they also managed to **interest a part of a wider public**, which avoids supporting the extreme right, through their strong opinions. Anti-Islamic and anti-migration groups then denoted all disagreements with their manifestations as attacks on the freedom of speech. The Report focuses on these entities for the following reasons:



- In the past and at present, there were investigations or **criminal proceedings** in connection with events of the aforementioned entities, particularly related to the statements and speeches given during these events.

- Overall, the **speeches of representatives** of these entities are **on the verge of law**, especially as regards the instigation to hatred or defamation of particular groups of people, usually on the basis of their ethnicity or religious beliefs.
- They use **extreme populism** to reach **the widest possible audience**, i.e. supporters and sympathizers of the extreme right scene.
- **Their method for mobilizing supporters** does not differ from the methods used by extremist platforms. These include deliberate provoking of a subjective feeling of threat and danger, which is also achieved through purposeful, misinterpreted or, although sporadically, false information.

In 2015, the influence of such entities was typical; they did not profile themselves on the traditional left-right political spectrum, nor did they held extensive ideological assumptions and positions. They rather functioned as **protest initiatives** that oriented their activities on criticism of the Czech membership in international organizations, particularly the EU and NATO, and the so-called post-November development, political representation and social elites. These initiatives, usually with origins in the environment of virtual social networks, involved people from both the extreme right and extreme left spectrum. On various grounds, these platforms often inclined to sympathy to an uncritical adoration of the Russian Federation and President Putin. Therefore, they often aided the spread of Russian propaganda. Some entities also manifested militant tendencies during the last year.

A large part of the extreme left scene tried to promote itself to the public through activities that cannot be regarded as extremist, but rather as value-indifferent, or even civically commendable. Extreme left-wing entities, however, are mentioned in the report because some of their members or sympathizers **tend to engage in violent activities in pursuit of their goals** (e.g. assaulting ideological opponents, arson attacks, damaging another's property, etc.). It should be borne in mind that their openly formulated ideological foundations are **based on intolerance (class, towards ideological opponents), unwillingness to democratic dialogue, and disrespect towards the pluralist political system**.

In 2015, there was a **total of 307 events** organized by politically extremist entities, or with the participation of individuals active in extremist movements. Compared to last year, which saw a total of 291 events, this represents a slight increase. Of the given number, a total of 106 events can be attributed to the extreme right scene. Events organized by the National Democracy are also included in this figure. A total of 141 events were recorded as regards the activities of the extreme left. Anti-Islamic and anti-migration groups organized a total of 60 events. Furthermore, there was a record of 175 criminal offences with an extremist subtext. As evident from the graph below, which captures data from 2011, the last year did not deviate from the existing development.



From the perspective of regional manifestations, there were no **changes** recorded **in comparison with the long-term development**. The capital of Prague continued to play a central role in comparison with other regions. Major public events were further held in Ostrava, Brno, České Budějovice and Pilsen. Newly, there were records of protests in front of facilities for foreigners. On the other hand, there were no records of protest events in the so-called socially excluded localities, or against ethnic minorities. The topic was substituted entirely by the reflection of the so-called migration crisis.

### **3.3. Main security threats and risks for the Czech Republic**

- General efforts of extremists to **divide society and weaken the Czech Republic by creating antagonisms** based on ethnic, religious, class, or other keys.
- Further **increase in tensions based on ethnic or religious keys** including demonstrations and manifestations of violence. Local triggering incidents still have the potential to mobilize the public. There is also a **polarization within the majority**, which creates animosity among the followers of various ideological streams.

- A possible **occurrence of radicalized militant individuals or small groups**, which can use violence to promote their interests.
- **Adoption of extremist elements into the political mainstream.**
- A possible **emergence of an extremist political entity with a charismatic leader**, who will be able to unite the extremist scene and reach out to other potential supporters.
- An emergence of **domestic militias**, which can often be illegally armed and aim their manifestations and activities against particular groups of people based on ethnic or religious keys. In general, the risk can be seen in the association of individuals with radical militant views against the constitutional, political and social establishment.

### **3.4. Anti-Islamic and anti-migration groups**

Various **populist entities, political movements, and initiatives mobilized in connection with the so-called migration wave.** Unlike the extreme right, these were relatively **successful in acquiring new followers.** They differed from the extreme right entities by a deliberate detachment from the extreme right or neo-Nazi scene. Nor were they associated with its activities in the past.

They mainly expressed their **negative attitudes towards Muslims and migration**, which were the two main topics. Typically, a construction that all migrants are Muslims, Islam is an inherently intolerant religion and that every Muslim is a terrorist or is prone to a pathological behaviour, was purposely used. Anti-Islamic and anti-migration groups were able to select particular messages, which were supportive of such construction. It is necessary to emphasize that many of these further interpreted or commented messages were distorted or completely false.

The majority of protest movements **emerged from the environment of social networks on the Internet.** After reaching a certain degree of popularity, these groups started to **move their**



Gathering in Prague on 17 th November co-organized by Block against Islam

**activities to the public.** Some activists, originally active only in the virtual environment, then began to show ambitions to infiltrate into real politics.

The only supporting topic of these groups was the **emphasis on the danger associated with Muslims and security risks linked to migration.** Many of these protest movements, however, either did not have any program or offered only abbreviated and populist „solutions“.

These groups were constantly trying to mobilize their supporters through social networks, press, flyers, petitions or public gatherings. At the same time, they defined themselves very aggressively against their opponents or against people who did not agree with their attitudes towards Muslims and on migration. Thereby they significantly contributed to increased polarization in the society.

### 3.4.1. Main entities

The main entity, which consolidated and largely mobilized its followers in the course of the last year, was the initiative **We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic** (hereinafter referred to as "IvČRN"), which emerged from the platform **Czech Defence League** (hereinafter referred to as "CzDL"). At the beginning of the year, it still operated only virtually. After the January attacks in Paris, however, it organized a series of demonstrations with the participation of 500 - 800 people in Prague, Brno and České Budějovice. In June, the initiative IvČRN transformed to an association entitled **Block against Islam** (hereinafter referred to as "BPI"). Martin Konvička became its leading figure.

The BPI association acted strongly against Islam as a religion, as well as against the presence of the Muslim community in the Czech Republic, respectively, across the European Union. In the second half of 2015, its members launched **another series of demonstrations in response to the so-called refugee crisis**. In this context, they made attempts to emphasize the dangers of the so-called multiculturalism and the "influx" of young Muslims. Criticism was also directed towards the European Union and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whom they identified as the originators of the migration wave. BPI has **established cooperation with other entities**, for example, a political party **Dawn - National Coalition** (hereinafter referred to as "ÚNK") and the **Union of Security Forces**.

Representatives of the IvČRN initiative have long tried to establish contacts with other political movements, members of Parliament and state institutions. Repeatedly, for example, they performed at conferences in the Chamber of Deputies. To support their efforts, they distributed a pamphlet of the Islamic State entitled Dabiq to state institutions and schools.

The most important achievement of the BPI was its **participation in the organization of a gathering on 17th November in Prague**. It was attended by roughly 2,500 people; a speech was also given by the President Miloš Zeman.

The cooperation between ÚNK and BPI brought certain advantages to the two entities. ÚNK was helped by new, newsworthy individuals around Martin Konvička. BPI benefited from the fact that its partner had representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and provided it with organizational assistance. Both entities were also able to easily develop contacts abroad, especially with the German **PEGIDA** movement. Representatives of ÚNK



[Martin Konvička's speech at a gathering in Prague on 17th November](#)

irregularly attended demonstrations in Dresden, representatives of Pegida participated in the aforementioned demonstration in Prague on 17th November. The Prague gathering was also attended by the founder of a controversial group **English Defence League** (hereinafter referred to as "EDL"), who uses a pseudonym Tommy Robinson. EDL is known for its

violent protests and provocations of the Muslim community in the UK. It inspired the creation of other national "defence leagues", including CzDL.

**A closer unification of anti-Islamic and anti-migration entities was prevented by disagreements between ÚNK and the Freedom and Direct Democracy movement** (hereinafter referred to as "SPD"), whose leader is Tomio Okamura. After the schism within the Dawn of Direct Democracy, animosity and unwillingness to cooperation existed between ÚNK and SPD. The fact that Dawn of Direct Democracy had a great political potential in the past, and that both ÚNK and the SPD have representatives in the Chamber of Deputies caused that **some traditional right-wing extremist entities attempted to establish cooperation**. However, they had to choose only one of them. The Workers' Party for Social Justice failed in its efforts to establish cooperation with IvČRN in the past. The issue particularly concerned its connections with the neo-Nazi scene. The chairman of the National Democracy Adam Bartoš, on the contrary, tried to gain political points by inviting SPD chairman to a series of assemblies entitled "camps of people". In the past, Tomio Okamura was popular in a part of the right-wing extremist scene for his statements against the so-called "inadaptable". Cooperation between Okamura and Bartoš, however, later stopped, presumably for the excessive radicalism of the chairman of the National Democracy.

For anti-Islamic and anti-migration entities, the **establishment of international contacts** was very important. An alliance with the **French National Front** was considered as the most valuable. Its chairman Marine Le Pen visited Prague in May. The closest Czech allies of the French National Front was the Civic Conservative Party (hereinafter referred to as "OKS") of Jiří Janeček (in August, OKS agreed on a merger with the party Patriots of the Czech Republic of Jiří Vítek) and SPD.

### **3.4.2. Activities**

During 2015, there was a total of **34 public protest gatherings** organized by the aforementioned entities. Compared to the extreme right, the participation was relatively high, usually around 400 - 1.000 people. The demonstration in Prague on 17th November, which was supported by BPI, was attended by about 2.500 people. At the November rally, however, the previously announced speech of Miloš Zeman clearly played an important role.

In connection with the activities of listed groups, **investigations and criminal proceedings, particularly in connection with public speeches** during demonstrations on suspicion of spreading of alarm messages or defamation and instigation to hatred against a specific group of people, were initiated during the last year.

### **3.5. Right-wing extremism**

On the right-wing extremist scene, a regrouping of forces took place in 2015. On the one hand, there has been a **marginalization** of the formerly dominant **Workers' Party of Social Justice** and, on the other, a certain strengthening of positions was recorded by the **National Democracy**. Its ties to the extreme right scene, unlike ties of Workers' Party of

Social Justice, were not so obvious and medialized and so the ND was more successful in reaching the public. **Migration was the key mobilization topic** in 2015.

In addition to the change in the proportion of strength of the two main extreme right organizations, **attempts to unite the extreme right scene in connection with the immigration crisis** were made.

Cross-annually, there was an **increase in recorded concerts and musical events** for supporters of right-wing extremism. However, it has to be emphasized that the nature of these events varied considerably from concerts known from previous years. Criminal activities in connection with the concerts were recorded very rarely and usually only concerned individuals.

As regards the criminal activity, **hate speech on the Internet** continued to grow in particular.

### 3.5.1. Structure and entities of the scene

Apart from the **National Democracy** (hereinafter referred to as "ND") and the **Workers' Party of Social Justice** (hereinafter referred to as "DSSS"), there was an absence of any other right-wing extremist organization operating on a national level in the Czech Republic. ND, in particular, tried to create its local representation but often only virtually. Local groups of activists continued to prevail; these operated mainly in Prague, Ostrava, Brno and South Moravia, Olomouc and Pilsen.

In 2015, a **rivalry between the DSSS and NS** was evident; it was mainly caused by the enmity between their chairmen. While at the national level, the collaboration of these entities was not conceivable, on a local level such collaboration took place especially during public meetings. Mutual relations were partly revived during a demonstration in Brno on 26th June and on the occasion of demonstrations on 17th November when supporters of DSSS also participated in the event convened by ND.



Chairman of DM Lamprecht looking up to the chairman of DSSS Vandas. Brno 26th June.

In 2015, **DSSS** also found itself in crisis, which accompanies the party since 2012. Although the party officially declared regional organizations in a total of 12 regions, relatively active branches remained only in the Ústí nad Labem region, partially active in Prague and individuals in Carlsbad region.

DSSS rather belatedly responded to the January terrorist attacks in Paris. On the contrary, those were quickly used by other entities, especially the IvČRN initiative. The party compensated its passivity in the domestic policy by a significant activity in establishing foreign relations and contacts. Among the more significant accomplishments can be included its participation in a pan-European coalition of nationalist groups called **Alliance for Peace and Freedom**, which stands jointly against the European Union and its "aggressive" attitude towards the Russian Federation. Furthermore, it supports the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria. Of the other members of the coalition may be mentioned, among others, the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), Greek

Golden Dawn, Italian New Power (Forza Nuova) and the British National Party (BNP). Support for the Alliance was also expressed by People's Party-Our Slovakia of Banská Bystrica county chief Marian Kotleba. Representatives of the given partner groups occasionally attended events organized by DSSS or the Workers' Youth; particularly members of the Young National Democrats (Jungenationaldemokraten - youth organization of the National Democratic Party of Germany) or the People's Party-Our Slovakia and Slovak Togetherness.

The **Workers' Youth** (hereinafter referred to as "DM"), as in previous years, is trying to focus its activities primarily on addressing the younger generation and attracting new supporters. In the long term, however, the recruitment of new members and sympathizers was unsuccessful. The cells were mainly active in the Moravian-Silesian, Olomouc, and South Moravian regions, partly in Prague. Officially, there was a cell in the Carlsbad region, but it had not developed any independent activities. In addition, the DM organized traditional public events of the DSSS.

Nationalist and Eurosceptic **ND** focused on issues related to the migration wave in 2015. The National Democrats tried to generate interest through controversy and radical speeches, as well as through the establishment of new alliances. Media coverage attracted anti-migration demonstrations organized under the title "camps of people". At the meeting in Prague on 1st July, some of the participants carried mock gallows.



ND supporters listening to the speech of T. Okamura, Prague 18th July.

The most outstanding "camp of people" was a gathering at the Republic Square in Prague on 17th November; after the ND demonstration, about 500 to 800 of the participants joined other protesters of anti-migration events. Together they moved in front of the Government Office, where about 4,000 people gathered eventually. After the official end of the event, about a

thousand people refused to leave the demarcated area, and some of them began to provoke violence. The police, therefore, used coercive measures against some of them.

ND reflected on the declining importance of DSSS and started looking for new partners. From a cooperation with the populist movement **Freedom and Direct Democracy**, it expected an increase of media interest and participation of people at public events. In an effort to cross-link anti-system groups, the party sought connections to various mobilization or monothematic platforms, for example, Anti-Maidan Prague, Czechoslovak Slovak National Uprising (successor of the Holešov Challenge), Hey Citizens!, Association of Friends of Russia, Institute for Slavic Strategic Studies and other, often virtual projects.

Especially in the second half of the year, the party launched the formation of regional structures. In virtual space, in particular, regional and local organizations were established. In November, a renewal of leadership also took place. **Luke Belson** replaced controversial **Ladislav Zemánek** in the position of the Deputy, who found himself on the Ukrainian list of undesirable persons in connection with his visits to the separatist Donetsk People's Republic.

In July, the party published a **call for the establishment of militia** that could be deployed both in a case of a war conflict and to defend the national borders.

In the course of the year, ND tried to establish cooperation with an initiative **Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush** against a war planned by NATO command (hereinafter referred to as "ČSVZ", later Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush for Peace<sup>3</sup>). Given the focus of the group and its paramilitary character, the ND wanted to use it for a promotion as well as the creation of its paramilitary component. ND intention was to gain the support of ČSVZ members in the development of its project, the National Militia, and gradually incorporate ČSVZ into its structures. Most members of ČSVZ, however, wanted to remain an apolitical organization and refused to merge with any political parties. Therefore, the challenge to join the National Militia remained without response, and closer cooperation or even the merger of these two entities did not take place. The advocate of cooperation with ND was the leading figure of ČSVZ Marek Obrtel, who was in a direct contact with the party chairman Adam Bartoš and who attended several of its events. Among others, ND representatives presented the ČSVZ initiative as a collaborating entity and, often, also as a co-organizer of "camps of people". This fact was often refused and denied by the representatives of ČSVZ disagreeing with cooperation with ND. Approximately 75 members of ČSVZ came to support the President Miloš Zeman at a meeting on 17th November; the initiative did not engage in any significant activities till the end of the year.



ČSVZ supporters expressing support for President Zeman, Prague 17th November.

ND leadership also sought to establish cooperation with foreign entities. **On 4th July, for example, ND representatives attended a conference of Polish Falanga party in Krakow, Poland.**

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Mobilization platform Generation of Identity manifested itself in a limited manner throughout the year. The group, which operates as a Czech branch of a long-term operating French anti-migration initiative, put emphasis on spontaneous events, lectures and other activities focused on promotion. Its membership base comprised of only a few dozens of

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<sup>3</sup> ČSVZ initiative was established in January 2015 as an open group on Facebook. It mainly targeted former members of the security forces before 1989, to whom the validity of their former service vow was emphasized. The activity and focus of the initiative nevertheless managed to reach also people, who are generally dissatisfied or frustrated with the development after 1989. Gradually, it ceased to be only virtual, when its supporters started meeting up at the so-called consultative fires, organize various exercises, created a military-type organizational structure (regional companies subordinate to unified command) and elected a leader Marek Obrtel. The initiative presented itself through a strong criticism of NATO, EU, USA and the post-November democratic regime in the Czech Republic. Pro-Russian attitudes were typical. In connection with the migration crisis, it started focusing on refugees. Throughout its existence, ČSVZ initiative struggled with contradictions between its members arising from differences of opinion and different ideas as regards its activities, direction, and cooperation with political parties, particularly with ND. The internal crisis first resulted in cutting off the founder of the original ČSVZ Facebook initiative and renaming the group to Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush for Peace, and ultimately in the resignation of Marek Obrtel from both its leadership and membership. As a result, ČSVZ split up into autonomous groups; it is not yet clear whether these groups will continue their activity.

people. Many of them were previously active within the neo-Nazi scene. Contrary to, for example, Austria, they were unable to attract and significantly expand the number of its followers. **Generation of Identity** also followed up on a former platform "European Solidarity Front for Kosovo", which supported the Serbs living in Kosovo. Relatively vitally it collaborated mainly with German and Austrian counterparts. It operated actively mostly in Prague, Ústí nad Labem, and South Bohemian regions.

Activists of the right extremist group **Pro-Vlast**, which profiled especially in the field of anti-Islamic activities, also continued in their work. Of the other group's activities, we can mention a demonstration, which was organized by Pro-Vlast on 4th April. The aim of this gathering was to oppose the activities of the Ombudsman Anna Šabatová and was attended by only about 20 people.

On 8 July, a new association **National Resurgence** was registered (hereinafter referred to as "NO"); a right-wing extremist Pavel Matějný, formerly the main figure of a right-wing extremist and anti-Roma movement the Czech Lions, was behind the emergence of the association. NO activists participated mainly in demonstrations of other entities in 2015, primarily ND. They organized, for example, a demonstration directed against the Prague Pride march in Prague on 15th August, which was supported by only 20 people.

Another attempt to establish a new platform was a project entitled **Autonom CZ**. It followed up the already defunct movement Autonomous Nationalists. Its members engage in a long-term collaboration with a branch of Autonomous Nationalists Czestochowa and have contacts with DM.



May Day DSSS gathering in Brno

hundreds of people on several occasions. Some gatherings highlighted the presence of radical opinions among the wider population. Examples include the so-called gallows for "national traitors", which were produced and carried out by people without contacts or engagement in activities of the extreme right. In other cases, flags of Novorussia, St. George's ribbons or flags of the Novorussian Armed Forces were displayed.

In 2015, DM organized a series of events. Under its auspices, for example, a May Day demonstration of DSSS was organized in Brno. It was attended by about 200 people, among others, also foreign activists from the National Democratic Party of Germany, Slovak group Defiance Trnava and the Hungarian branch of Blood & Honour. DM also participated in the organization of a demonstration against immigration quotas in Brno on 26th June, which was,

### 3.5.2. Activities of the scene

During the last year, there was a total of 48 gatherings and public events organized by extreme right-wing entities. Unlike the previous years, there was a greater **involvement of a wider "non-extremist" public** in the events associated with the extreme right.

A typical example was the so-called **"camps of people"** organized by ND and allied initiatives. Anti-Islamic and anti-migration themes managed to mobilize

nevertheless, officially convened under the auspices of the Facebook initiative "We do not want refugees in the Czech Republic." The demonstration was attended by about 700 people. It was protested against by about 500 opponents. There were minor public disturbances, and the police had to detain several people. DM also held a traditional demonstration "Kosovo is Serbia" in Ostrava on 14 February. A right-wing group Autonom CZ - Independent Activists from Ostrava also co-organized the event. It was attended by 60 - 80 people, including representatives from Poland and Slovakia.

DM representatives traveled to Germany on several occasions, where they helped their German counterparts from Junge Nationaldemokraten with various organizational matters. During the year, they also actively participated in several meetings of the European youth nationalist groups.

In 2015, there was a **slight increase in the number of concerts** organized for supporters of the extreme right scene. Eight concerts were registered in 2014 and 16 in 2015. Their character was moderate in comparison with problematic concerts from the previous

years. Former explicit manifestations of hatred, calls for violence or the promotion of hateful ideologies were completely suppressed or remained latent, and were mostly associated with reproductions of old songs, whose original texts of hate were amended.



Tomáš Ortel singing against immigration, Prague, Vyšehrad 15th August.

Recorded concerts usually took place in border regions and localities in northern Bohemia, such as a concert in Liberec on 7th November with the performance of **Saubande (CZ)**, **Painful Awakening** and **7 of November**. Similar bands are, for example, **Lucky Boneheads Crew 1912**, **Rollberg** or **Bootboys Social Club**, which perform abroad relatively often. Domestic sympathizers continued to

visit concerts in Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, but also in the UK and Portugal.

At the end of the year, the attention was gained by the nomination and subsequent award of a controversial Pilsen band **Ortel** in the Czech Nightingale Mattoni Awards. In the past, a part of its members participated in groups of the White Power Music genre. In 2010, Ortel, as one of the first right-wing extremist bands, started focusing on concerts of a purely commercial nature. Although its audience was formed and continues to be formed by extreme-right sympathizers, a significant portion of its supporters is currently represented by people from the wider public. A hard neo-Nazi core distanced from Ortel because it did not agree with its moderate production. In 2015, the band leader Tomáš "Ortel" Hnídek repeatedly featured in the gatherings of ND. His musical production had a very anti-migration and anti-Islamic orientation. The example of Ortel, can demonstrate that some musicians benefited from the populist use of critics of issues associated with the migration wave to increase their popularity.

Compared to 2014, there was a **slight decrease in criminal offences** with extremist subtext. In the long term, with the exception of 2011 and 2013 when demonstrations and

protests in the so-called socially excluded localities were recorded, there is also a decrease in violent criminal activities.

Conversely, a long-term phenomenon is the **increasing prevalence of hate speech disseminated through the Internet, especially through virtual social networks**. These networks allow users to share various materials or texts with hateful or derogatory content against certain groups of people based on their religious or political beliefs, or racial and ethnic origin. The boundaries between freedom of speech, which is often referred to, and illegal activities, specifically defamation and instigation to hatred, is relatively thin and depends on the context in which the manifestation occurs.

In this context, it is also possible to mention activists associated with **White-media.info** website. They attracted attention just before Christmas, claiming responsibility for hacking the Twitter account of the Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka. White-media functions since 2009, first as a video sharing website aimed at the promotion of primitive racism and xenophobia. Later, the content was supplemented by a section of the monitoring of ideological opponents and, subsequently, also a section on hacking, which publishes attacks of "nationalist" hackers on various, often publicly exposed, persons. The website is deliberately operated from a server in the US with regard to a well-known perception of freedom of speech as regards the law of that country. For this reason, the network of contributors to White-media.info is difficult to prosecute.

### **3.6. Left-wing extremism**

During the last year, the extreme left scene also **mobilized in connection with the topic of migration**, but from the opposite perspective. The first impulse was a series of demonstrations of the initiative IvČRN in the aftermath of January terrorist attacks in Paris. Similarly to the protests in the so-called socially excluded localities, entities and individuals well-known from the environment of the extreme left scene as well as various civic initiatives and public figures participated in a series of the so-called counter-demonstrations. Counter-demonstrations have become a regular phenomenon that accompanied gatherings and public events of right-wing extremist or anti-Islamic and anti-migration entities. A variety of initiatives aimed at helping refugees was established within the extreme left; a relatively active was the Czech branch of an international platform **Refugees Welcome**.



Gathering in support of refugees, Prague 17th October.

During the year, the anarchist movement intensely responded to the implementation of the police operation "Phoenix", aimed at people suspected of involvement in activities of a

militant group **Network of Revolutionary Cells** (hereinafter referred to as "SRB"). The aforementioned group claimed responsibility for a total of 14 arson attacks since its establishment, some of which were committed after the Phoenix operation. As a result of Phoenix, five people were accused of criminal activities (more to the SRB in the next section).

### 3.6.1. Structure and entities of the scene

The main streams within the domestic extreme left are formed by the anarchist movement, and also a long-term marginal Trotskyist and Marxist-Leninist groups. Radical environmental groups and squatters also developed certain activities.

The anarchist movement was fragmented to locally active groups, cells, and individuals. The **Anarchist Federation**, formerly known as the Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation, formed the umbrella platform. It was personally interconnected with the **No Racism Initiative**, a group, which engaged in the majority of protest events against the gatherings of the extreme right, as well as anti-Islamic and anti-migration entities. A free group entitled the **Voice of Anarcho-pacifism** (hereinafter referred to as "VAP"), which brings together various local collectives and individuals, was also active until April. VAP activities ceased after two of its members were accused in connection with the police operation "Phoenix".

In 2015, the greatest media attention was paid to the anarchist scene in connection with an ongoing **direct action of militant anarchists** from SRB. Through a communique published on the Internet websites of left-wing extremist organizations, they claimed responsibility for a series of arson attacks, which were directed against the owner of a Prague restaurant *Řízkárna*, and against police vehicles.

The first three attacks took place during March 2015. Two of them were directed against vehicles of *Řízkárna* restaurant, one at a police vehicle in Olomouc. Further SRB attacks followed the "Phoenix" police operation dated to 28 April 2015, during which several individuals, suspected of the involvement in SRB activities, were detained. Subsequently, five individuals were charged in connection with planning a terrorist attack on a train carrying military material with the use of Molotov cocktails, and one person for an illegal possession of firearms<sup>4</sup>.

In response to the action "Phoenix", further six arson attacks<sup>5</sup>, which were later claimed by SRB, took place between May and July 2015. The published communique, among

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<sup>4</sup> By the end of 2015, all of them were gradually accused, with one exception, released from custody and are being investigated at liberty.

<sup>5</sup> On 14th May, there was an arson attack on a vehicle of *Řízkárna* restaurant. The communication included criticism of the police repression against the Czech anti-authoritarian movement. On 15th May, anarchists carried out an arson attack on a vehicle of the municipal police in Hostivařská street in Prague. In the communication, they appealed to other anarchists to join the fight against the system and criticized the operation Phoenix. On 26th June, another arson attack was carried out on a vehicle of *Řízkárna* in Prague. According to the communication, the primary aim of the action was a call for a fight against capitalism and pointing out at the criticism of exploitation of its employees. On 28th June, there was another arson attack on vehicles of the PČR in Most. The communication again criticized the police repressions against the anti-authoritarians. On 1st July, militant activists carried out an arson attack on a police vehicle in Strašnice, Prague. In the communication, they criticized the state monopoly on arms and, on the other hand, supported personal possession of weapons; they also expressed solidarity with accused anarchists. The last arson attack on a police vehicle, which was claimed by SRB in 2015, took place in Bubenská street in Prague on 4th July. The communication involved criticism of the operation Phoenix.

other things, stated that these events represented an action of solidarity with the detained anarchists and a protest against repressions against the Czech anti-authoritarian movement.

The police measure "Phoenix" also mobilized moderate anarchists, who joined the criticism not only of the action itself but also of the overall repressive procedure of the state against their movement. A mobilization platform entitled "**Anti-Phoenix**" was founded. Anarchists expressed their support for the accused individuals through solidarity demonstrations or benefit concerts. In Prague, for example, particularly in front of the detention centres in Pankrác and Ruzyně, they organized several meetings in support of the detainees, which were attended by several dozens of people. A slightly larger demonstration took place on Jungmann Square in Prague on 28 August under the title "Who watches the Watchmen?"<sup>6</sup>.

Support for the detained anarchists was also expressed by a radical animal rights group, the **Animal Liberation Front**, a division of the Justice Department, through its communiqué. Its activists sprayed about 200 minks with a pink paint in Velký Ratmírov on 8 August.

During 2015, adherents of SRB also published articles on the Internet websites of allied anarcho-autonomous entities which included instructions on how to, for example, ignite a vehicle or make a Molotov cocktail.

Since 2014, the so-called solidarity networks, i.e. informal groups of activists who identify themselves as a radical version of trade unions "fighting for workers' rights", attempted to win recognition in the Czech Republic. Specifically, this was the already nonfunctional **Most Solidarity Network** and, based on its model, Prague Solidarity Network (**Solis Prague**) established in November 2014. To broad public knowledge, both groups came through coercive actions against the Prague restaurant Řízkárna in connection with the allegedly outstanding salaries to some former employees. The campaign included a wide range of activities: from gatherings in front of restaurants, posting of flyers damaging the reputation of the restaurant, occupying the interior, contacting suppliers and competitors, to sabotage and direct damages to the restaurant's property. In 2015, there was a total of four arson attacks on the restaurant's property, after which the campaign temporarily stopped. After several months of silence, a new wave of actions was launched in December, involving the spillage of butyric acid in the restaurant, anonymous bomb threats or personal threats to the owner.



Anarchist 1st May with a motto "War to War"

Partial campaigns were also **anti-war protests**, which have become the main theme of last year's anarchist 1st May. The anti-war campaign followed the less extensive activities undertaken already in 2014.

The topic of **squatting** was of an interest of anarchists in 2015. Supporters of alternative lifestyle particularly used two places in Prague. About 30 activists were residing in the Cibulka squat for a long period. On 5th May, the property owner filed a complaint against

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<sup>6</sup> It was attended by about 150 – 180 people and passed without disturbing public order.

the squatters and wanted to evacuate the building. On 6th May, the Police of the Czech Republic intervened and vacated the premises against the will of squatters. In the other period of 2015, anti-authoritarians organized several small demonstrations in support of Cibulka; all of them were peaceful.

The second place, in which supporters of squatting were concentrated, was the Autonomous Social Centre Klinika in Prague's Žižkov. Activists used this facility legally from 2nd March when they signed a contract permitting its use. Many lectures, benefit concerts, readings and other solidarity events took place there, while their main topic was the refugee crisis or the expression of support for anarchists accused in the aftermath of Operation Phoenix. Anarchists participated in a range of events organized at Klinika during the year.

**The Marxist-Leninist part of the left-wing extremist spectrum remained fragmented into several marginal collectives with a small membership base in 2015 and continued to stagnate.**

It was possible to record greater activity at Trotskyist groups the Socialist Solidarity (hereinafter referred to as „SocSol“) and Left perspective (hereinafter referred to as „LP“). Nevertheless, they remained on the edge of interest of the general public.

Together with anarchist groups, they participated in the organization of pro-refugee gatherings and protests against anti-migration and right-wing extremist events. Between 23rd and 26th July, the LP and SocSol co-organized the traditional Anti-capitalist Camp in Heřmanice v Podještědí. Their activities were also apparent on the Internet. On their websites, they published articles, in which they supported the position of Russia concerning the conflict in Ukraine, or articles supporting squatter activities.

The Youth Communist Movement was further represented by the **Communist Youth Union** (hereinafter referred to as „KSM“) and the **Czechoslovak Youth Communist Union** (hereinafter referred to as „SMKČ“), whose activity was, however, visible mostly on the Internet. The unions continued to struggle with a relatively small members base. As such, this was even further weakened in the case of SMKČ by the leave of some members to the newly established Czech Communist Party 21 (hereinafter referred to as „KSČ 21“)<sup>7</sup>. Even though the members of KSM and SMKČ repeatedly criticized the leadership of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia for the alleged liberal direction of the party, they attended its public events, where they made unsuccessful efforts to promote their entities. They only held a minimum of their own events and rather supported the gatherings of other extreme left entities<sup>8</sup>.

A larger part of activities of young communists was focused on article publishing on the Internet. Repeatedly, they adored the regime in Czechoslovakia in the period of 1948 – 1989 and criticized the democratic establishment of the Czech Republic. Besides, they published articles taken over from the environment of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, whose member is the Communist Youth Union, and the International Coordination of

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<sup>7</sup> KSČ 21 was established at the end of 2014 in response to a split within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after the death of Miroslav Štěpán and withdrawal of a part of its members to a newly founded party. KSČ 21 was an utterly insignificant entity during 2015 without any activity.

<sup>8</sup> Both KSM and SMKČ, for example, attended a „manifestation gathering against capitalism in our countries“ by the grave of Klement Gottwald in Prague's Olšany Cemetery on 21st February. It was co-organized by KSČ 21 and other marginal Marxist-Leninist entities. The total attendance was about 50 people.

Revolutionary Parties and Organizations, whose member is the Czechoslovak Youth Communist Union.

### 3.6.2. Activities of the scene

In 2015 there was a total of **61 public events** and gatherings of the extreme left. Significant aspects of public events of the extreme left during 2015 were **protest demonstrations and rallies against events of the extreme right, as well as events of anti-Islamic and anti-migration groups**. The extreme left directed its attention to public events of the latter group shortly after the beginning of the year, when particularly the group IvČRN ("We don't want Islam in the Czech Republic") attempted to exploit fears in the society following the January terrorist attacks in Paris. By the end of the year, it became the rule that the demonstrations organized in Prague mainly were attended by their opponents. Approximately 600 people attended the rally against xenophobia in Brno on 26 June, which was organized as a protest gathering against a similar-size assembly of DSSS, DM, and ND. Approximately the same number of participants was recorded during a demonstration in Prague on 17 November.

A part of public gatherings of anarchists was organized as a **protest against the "police repression"**. On 9 May, a demonstration protesting against the eviction of a squat Cibulka in Prague, which was attended by about 450 people, was held. Demonstrations in response to the "Operation Phoenix" took place in front of two prisons in Prague - Ruzyně and Pankrác, where there are anarchists placed in custody.

A **May Day demonstration** which was held under the title "War on War" was jointly organized by the Anarchist Federation, Voice of Anarcho-pacifism, and by a Russian entity called the Autonomous Action. The gathering was attended by about 450 people.

A total of 29 concerts and other interest events took place during last year. Usually, these were fundraising events for the support and collection of funds for platforms of the **Anarchist Black Cross** ("ABC")<sup>9</sup>, **Good Night White Pride**<sup>10</sup>, and for the support of refugees or radical environmental groups. The domestic section of the ABC focused on helping activists prosecuted in Russia and Belarus. A part of more radically minded anarchists targeted their support to imprisoned members of militant organizations such as **Conspiracy of Cells of Fire** and the **Informal Anarchist Federation**.



Gathering against DSSS event, Brno 1st May

<sup>9</sup> International platform for assistance to prosecuted or imprisoned anarchists.

<sup>10</sup> International music platform protesting against neo-Nazis.

One of the most important music events in the field of the extreme left was an annual festival Fluff Fest in Rokycany from 26 to 29 July with the participation of about 3,000 people, mainly from abroad.

In connection with the anarchist scene, there was a total of **8 cases of arson attacks** recorded during the last year, the responsibility for them later claimed by the **SRB** through a communique published on the Internet. In the second half of the year, there were records of sharing of material and instructions for arson attacks and other criminal activities through the Internet. In one case, there was also a record of an attack related to the **Animal Liberation Front**. Activists broke into the building of a fur farm in Velký Ratmírov and sprayed the animals with colourful sprays. This action resulted in the death of many affected animals.

Partial misdemeanors and criminal offences were also associated with the aforementioned counter-demonstrations and represented primarily non-compliance with alerts of a public official, or, in several cases, a violent behaviour towards a public official.

### **3.7. Alternative news websites**

Already in 2014, there were records of the operation of the so-called **alternative news websites and portals**. These media managed to influence the domestic extremist scene in a significant manner, as well as a part of the public that feels that the so-called mainstream news deliberately conceal or misrepresent some information. Last year, the impression was not only stimulated among the readers, but there were records of apparent **attempts to manipulate the public opinion, or even to cause protest and other events**. An example of the former is manipulation of information on migration wave, furthermore, often fabricated or edited news on schisms within the European Union, or alleged aggressive activities and plans of NATO cited from „reliable sources“. Incitement to cause public protests and other events can be illustrated by the passage of the US Army through the Czech Republic (the so-called „Dragoon Ride“). The **Aeronet** website (AE-News) published an interview with an alleged member of the preparatory committee for protests against the passage of the convoy through the Czech Republic, who not only suggested public demonstrations and protests but also attempts to block the convoy or make the passage impossible with the use of violence. In reality, it turned out that it was a completely false information with the aim to incite the actions of the opponents of the Dragoon Ride. **These sites clearly contribute to the polarization of the society and the mobilization of a certain part of the public**. For example, they became the information source of supporters of the paramilitary groups the Czechoslovak Soldiers in Reserve.

These websites can be identified as **openly pro-Russian**. On the one hand, they openly promoted the policy of the Russian Federation, more specifically of President Putin, on the other hand, some of them used conflicting topics to create antagonisms in the society. An example may be the **accentuation of the migration wave**. In this context, they **criticized the membership of the Czech Republic in the European Union and NATO**. NATO, led by the USA, was labeled as the originator of migration to Europe (there were records of new about terrorists from the Islamic State being led by US agents), the European Union as an ambivalent entity unable to defend itself against the „dictate“ of the USA. The entire Western world is then perceived in a state of a general decline. The only real defender of the European values is represented by Russia. According to these websites, Russia should lead, as the only country, an effective fight against religiously motivated terrorism.

Among the central „alternative sources of information“, it is possible to include the **Aeronet** (AE-News), the Czech version of **SputnikNews**, **První zprávy** (First News), **AC24** and **Stalo-se** (It-Happened). In particular, the first mentioned portal gained a certain leading position. Aeronet consistently kept a secret of the identities of its „journalists“; articles were published under pseudonyms. Aeronet presented itself as a community of citizens of the Czech Republic and Slovakia living abroad. With the aim to gaining more readers, it gradually changed its content from originally quasi-serious news to conspiracy theories. The mobilization function of Aeronet was weakened by articles in some media, which explained the creation of its outputs to the public. Aeronet repeatedly called on its supporters to provide financial contributions to its operation.

### ***3.8. Statistics of criminal activity with extremist overtones***

#### **3.8.1. Introduction**

Police statistics are processed on the basis of the Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium („ESSK“). Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as court statistics (processed by the Ministry of Justice), have a different horizon of reporting than the police statistics. The decisive element is not the timing when a crime was committed, but rather the time when a prosecutor prepared an indictment, decided on the cessation of the prosecution, etc. The absence of an interconnectedness of these three statistics is a great handicap; however, it is not technically possible to solve this issue at the moment.

By 2009, police statistics were governed by the Act No. 36/1960 Coll. on the territorial division of the state as amended. Statistics were, therefore, formerly distinguished into 7 regions and the capital of Prague. Since 1st January 2010, the breakdown of statistics is identical to the higher territorial units; they, therefore, distinguish 14 regions. This change makes a year on year comparison of data in terms of regions before and after 2009 impossible.

Detailed statistics on perpetrators (according to other indicators, sex, age, etc.) are based on the so-called non-standard configurations. It means that it reflects all the proven criminal activity of a particular perpetrator. Regarding standard configurations, which are the basis for national and regional statistics of an extremist criminal activity, only the most serious offences are recorded. Between the two statistics discrepancies may, therefore, arise. The standard configuration reports 246 offenders and the non-standard configuration reports 252 offenders in 2011.

Categories within the statistics relevant to perpetrators by education are not in compliance with the Act No. 561/2004 Coll., about pre-school, primary and secondary, high, tertiary professional and other (the Education Act), and the Act No. 111/1998 Coll., on Universities and Amending Other Acts, as amended. Categories within the statistics relevant to perpetrators by employment are not in compliance with the Act No. 109/2002 Coll., on Institutional and Protective Care in School Facilities and on Preventive Educational Care in Reformatory Facilities and Amending Other Acts, as amended. At present, the police

categorization includes titles, which are not in use any longer. The Police Presidium is preparing a wider update of the statistical system.

In the past, statistics of crimes committed by the police officers were processed by the Inspectorate of the Police of the Czech Republic, which was later substituted by the General Inspectorate of Security Forces from 1st January 2012. Data is, therefore, provided by the General Inspectorate since 2011.

Within the non-standard statistical outcomes, the Police of the Czech Republic have been processing statistics related to detected criminal offences with anti-Semitic overtones since 2005<sup>11</sup>. Since 1st January 2005, classifications of extremist crime were extended in the Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium of the Czech Republic (ESSK) in terms of codes allowing identification of crimes motivated by religious and ethnic hatred against Jewish people and the Jewish fate, including assaults on buildings of Jewish Communities and their equipment, synagogues and Jewish cemeteries.

Criminal offences motivated by hatred against Roma have been provided in the reports since 2011. It is necessary to add an explanatory commentary to these statistics. There is no distinction between victims of crimes by ethnicity or nationality in police statistics. It is only possible to detect that the victim was a foreigner. On the other hand, criminal offences motivated by racial hatred or hatred against Bohemians, Moravians and Silesians, Polish, Germans, Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Hungarians, Russians and Ruthenians, Roma, Jewish, Arabs, Chinese, and other nationalities, are recorded in the Statistical Recording System of Crime. For a crime motivated by hatred against Roma to be recorded in the police statistics, following conditions must be met: 1) when filling a form about a relevant criminal offence, the police officer must evaluate the act as a crime with extremist overtones; 2) victims should clearly identify that they are Roma or that the crime targeted an object, which has clear ties to the Roma ethnicity (e.g. spraying of a racist inscription on a Roma Holocaust memorial, or a museum of Roma culture, etc.). Crimes against Roma are not included in the statistics if it is not possible to prove that they had anti-Roma overtones (e.g. a car-theft when the perpetrator does not know ethnic origins of its owner). In addition, many Roma individuals do not avow their Roma ethnicity. Figures in such statistics are indicative and have limited predictive value.

### **3.8.2. National statistics**

There was a total of 247.628 criminal offences committed in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2015. Criminal offences with extremist overtones accounted for about 0,07 % of the total amount. The Police of the Czech Republic detected 175 criminal offences with extremist subtext in 2015. There was a decrease in the detected extremist acts in the cross-annual comparison by 26 (-12,9 %).

From the aforementioned criminal offences, 65,7 %, i.e. 114 were detected (in 2014, it was 66,7 %, i.e. 132 criminal offences). As regards these offences, an investigation and criminal proceedings were initiated in the case of 154 individuals in 2015.

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<sup>11</sup> In the period prior the expansion of statistics, there was an increase in criminal offending with an anti-Semitic overtones all across Europe. The topic of anti-Semitism became a priority for both the European Union and for international organisations.

**Tab. 1: Total amount of criminal offences with extremist subtext recorded in the territory of the Czech Republic in the period of 2006 – 2015**

(based on the Statistical Recording System of Criminality of the Police Presidium of the Czech Republic - ESSK)

Year	Recorded criminal offences	Share in total crime figures (%)	Solved criminal offences	Persons prosecuted and investigated
2006	248	0,07	196	242
2007	196	0,05	119	181
2008	217	0,06	126	195
2009	265	0,08	186	293
2010	252	0,08	168	231
2011	238	0,08	157	246
2012	173	0,06	116	208
2013	211	0,06	144	198
2014	201	0,07	132	157
2015	175	0,07	114	154

Source: PCR, 2016

**Tab. 2: Individual types of criminal activities and crime rates in the Czech Republic in 2015**

Types of criminal offences	Number of cases	Share in detected criminal offences
Violent crime	15639	6,32%
Vice crime	2256	0,91%
Property crime	139089	56,17%
Other criminal offences in total:	27313	11,03%
Remaining criminal offences	32531	13,14%
Economic crime	30616	12,36%
With extremist overtones	175	0,07%

Source: PCR, 2016

### 3.8.3. Statistics according to regions

Most criminal offences with extremist subtext were recorded in the **Moravian-Silesian Region (26 criminal offences)**, which represents about 14,9 % of the total amount of such crimes perpetrated in the territory of the Czech Republic. It is followed by the capital of Prague (24 criminal offences, i.e. 13,7 %), the Central Bohemian Region (20 criminal

offences, i.e. 11,4 %) and Ústí nad Labem Region (18 criminal offences, i.e. 10,3 %). On the other hand, the lowest amount of such criminal offences was recorded in the Pardubice Region (1 criminal offence), Carlsbad Region (1 criminal offence, i.e. 0,6 %) and Vysočina Region (5 criminal offences, i.e. 2,9 %).

In the cross-annual comparison, the greatest decrease in the number of detected criminal offences with extremist subtext was recorded in the capital of Prague (- 16 criminal offences), followed by the Moravian-Silesian Region (- 11 criminal offences) and Ústí nad Labem Region (- 10 criminal offences).

In some regions, conversely, there was an increase in detected criminal offences. The most significant increase was recorded in the Zlín Region with 12 more offences than in the previous year. It is followed by the Liberec Region (+ 3 criminal offences), Olomouc Region (+ 2 criminal offences) and Vysočina Region (+ 2 criminal offences).

**Tab. 3: Criminal activity with extremist subtext according to regions in 2015**

Region	Detected criminal offences			Solved criminal offences		Detected perpetrators	
	abs.	from total (in %)	difference (14-13)	abs.	from total (in %)	abs.	from total (in %)
<b>Prague</b>	24	13,7%	-11	11	9,6%	19	12,3%
<b>Central Bohemian</b>	20	11,4%	2	14	12,3%	15	9,7%
<b>Southern Bohemian</b>	11	6,3%	-3	9	7,9%	9	5,8%
<b>Pilsen</b>	7	4,0%	-4	2	1,8%	2	1,3%
<b>Carlsbad</b>	1	0,6%	-3	1	0,9%	1	0,6%
<b>Ústí nad Labem</b>	18	10,3%	-2	14	12,3%	25	16,2%
<b>Liberec</b>	7	4,0%	1	3	2,6%	9	5,8%
<b>Hradec Králové</b>	10	5,7%	6	7	6,1%	8	5,2%
<b>Pardubice</b>	0	0,0%	-6	0	0,0%	1	0,6%
<b>Vysočina</b>	5	2,9%	0	4	3,5%	4	2,6%
<b>Southern Moravian</b>	15	8,6%	-6	7	6,1%	7	4,5%
<b>Olomouc</b>	14	8,0%	0	5	4,4%	7	4,5%
<b>Moravian - Silesian</b>	26	14,9%	-22	21	18,4%	31	20,1%
<b>Zlín</b>	17	9,7%	12	16	14,0%	16	10,4%
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-36</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: PCR, 2016

### 3.8.4. Statistics by acts

The greatest representation of **criminal offences** falls **under Section 403** (Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms), **Section 404** (Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms), **Section 405** (Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide) of the Criminal Code, No. 40/2009 Coll. These criminal offences represent 48,6 % (85 criminal offences) of the total amount of crimes with extremist subtext. There were 57 cases were solved, and 70 perpetrators were detected.

**Criminal offences under Section 355** (Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group of People) represented the second most numerous group. They contributed to the total number of criminal offences with 9,1 % (16 criminal offences). There were 12 cases solved, and 18 perpetrators were detected.

**In comparison with 2014, there was a higher representation of criminal offences under Section 352** (Violence against Group of People and Individuals) in 2015. There were 17 criminal offences detected (12,1 %).

**Criminal offences under Sections 145 and 146** (Grievous Bodily Harm and Bodily Harm) contribute to the total amount of crimes with 4,96 % (7 cases). There were 2 criminal offences solved, and 6 perpetrators were detected.


There was **no case classified as murder (Section 140)** in 2015.

**Tab. 4: Criminal activity with extremist subtext by acts in 2015**

<b>Title</b>	<b>Detected</b>	<b>Solved</b>	<b>Perpetrators</b>
<b>Violence against Public Authority excluding the Police (Sections 323, 324, 325, 326)</b>	1	1	1
<b>Grievous Bodily Harm and Bodily Harm (Sections 145 and 146)</b>	7	2	6
<b>Violence against Group of People and Individuals (Section 352)</b>	17	12	20
<b>Dangerous Threatening (Section 353)</b>	3	2	2
<b>Extortion (Section 175)</b>	1	0	0
<b>Breaking and Entering (Section 178)</b>	1	1	1
<b>Damage to a Thing of Another (Section 228)</b>	3	0	0
<b>Disorderly Conduct (Sections 358, 359)</b>	5	4	10
<b>- at sports event or public event (Section 358)</b>	18	18	18
<b>Spraying (Section 228/2)</b>	4	0	0
<b>Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People (Section 355)</b>	16	12	18
<b>Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression their Rights and Freedoms (Section 356)</b>	13	5	8
<b>Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms (Sections 403, 404, 405)</b>	85	57	70
<b>other criminal activity</b>	1	0	0
<b>Czech Republic TOTAL</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>154</b>

Source: PCR, 2016

**Graph 1: Composition of detected extremist criminal offences according to the sections of the Criminal Code of the Czech Republic in 2015**



Source: PČR, 2016

Tab. 5: Overview of selected criminal offences with extremist overtones – total incidence in the period of 2007 -2015 according to the merits of the case

Year/Section	196 para 2/	198/	198a/	219	221 para 2b/	222 para 2b/	235 para 2f/	257 para 2b/	260/	261/	261a/
	352	355	356	para 2g/ 140 para 3g	146 para 2e	145 para 2f	175 para 2f	228 para 3b	403	404	405
2007	18	28	13	1	7	4	0	2	47	63	2
2008	25	41	11	1	4	2	2	1	42	68	1
2009	23	25	16	1	2	2	1	6	92	72	4
2010	43	43	15	1	9	1	0	2	35	74	3
2011	40	33	15	0	17	0	0	7	21	70	6
2012	20	33	5	0	11	3	2	16	6	65	8
2013	19	37	13	0	19	0	0	3	9	63	8
2014	12	27	18	1	5	1	0	5	9	85	7
2015	17	16	13	0	7	0	1	2	5	75	5


Source: PČR, 2016

### 3.8.5. Perpetrators

In terms of education, there were no significant changes related to the composition of perpetrators of criminal offences with extremist subtext compared to previous years. There was only a slight increase in the proportion of individuals with an apprentice certificate on the total amount of perpetrators. **The first place is represented by 66 persons, i.e. 44,0 % who are graduates of primary and secondary schools with apprentice certificates** (62 persons, i.e. 39,5 % in 2014). The second place belongs to graduates of primary schools without any

qualification. This category is represented by 43 persons, i.e. 28,7 % (46 persons, i.e. 29,3 % in 2014). There are 24 perpetrators with high school education, i.e. 16,0 % (27 persons, i.e. 17,2 % in 2014)<sup>12</sup>. The total of 15 persons (10,0 %) fall into the categories of „foreigners“, „children“, or their education could not have been determined.

**Graph 2: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the Czech Republic in 2015 according to education**




Source: PČR, 2016

At the categories of offenders broken down by age groups, there were slight changes. **The most occupied category remains the age group 21 – 29**, but there was an increase in the proportion of the age group 30 – 39 in 2015. The latter category includes 49 persons, i.e. 32,7 % from the total amount (41 persons, i.e. 26,1 % in 2014).

**Graph 3: Perpetrators of extremist acts in the Czech Republic in 2015 according to age groups**

<sup>12</sup> According to the Act No. 561/2004 Coll. about pre-school, primary and secondary, high, higher vocational and other education (Education Act) are, in accordance with the new terminology, graduates of secondary schools with an apprentice certificate newly "graduates of high schools with an apprentice certificate, and perpetrators with high school education newly perpetrators with a high school education with a leaving exam (see § 58 of the Act about pre-school, primary and secondary, high, higher vocational and other education).



Source: PCR, 2016

Similarly to previous years, the **majority** of perpetrators of criminal offences with extremist subtext are **males**. In comparison with 2014, there was a decrease in female offenders to 2 % (8,3 % in 2014). There was a general decrease in the total number of investigated females to 3 (13 females in 2014). There were 147 male offenders (144 males in 2014), which, considering the decrease in the number of investigated females, meant an increase in male offenders to 98 % (91,7 % in 2014).


**Tab. 6: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the Czech Republic in 2015 according to gender**

Gender	total number	share (in %)
male	147	98 %
female	3	2 %

Source: PCR, 2016

As regards the categorization by criminal history, there was a **54 % share of recidivists**, i.e. 81 individuals (78 persons, i.e. 50 % in 2014). Offenders, who were already investigated in the past, represent 6 %, i.e. 9 individuals (14 individuals, i.e. 9 % in 2014). The remaining 59 persons represent 39 % offenders who do not exhibit any of the aforementioned characteristics (41 %, i.e. 65 persons in 2014). In one case of a perpetrator, it was not possible to determine a criminal history.

**Graph 4: Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences in the Czech Republic in 2015 according to their criminal history**



Source: PČR, 2016

**Tab. 7: Perpetrators of extremist acts in the Czech Republic in 2015 according to their employment**

Type of employment	Males	Females	Total
metallurgical workers	1		1
construction workers	12		12
production workers	13		13
pensioners	2		2
pensioners - disabled	1		1
mechanics and assemblers, janitors, servicemen	4		4
unemployed/person registered at the Labour Office	25		25
persons in custody	1		1
persons without employment status	28	1	29
persons without employment data	2		2
persons on maternity leave		1	1
other workers of non-production sector	4		4
education staff at all levels	1		1
entrepreneurs, self-employed persons and other	11		11
trade workers	2		2
personnel in protection and security of objects	2		2
storage facilities workers	5		5
hospitality and hotel staff	6		6
military personnel	1		1
drivers of road motor vehicles	6		6
high school and vocational school students	10	1	11
apprentices and persons preparing for manual work	2		2
university students	4		4
primary school pupils	4		4
Total	147	3	150

Source: PČR, 2016

The table below represents types of termination of a phase in criminal proceedings defined by the police investigation of crimes with extremist subtext and their perpetrators.

**Tab. 8: Perpetrators of extremist acts in the Czech Republic in 2015 according to types of termination of criminal proceedings by the Police of the Czech Republic and their criminal history**

<b>Criminal history</b>	<b>Type of termination</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Investigated in the past</b>		<b>9</b>		<b>9</b>
	Termination by proposal to indictment to public prosecutors under Sections 166/3 and 175a	3		3
	Suspended under Section 159a/2,3 – excluding amnesty	2		2
	(empty)	4		4
<b>Recidivists</b>		<b>79</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>81</b>
	Suspended under Section 172/1d(excluding amnesty),e,f,2a,b,c	2		2
	Conditional cessation of prosecution under Sections 307,309	1		1
	Termination by proposal to indictment to public prosecutors under Sections 166/3 and 175a	46	2	48
	Termination by proposal for indictment to public prosecutor under Section 179c	21		21
	(empty)	9		9
<b>Exhibit none of the given</b>		<b>58</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>59</b>
	Suspended under Section 172/1d(excluding amnesty),e,f,2a,b,c	2		2
	Conditional cessation of prosecution under Sections 307,309	4	1	5
	Proposal of public prosecutor on conditional cessation in shortened preliminary proceedings under Section 179g of the Code of Criminal Procedure	5		5
	Termination by proposal to indictment to public prosecutors under Sections 166/3 and 175a	24		24
	Termination by proposal for indictment to public prosecutors under Section 179c	7		7
	In proceedings against youth offenders by proposal to indictment to public prosecutors under Sections 166/3 and 175a	1		1
	Suspended under Section 159a/2,3 – excluding amnesty	3		3
	(empty)	12		12
<b>Not identified</b>		<b>1</b>		<b>1</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>147</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>150</b>

Source: PČR, 2016

### 3.8.6. Criminal activity perpetrated by members of the security forces

In the area of extremism, the General Inspectorate of Security Forces investigated the total of **5 cases**.

In the first case, evidence as regards the commitment of possible criminal activity by a **civilian employee of the Prison Services** of the Czech Republic was examined. It concerned alleged expressions of sympathies for a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and

freedoms as well as excesses in behaviour when the civilian employee had a German swastika tattooed on his forearm and books with Nazi theme stored in his office. Furthermore, when dealing with other inmates, he did not hide his negative attitude towards persons of Roma ethnicity. During the investigation of this case, it was found that the civilian employee of the Prison Service did not meet the merits of the case and the matter was referred for further action, respectively for an assessment of a possible disciplinary offence to the relevant department of prevention and complaints of the relevant prison facility for inappropriate behaviour of the investigator towards the convicted.

In the second case, the inspection examined the evidence on possible crimes committed by **members of the Prison Service**, who were captured in several photographs carrying a flag of Sudeten Landsmannschaft association and raised right arms. Following the investigation by members of the inspection, the suspicion of committing crime by members of the Prison Service of the Czech Republic was not confirmed and the case was forwarded to the relevant department of prevention and complaints of the relevant prison facility for a possible suspicion of committing a disciplinary offence under Section 50 Act No. 361/2003 Coll.

The third case was examined by the inspection on suspicion of committing the crime of defamation of a nation, race, ethnic or another group of persons under Section 355 of the Criminal Code, which could have been done by a **member of the Prison Service of the Czech Republic**, who was, as a chairman of the association "We are against all", responsible for putting up posters with xenophobic content. The investigation by the inspectorate's police body did not find suspicion of committing a crime; the case was forwarded to the relevant department of prevention and complaints of the relevant prison facility for a possible suspicion of committing a disciplinary offence under Section 50 Act No. 361/2003 Coll., on the service of members of security forces.

In the fourth case, the inspection obtained evidence of possible illegal activities of a **member of the Police of the Czech Republic**, who allegedly committed the offence of instigation to hatred against a group of persons or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 of the Criminal Code. This member inappropriately responded to the current topic of refugees and migration through the social network Facebook. The investigation by the members of the inspection did not find suspicion of committing a crime; the case was forwarded to a relevant service officer with personnel powers for a possible suspicion of committing a disciplinary offence under Section 50/1 Act No. 361/2003 Coll., on the service of members of security forces.

In the reporting period, an investigation of a **member of the Police of the Czech Republic** suspected of committing an offence of instigation to hatred against a group of persons or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 of the Criminal Code and violence against a group of people and individuals under Section 352 of the Criminal Code was initiated. He was using Facebook social network for committing the criminal offences. The investigation is conducted by the relevant inspection's police authority, and it is still ongoing.

No further cases of illegal behaviour, respectively criminal activities in the field of extremism, were not detected by the inspection in 2015.

Only two cases were examined in 2014 and 4 cases in 2013.

### **3.8.7. Criminal activity committed by members of the Army of the Czech Republic**

In the environment of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), there were **no records of a significant increase in activities of extremist-oriented individuals or groups in 2015**. Within the Army of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as "AČR"), the trend of inclination towards right-wing extremism continued; however, the activities of the followers were manifested only by individuals, moreover, not in an organized manner. Hidden or delegated Nazi symbolism, racist statements of soldiers on social networks and individual violent tendencies, which escalated into violence in public and were dealt with by the Police of the Czech Republic, were recorded. Identification of extremist-oriented people in the ranks of recruits continued in a way that the identification and knowledge help to prevent their entry into the AČR through lawful methods. As a reaction to the developments in the society, particularly in relation to migration crisis in Europe, groups that often bear elements of paramilitary activities have emerged. Involvement of soldiers in active service to these initiatives has been marginal. Activities of extremist entities in relation to the defence sector reflected societal developments in the Czech Republic. Existing legislative and managerial measures, however, did not allow a higher penetration rate of extremist conduct in the AČR.

In 2015, the Military Police (hereinafter referred to as "VP") recorded **one case of unlawful behavior of a member of the AČR with extremist subtext**. VP police authority had received information by the Police of the Czech Republic, that a professional soldier verbally assaulted police officers and repeatedly called out "Allah Akbar" and "Islamic State" and manifested sympathies for the given radical Islamic group during his escort to the local department of the Police of the Czech Republic following his detention for a disorderly conduct of in the city of Albrechtice on the night of 30 to 31 May. The Police of the Czech Republic, therefore, initiated criminal proceedings for reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence of expression of sympathy towards a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms. The aforementioned soldier was released from the service on 31st October.

### **3.8.8. Court statistics**

In 2015, the courts issued final verdicts to 65 569 persons (72 854 in 2014, 77 976 in 2013, 71 471 in 2012, 70 160 in 2011, 69 953 in 2010, 73 752 in 2009, 75 751 in 2008, and 75 728 in 2007), which represents a decrease in comparison to 2014 by 9,99 %. From this number, there were **54 individuals convicted of criminal offences with racial subtext** in 2015. This figure represents only 0,08 % from the total amount of convicted individuals during this year.

In comparison with 2014, there is a record of an increase in the number of offenders **convicted** of crimes with racial subtext (by 2 persons, i.e. about 3,8 %, while there were 52 persons convicted in 2014, 71 persons in 2013, 83 in 2012; 111 in 2011; 96 in 2010; 103 in 2009; 97 in 2008 and 72 in 2007). From the given data, it is evident that the share of these offences on the total amount of convictions in the Czech Republic remains relatively low. In absolute numbers, it oscillates between approximately 50 to 100 offenders in the period of the previous 8 years.

In 2015, most offenders were convicted of the following criminal offences:

Criminal offence	Provision of the Criminal Code (CC)	Number of persons	Total 2015
		2015, (CC 40/2009)	
<b>Bodily Harm</b>	Sec. 146	4	<b>4</b>
<b>Extortion</b>	Sec. 175	2	<b>3</b>
<b>Breaking and Entering</b>	Sec. 178	2	<b>3</b>
<b>Theft</b>	Sec. 205	3	<b>2</b>
<b>Damage to a Thing of Another</b>	Sec. 228	3	<b>7</b>
<b>Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems and Information Media</b>	Sec. 230	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Violence against Public Official</b>	Sec. 325	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Threatening with Intention to Affect Public Official</b>	Sec. 326	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Abuse of Competence of Public Official</b>	Sec. 329	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Violence against Group of People and Individuals</b>	Sec. 352	9	<b>9</b>
<b>Dangerous Threatening</b>	Sec. 353	6	<b>2</b>
<b>Dangerous Pursuing</b>	Sec. 354	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People</b>	Sec. 355	17	<b>17</b>
<b>Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression their Rights and Freedoms</b>	Sec. 356	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Disorderly Conduct</b>	Sec. 358	23	<b>23</b>
<b>Approval of Criminal Offence</b>	Sec. 365	1	<b>1</b>
<b>Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms</b>	Sec. 403, 404	28	<b>28</b>
<b>Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide</b>	Sec. 405	1	<b>1</b>

Source: Ministry of Justice, 2016

In 2014, perpetrators of such delicts were most often convicted of the **Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression Human Rights and Freedoms under Section 403 and Section 404 of the Criminal Code – 28 persons**. These are followed by convicted offenders for criminal offences under Section 358 of the Criminal Code – Disorderly Conduct with racial subtext – 23 persons. The third, most common, delicts fall under Section 355 – Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People – 17 persons.

**Five individuals were sentenced to imprisonment for criminal offences with racial overtones.** Three of the individuals convicted of crimes with racial overtones were identified recidivists. Three perpetrators were sentenced to imprisonment with a maximum custodial sentence of 1 year; other 2 perpetrators were sentenced to **imprisonment with a custodial sentence** ranging from 1 to 5 years. A **sentence of imprisonment, with a conditional suspension** of the sentence, was given to 37 individuals. In comparison with 2014, the number of the alternative community service sentence remained almost the same – there were 9 cases in 2015 and 8 cases in 2014. **Two youth offenders and two female offenders** were convicted of this offence.

### 3.8.9. Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office

**Overview of criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic and other hatred in the period of 1995 - 2015**

<b>Criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic and other hatred</b>	<b>Total of prosecuted persons</b> (figures in brackets represent the procedure of shortened preliminary criminal proceedings)	<b>Total of accused persons</b>
1995	508	461
1996	616	552
1997	569	495
1998	535	439
1999	580	510
2000	535	451
2001	529	369
2002	467 (+51)	435 (+50)
2003	325 (+44)	286 (+44)
2004	351 (+48)	326 (+47)
2005	294 (+46)	264 (+45)
2006	221 (+52)	192 (+51)
2007	204 (+36)	197 (+36)
2008	200 (+41)	185 (+40)
2009	194 (+34)	183 (+32)
2010	225 (+63)	213 (+58)
2011	218 (+66)	209 (+59)
2012	224 (+65)	213 (+61)
2013	120 (+81)	115 (+77)
2014	139 (+45)	129 (+43)
2015	130 (+15)*	115 (+12)*

\*Preliminary data

**Table 2: Data on the numbers of prosecuted and accused persons for criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic and other hatred in the period of 1995 - 2015**

CZ	Sec 196/2 old CC Sec 352/2 CC	Sec 196/3 old CC Sec 352/3 CC	Sec 198 old CC Sec 355 CC	Sec 198a old CC Sec 356 CC	Sec 219/2g old CC Sec 140/3g CC	Sec 221/2b old CC Sec 146/2e CC
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	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused
1995	177	162	18	17	112	108	28	22	0	0	13	12
1996	210	179	18	17	74	66	30	29	1	1	90	82
1997	150	119	29	19	107	103	25	20	0	0	56	55
1998	126	111	3	0	124	90	7	6	3	2	40	36
1999	139	123	24	24	103	91	12	11	2	2	42	42
2000	98	84	24	24	150	129	19	14	0	0	22	13
2001	95	92	0	0	127	118	19	16	0	0	28	27
2002	85	81	3	3	105	98	4	3	2	2	21	20
2003	64	56	0	0	81	77	8	7	0	0	28	27
2004	67	63	8	8	105	101	5	5	1	0	21	21
2005	74	67	0	0	85	78	3	2	3	3	14	14
2006	48	45	0	0	58	50	3	1	0	0	11	11
2007	33	31	0	0	37	35	24	24	0	0	24	24
2008	31	30	0	0	36	35	7	7	1	1	5	5
2009	33	32	6	6	19	19	7	4	0	0	19	19
2010	46	44	40	37	39	38	6	4	0	0	7	7
2011	41	39	38	37	35	35	5	5	1	1	17	16
2012	41	40	29	28	34	31	8	7	0	0	23	22
2013	15	15	5	5	27	25	2	2	0	0	21	21
2014	13	12	3	3	23	18	6	6	2	2	8	8
2015	17	15	5	5	25	24	4	3	0	0	6	5
CZ	Sec 222/2b old CC Sec 145/2f CC		Sec 235/2f old CC Sec 175/2f CC		Sec 257/2b old CC Sec 228/3b CC		Sec 260 old CC Sec 403 CC		Sec 261 old CC Sec 404 CC		Sec 261a old CC Sec 405 CC	
	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused
1995	23	23	0	0	6	5	13	11	118	101	0	0
1996	42	41	1	1	27	25	30	27	93	84	0	0
1997	45	43	5	5	18	15	29	18	105	98	0	0
1998	28	28	6	6	16	16	27	15	155	129	0	0
1999	30	28	1	0	16	16	52	37	159	136	0	0
2000	12	12	0	0	7	6	79	67	124	102	0	0
2001	6	6	3	3	2	2	51	41	198	164	1	0
2002	24	24	2	2	3	3	75	67	143	132	1	1
2003	13	13	0	0	6	4	28	17	96	84	1	1
2004	9	5	4	4	1	1	31	25	96	90	3	3
2005	7	7	0	0	2	2	23	18	72	65	1	1
2006	3	3	0	0	2	2	16	11	78	69	2	0
2007	3	3	0	0	5	5	14	12	63	62	1	1
2008	9	9	0	0	2	2	29	29	72	61	8	6
2009	21	21	0	0	1	1	25	24	66	60	4	4
2010	1	1	1	0	1	1	39	38	42	40	2	2
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15	62	57	4	4
2012	2	2	2	2	1	0	27	27	52	49	5	5
2013	3	3	0	0	1	1	18	18	27	24	1	1
2014	3	3	1	1	3	3	15	15	57	53	5	5
2015	2	2	0	0	3	3	8	8	57	47	3	3

As in the last year, there were no attacks with racial motivation resulting in death. Also, there were no arson attacks on Roma families. There were practically no anti-Roma marches and demonstrations similarly to last year. The most frequent information under Article 1 paragraph 1 point a) of the Instruction of General Nature of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office No. 10/2011 are cases of the so-called hailing, presentation of „illicit“ symbols on clothing or their spraying on buildings, public presentation of illicit tattoos, hate speech published on the Internet, racially motivated insults. Any physically motivated racial attacks were directed mainly against people of Roma ethnicity, however, as previously noted, without any serious consequences.

## **Selected cases - from the perspective of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office**

### Publication of anti-Islamic videos

This criminal case concerned the publication of videos on YouTube with slogans "Kill the Arabs", "Arabian fucking swines," "Allah is a prick," "Allah is fag", etc.

Criminal proceedings in the case of R. H. were initiated through the resolution of the police authority for the offence of defamation of a nation, race, ethnic group or other group of persons under Section 355 paragraph 1 point a), paragraph 2 point b) of the Criminal Code, and instigation to hatred against a group of persons or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 paragraph 1, 3 point a) of the Criminal Code. In this case, charges have been brought.

### Anti-migration speech at a demonstration at the Old Town Square

The subject of the investigation was a behaviour of T. O. consisting of uttering hate speech against Muslim immigrants at demonstrations held at the Old Town Square in Prague in July 2015. The case was forwarded to the competent authority as a minor offence based on a measure of the police authority under Section 159a paragraph 1 point a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

### Carrying gallows at the demonstration on Wenceslas Square

This case concerned carrying two mock gallows with a noose at a demonstration entitled STOP Immigration, which took place on Wenceslas Square in Prague in July 2015, followed by a march to the Office of the Government. There were following signs on the gallows: For national treason; EU = CCCP; It is 5 minutes past 12; Czech people uprising.

Through a measure of the police authority under Section 159a paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the matter was postponed. Even though carrying mock gallows may be considered as a threat (of hanging) likely to cause reasonable concern (especially in the context of hatred-oriented demonstration), it is clear that the threat was not directed against a particular individual or a specific group of people. Therefore, it was not possible to reach the merits of the case (criminal offence of violence against a group of people or an individual) under Section 352 of the Criminal Code, dangerous threatening under Section 353 of the Criminal Code or instigation of hatred against a group of persons or restriction of their rights and freedoms under Section 356 of the Criminal Code. Addressing threats by hanging was possible solely from the inscriptions on the gallows. It was not determined whether the carriers of gallows expressed themselves verbally during the demonstration. The given conduct did not meet the above-mentioned or other crimes.

In conclusion, it is possible to summarize that hate manifestations, which were formerly recorded mainly against Roma with the peak in 2013 anti-Roma marches, changed to manifestations against Muslims and immigrants (respectively Muslim immigrants) in 2015. Until now, the manifestations „only“ remained on a verbal level, and there were no records of

physical attacks against Muslims and immigrants, which is probably related to the minimal presence of both groups in the territory of the Czech Republic.

### 3.8.10. Statistics of the Probation and Mediation Service

Of the total number of cases, which were handled by centres of the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic („PMS“) since its establishment, it is evident that the proportion of cases of the PMS related to extremist motivated crimes is, in a long-term, low. Since 2002, it relates to about 0,2 % to 0,7 % of the total number of newly recorded files in the given year. The estimation for 2015 is even lower – 0,1 % of such files. In comparison with the previous year, there will probably be a decrease in both the proportion and the number of cases in 2015.

A number of criminal offences with extremist subtext in individual judicial regions in the period of 2011 – 2015:

soudní kraje	2011 celkem spisů	z toho s rasistick ým podtextem	2012 celkem spisů	z toho s rasistick ým podtextem	2013 celkem spisů	z toho s rasistick ým podtextem	2014 celkem spisů	z toho s rasistick ým podtextem	2015* celkem spisů	z toho s rasistick ým podtextem
Praha	1 832	7(0,4%)	2 237	14(0,6%)	1 964	3 (0,2%)	2593	12 (0,5%)	2 606	9 (0,3%)
Středočeský	3 109	13 (0,4%)	3 486	30 (0,9%)	3 090	14 (0,5%)	3793	5 (0,1%)	3 360	4 (0,1%)
Jihočeský	2 033	5 (0,2%)	2 359	25 (1,1%)	1 794	12 (0,7%)	2211	4 (0,2%)	2 110	4 (0,2%)
Západočeský	2 838	17 (0,6%)	3 318	19 (0,6%)	2 557	2 (0,1%)	3038	4 (0,1%)	2 761	5 (0,2%)
Severočeský	4 412	22 (0,5%)	5 000	46 (0,9%)	4 178	20 (0,5%)	5619	18 (0,3%)	5 036	4 (0,1%)
Východočeský	3 088	18 (0,6%)	3 435	14 (0,4%)	2 844	7 (0,2%)	3000	4 (0,1%)	2 652	0 (0,0%)
Jihomoravský	4 237	11 (0,3%)	5 097	13 (0,3%)	4 228	9 (0,2%)	4966	8 (0,2%)	4 536	6 (0,1%)
Severomoravský	5 601	21 (0,4%)	6 197	47 (0,8%)	5 373	9 (0,2%)	6317	4 (0,1%)	5 596	8 (0,1%)
<b>celkem ČR</b>	<b>27 150</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>31 129</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>26 028</b>	<b>76 (0,3%)</b>	<b>31537</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>28 657</b>	<b>40</b>
* finální data nejsou prozatím k dispozici zpráva byla zpracována k 4. 12. 2015										

Source: PMS ČR

From the perspective of the criminal law classification, most of the cases dealt with by the PMS concerned perpetrators accused/convicted of the criminal offence of Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms (Section 404 of the Criminal Code). This accounted for 50 % of all the files registered by the PMS in relation to extremism.

Other frequently dealt with cases from the perspective of types of criminal activities, were cases of offenders accused/convicted of criminal offences of Violence against Group of People and Individuals (Section 352 of the Criminal Code) – about 29 % of cases registered by the PMS in relation to extremism, and Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group of People (Section 355 of the Criminal Code) – about 18 %.

Other criminal offences appeared in the records of the PMS minimally.

### 3.8.11. Criminal activity with anti-Semitic overtones

**There were 47 criminal offences with anti-Semitic subtext recorded in 2015.** It represents an increase by two cases in comparison with the previous year. In 2013, there were records of 15 criminal offences.

Criminal offences with anti-Semitic subtext represented 26,9 % of the total amount of crimes with extremist subtext in 2015, i.e. an increase by 4,6 % in comparison with the previous year. Considering the composition of crimes, these were predominantly the offences under Section 404 (Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms); there were records of 34 cases.

### 3.8.12. Criminal activity motivated by hatred against Roma

**There were 33 criminal offences motivated by hatred towards Roma recorded in 2015.** It represents a decrease in comparison with the previous year when 53 criminal offences were registered. These criminal offences contribute to the total volume of crimes with extremist subtext with 18,6 %.

With regard to offences according to their composition, these are mostly crimes under Section 352 (Violence against Group of People or Individuals), Section 355 (Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group of People), and Section 356 (Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms). The most significant increase was recorded at criminal offences under Section 404 (Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms) – from 17 criminal offences in 2014 to 4 criminal offences in 2015.

**Tab. 8: Detected criminal offences motivated by hatred against Roma in the Czech Republic in 2015.**

Paragraph	Amount
146	1
178	1
228	1
352	9
353	2
355	8
356	5
358	1
403	1
404	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>

Source: PČR, 2016

The most criminal offences of the aforementioned character were committed in the Ústí nad Labem Region (8 criminal offences) and Moravian-Silesian Region (7 criminal offences). These regions were also in the lead of the statistics in 2014.

### 3.8.13. Criminal activity motivated by hatred against Muslims

Similarly to the aforementioned criminal offences both anti-Semitic or motivated by hatred towards Roma, information on the number of detected extremist acts motivated by hatred towards Muslims have a rather informative character.

In 2015, the Police of the Czech Republic recorded **5 criminal offences motivated by hatred against Muslims**. There were two cases qualified under Section 356 (Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms) and one case of each under Section 175 (Extortion), Section 352 (Violence against Group of People and Individuals) and Section 404 (Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms).

The Police of the Czech Republic also recorded **5 criminal offences motivated by hatred towards the Arabs** during the same year. These were three cases under Section 356 (Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression their Rights and Freedoms), and two cases under Section 355 (Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or Other Group of People).



A typical picture of the anti-Muslim movement (an invitation for a demonstration, which took place in Cologne in June)

## 4. Foreign influences impacting on the Czech extremist scene

Manifestations of extremism are no longer only a national matter of individual countries. Because of the ease of communication, especially through the Internet, the extreme political movements are increasingly internationalized. This cross-border effect is manifested through the cooperation of individual groups, taking over the activities of allied international organizations, mutual support, expressing solidarity to those affected by state repression, creating Czech branches of international networks, etc. An essential part of monitoring extremism at the national level must, therefore, be also the analysis of manifestations of extremism abroad.

In 2015, it was possible to record various manifestations of extremism abroad in the area of both the extreme right and extreme left. The main and decisive topic has become the migration wave and other associated symptoms, particularly hatred against Muslims. It is, therefore, necessary to pay the greatest attention to these phenomena and monitor their concept within the extremist structures. Partly aside remained the development in Russia and Ukraine in 2015. Extremist scenes in these two countries continued to be very important for the Central European region, despite the local radical movements pursuing partially divergent interests. Hence, they will be given separate consideration at the end of this chapter.

## **4.1. European extreme right**


Activities of the extreme right and its supporters were closely monitored and evaluated, both by the state authorities and NGOs and the media.

The most important and the most debated topic in 2015 became the bitter **attitude** of these ideological groups towards the **current migration wave**. Along with the opposition towards immigrants, the second but fundamentally very close ideological cornerstone of the extreme right was the **hatred towards Islam and Muslims**. In general, these two topics dictated the main direction of this political stream and also managed to unite it internationally. Even in countries, where previously it was not possible to record security issues with immigration or radical concept of Islam to a larger extent, the topic was often and significantly articulated. Other typical topics of the extreme right receded into the background, which was certainly aided by the fact that as regards the issues of immigration and Islam the extreme right entities felt considerable support from the wider public in 2015. Similarly, this was formerly the case in some other countries in the use of anti-Roma rhetoric.

The most pressing issue in this regard constituted of **direct attacks against facilities**, which were used by incoming immigrants. The given issue with regard to the quantity of attacks became the greatest challenge for the German security authorities. However, the issue was relevant in all European countries that were to a greater or lesser extent affected by the current wave of refugees. According to the German Bundeskriminalamt, there were 1005 attacks on migrant housing facilities in 2015, out of which 901 had a clear right-wing radical background. The number of such attacks increased five times compared with 2014: in 2014, there were 199 attacks out of which 177 had a right-wing radical background. The worst situation was in North Rhine – Westphalia, where the number of attacks against the migrant housing facilities (the total of 214 cases in 2015) increased eight times in comparison with 2014. Among the minor incidents it is possible to mention, for example, painting of Nazi and neo-Nazi symbols on the aforementioned buildings; more serious consequences were left by arson attacks, whose number increased thirteen times in comparison with 2014. The number of physical assaults against individual migrants also increased five times. For example, five Syrians had to seek medical help, when after returning from a restaurant they were attacked and suffered kicks and stab wounds at the end of March, three Africans were beaten by seven young Germans chanting racist slogans in April, migrants from Egypt and Mauritania suffered severe injuries after they were attacked by a minimum of six people in Strasbourg near the Polish borders about a month later, three Syrian refugees were attacked by about thirty people in German Magdeburg in November. More similar examples from 2015 would have been possible to indicate. Furthermore, German radicals focused their resentment also against persons, who proclaimed a different political stance on this issue. Right-wing extremists were allegedly behind a car explosion of a Saxon politician in July – a councilor of the city of Freital, who promoted accepting of refugees. In response to these attacks, the activation of security forces occurred followed by the police discovery of several cells of right-wing extremists in the second half of the year that carried out such attacks or were preparing for them. It is possible to mention, for example, an intervention in Bamberg in November, where the arrested individuals were planning a bomb attack against a facility housing illegal migrants from the Balkans waiting for deportation.

The topic of physical assaults against immigrants was also broadly discussed in **Sweden**, where also occurred a massive increase in these acts. In particular, dozens of carried out arson attacks against asylum centres also demonstrate the rise in xenophobic and hateful attitudes. An attack at a school in Trollhättan was allegedly also directed against immigration; the school is attended by many children from immigrant families, and the surrounding neighbourhood is well-known for a large amount of immigrants, its poverty, and heightened social tensions. On 22nd October, a masked young man killed a teacher and one pupil. His face was covered in a mask of Darth Vader from the Star Wars movies; he was dressed in a black coat, and he held a sword. Many pupils thought it is a Halloween joke and one of the female pupils even took a photograph with the attacker. Later it became clear that the attacker was a sympathizer of the extreme right and hated immigrants and he selected his victims on the basis of their ethnicity.

In close association with the anti-migration protests and violent acts, it was also possible to record the **increase in the number of expressions of hatred against Muslims** and the Islamic religion. These manifestations often varied in vigor, from verbal expressions, through symbolic attacks against Muslim places of prayer, to arson or bomb attacks against mosques. The most attacks were carried out in countries, which are most affected by the influx of refugees. At the end of 2014, three arson attacks against Swedish mosques gained a significant attention; these took place in Eskilstuna, where the arsonist attacked during afternoon prayers (5 persons injured), in Eslöv and Uppsala, where the arsonist accompanied the attack by defamatory inscriptions directed against Muslims and urged them to leave Sweden. A significant rise in attacks against Muslims also occurred **in France**, in particular



Map of anti-Muslim attacks perpetrated immediately after the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo (source: [www.vox.com](http://www.vox.com))



Things, which were seized during the police intervention against neo-Nazis in Bamberg in November (source: [sueddeutsche.de](http://sueddeutsche.de))

as a response to terrorist attacks perpetrated by radical Islamists. A significant increase of these acts was also possible to record after the terrorist attacks on the editorial office Charlie Hebdo in January. Shortly after these attacks, unknown assailants threw several grenades to the courtyard of the Sablons mosque in Le Mans. In Port-la-Nouvelle, attackers had shelled the house of prayer about an hour after the evening prayers. In August, a mosque in southern French town Auch was deliberately set on fire, during which three-quarters of the mosque were destroyed. Fire engulfed the mosque shortly after three Americans and a Britton incapacitated a Moroccan youth, who belonged to an Islamic movement and injured two people, on a train from Amsterdam to Paris. Incidents also occurred during the demonstrations, where, for example, the desecration of a Muslim house of prayer took place in a Corsican town of Ajaccio in December; the assault was carried out after the escalation of an anti-Muslim demonstration, which turned into a punitive expedition with hate slogans and burning of the Quran.

As already mentioned, the resistance

towards the refugee wave and the Islam also led to the **international liaison of extreme right groups** because all entities belonging to this ideological stream attempted to grasp this topic. Due to the finding of a „common enemy“, and with the prospect of mutual help and inspiration, they could easily overcome their mutual antipathy and unite for the common joint fight. Czech entities also became involved in these international activities. Thus arose or deepened cooperation multilateral organizations associating several groups from many countries and it was also possible to record tighter initiatives operating mainly on a cross-border basis (see, for example, international activities of the Worker’s Youth or the Worker’s Party of Social Justice). An example of the first group may also be the newly established **World National-Conservative Movement**, officially formed during December 2015. This movement has declared that it should function as an umbrella organization for the activities of nationally-oriented political parties, non-political organizations and individuals throughout the world, and that it would fight for the defence of national identities and national interests, traditional religious and moral values, the deepening of the dialogue between nations, mutual support to patriotic forces and for the development of a new geopolitical doctrine. The interesting thing is the pro-Russian orientation of this movement, which, among other things, has built on the International Russian Conservative Forum held in St. Petersburg in March. Groups that have signed up to the project are quite diverse. Among them are, for example, the Greek Golden Dawn, the Hungarian Party of Justice and Life and the Serbian Radical Party. The movement in the role of an honorary chairman was led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was



Promotional flyer for the November DSSS demonstration; a symbol of German JND in the first place (at the bottom)

participated in the promotion of the anti-migration event that took place in Berlin in November. It was also possible to record a joint campaign of these entities entitled „Together in the fight for Europe! / Gemeinsam im Kampf für Europa!“. Similarly, representatives of this Czech youth organization also attended several international conferences of nationalist groups. As an example, it is possible to mention the European Congress of the European National Youth that took place in German Riesa in October and was attended mainly by groups from Western Europe, or the European Congress in Rome that took place in November. An event in Italy was attended by the Junge Nationaldemokraten, Slovak People’s Party or Polish Third Way.

expelled from the French National Front in 2015 after being its most prominent personality for a long time. Of groups operating in the Czech Republic, allegiance to this movement was declared by the National Democracy.

In relation to the immigration crisis, it was also possible to record a close **cooperation** between the **Worker’s Youth and the German group Young National Democrats (Junge Nationaldemokraten)**. Supporters of the youth group National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) were, for example, present at a demonstration entitled „For national pride and sovereignty, against immigration and the dictates of Brussels“, which took place in Prague on 17th November. Some activists of the Worker’s Youth, on the other hand, assisted in the election campaign of NPD in Hamburg in February. DM was also invited to a summer festival organized by the NPD, which took place in Berlin in July. Its supporters also attended a protest in the German capital in October, against the construction of an asylum centre. It also

In connection with its participation in these international events, the DM also began to promote the nationalist project **Reconquista Europe**. This transnational movement was the main motive of the October gathering in Riesa. In 2015, it was also supported by other followers of the extreme right. In the past, references to it already appeared in ideological texts of the Generation of Identity.

Most of the DM contacts were established primarily through the German peers. Without these contacts, which have been maintained on a close personal rather than an institutional level, the significance of the DM would have been marginal from the perspective of an international movement.

**The Worker's Party of Social Justice** similarly attempted to present close **links** with some ideologically allied **groups abroad**, especially with the Slovak People's Party - Our Slovakia. Both of these parties mutually supported each other during the year, including their mutual participation of their representatives in organized gatherings. For example, Marian Kotleba attended the anti-migration demonstration that took place in Prague at the beginning of August, during which another significant representative of the Slovak extreme right – Marián Magát – was arrested for his speech. Conversely, representatives of the DSSS visited Slovakia at the invitation of Kotleba in May. Several dozens of Czech right-wing radicals were also arrested during the July anti-migration march in Bratislava. Support for this event was, for example, announced by the DM. The DSSS's integration to the pan-European national party **Alliance for Peace and Freedom** (APF) also cannot be forgotten; it was accepted into the party during the May meeting in the European Parliament in Brussels (this group was created at the beginning of February). This group also includes, for example, the Greek Golden Dawn and the German NPD, also, Nick Griffin, a long-term chairman of the British National Party, also adheres to it. Besides the „classic“ extreme-right topics, worth mentioning is its support for the Russian conservatism, including the support for the current Russian policy. In December, the DSSS chairman, Tomáš Vandas, was elected to the Board of this organization.



Marián Magát, Prague 8th August, shortly before the police detention, wearing a badge of Action group Vzdor (Defiance), an extremist organization with branches in several Slovak cities. In 2015, it presented a plan to create an elite paramilitary troops. (source: idnes.cz)

The question of parasitism of the extreme right on the subject of migration was also discussed in relation to the eventual risk of **strengthening the extreme right or populist parties, which strongly use the anti-migration and anti-Muslim rhetorics**. The results of the elections that took place in 2015 showed that there was a partial strengthening of these entities, however, their support was not always as strong so they could consider the participation in the election as genuinely successful. Often, this was the case also because of the election system settings, or because other „non-radical“ political parties took over similar rhetorics. The May elections to the British House of Commons could be assessed as contradictory by the **United Kingdom Independence Party** (UKIP). Only partially, it built on the success of the elections to the European Parliament that took place in 2014, in which it won with a gain of 27,5 % of the votes. This was its historical success (in comparison with the previous elections in 2010, its support increased by about 10 %); because of the British

political system, however, it only gained one MP seat. From the perspective of the decision-making process, it remained a marginal party. Similarly, the political system prevented the victory of the **National Front** in the French regional elections that took place in December. Even though the National Front was the most successful party in the first round of the elections, in which it gained the highest number of votes in six regions, in the second round,



Arrest of the Golden Dawn chairman Nikos Michaloliakos. In April, a trial began with him and other 68 representatives of this party. They are accused of leading a criminal organization, which was behind many attacks on immigrants and their opponents. If found guilty, the chairman will face 10 years of imprisonment. 300 witnesses are supposed to testify during the trial. (source: theguardian.com)

also due to the withdrawal of several candidates, it did not manage to win in any of the regions. Both in the Great Britain and France it was shown, that even though the popularity of these populist parties rises, they do not reach out to such an amount of voters to win on such a scale so they would gain at least a partial share of power. In Finland, in the case of a similarly oriented political party entitled the Finns, it was later shown, that the support is limited; the party gained 17,7 % of the votes in the April parliamentary elections (about 1,4 % fewer votes than in 2011). Of the other national elections are worth mentioning especially two elections held in Greece, which also showed the

**stagnation of support for the Golden Dawn.** This party received 6,3 % of the votes in the parliamentary election in January (in the previous parliamentary elections in 2012, it was 6,9 %), in the next parliamentary elections that took place in September, the party gained the support of 7 %. Despite numerous scandals and its strong radical rhetorics, the Golden Dawn managed to maintain the support of a part of the public, on the other hand, this support yet seems to be borderline. Conversely, the Polish ultra-conservative party „**Coalition on the Restoration of the Republic, Liberty and Hope – KORWiN**“ may evaluate the past parliamentary elections as a failure; it did not, contrary to the expectations, manage to exceed the 5 % threshold necessary to enter the parliament, when it gained only 4,76 % of the votes. Nevertheless, five members of the radical nationalist political party National Movement (**Ruch Narodowy**) managed to be elected to the Polish Sejm. This party concluded an agreement prior the parliamentary elections with the Kukiz'15 movement on placing of some of its member on the candidate list of the movement that gained 8,81 % in the parliamentary elections and, therefore, ended in a third place.

Alongside the functioning political parties or radical groups, the challenge for security forces was also represented by newly established or shortly functioning groups, which derived their member base from the environment of right-wing extremism. At the same time, they tried to get rid of the extremist or neo-Nazi „label“ through these new projects. They did so primarily for the purpose of eventual greater acceptance in society and to gain stronger support. This can generally be regarded as a long-term trend. An example might be the genesis of the project Generation of Identity, whose supporters have distanced themselves from the traditional neo-Nazism. In Germany, primarily persisted the discussion over the attitude to the **PEGIDA** movement (abbreviation of the Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, translated as the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West), which, on the one hand, came from the extreme right scene, on the other hand,

however, it also associated persons and groups that cannot be considered supporters of right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism. For example, support to PEGIDA was expressed by the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland - AfD) that received more than 7 % of the votes in the last election to the European Parliament. Most attention continued to acquire the gatherings organized by this group, which were in some cases attended by several tens of thousands of people. In October, for example, the demonstration in Dresden was allegedly attended by up to 20,000 people with several hundreds of Czech citizens. A similar number of participants also had the opposing demonstration held on the same day in the same city.



The October Pegida demonstration in Dresden with the attendance of about 20.000 people on a commemoration of the establishment of this movement. Banners of Generation of Identity may be seen at the forefront. These gatherings were, among others, attended by many groups belonging to the extreme right scene. (source: Reuters)

Public events of PEGIDA often involved strong hate speech as well as clashes with security forces. In June, PEGIDA also participated in the electoral contest for the first time, in direct elections for the position of the Mayor of Dresden. The candidate of this movement was also supported by NPD. The electoral gains of this candidate (9,6 % of the votes) were considered to be a great success by experts. Eventually, the PEGIDA leader Lutz Bachmann announced his intention to participate in the future elections. Alongside PEGIDA or NPD, a smaller political party entitled the **Third Way** gained attention in Germany in 2015. On the one hand, this party expressed itself in moderation, on the other, however, it was even more connected with the local neo-Nazi environment. German security services warned that the Third Way, functioning only since 2013, represents a significant danger to the society.


Besides the evaluation of the activities of these groups was then also in many countries discussed the possibility of a **repressive procedure** against these entities and persons expressing hateful ideas. Among the most discussed repressive measures belonged the **criminal proceedings with the Chairman of the French National Front**, Marine Le Pen, who was accused of fanning racial and religious hatred. She compared the praying of Muslims in the streets to the Nazi occupation. The court, however, found Le Pen innocent, also on a proposal from the public prosecutor's office. The statement, which was a political speech according to the court, falls under the protection of freedom of speech.

Among other repressive measures worth mentioning is the **continuation of the trial with National Socialist Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund - NSU)**, where the main defendant Beate Zschäpe appeared for the first time after two and a half years of the

process. Nevertheless, she rejected the charges of ten murders and other crimes committed by the group. The acts were apparently committed by the two remaining members of the group, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt, who are already dead. She claimed that she always learned about the acts retrospectively. She only admitted to arson in a flat in Zwickau, where all of them were hiding. She allegedly committed this act to destroy evidence on the NSU. She apologized to the relatives of the victims. She stated that she felt a moral guilt for her actions. She also stated that she had a difficult childhood in the former German Democratic Republic, because she lived in a single-parent family, and her mother was an alcoholic. To the final phase also entered the **process of dissolving** the NPD before the German Constitutional Court. In December, the court ended a preliminary examination of the proposal to dissolve. The beginning of the main trial was set for March 2016. According to some experts, this move suggests an eventual consonance of the judges of the German Constitutional Court with the submitted proposal.

## 4.2. European extreme left

Militant extreme left groups also remained active in the European environment in 2015. Especially a radically tuned anarchism was behind many violent attacks and constituted a considerable threat to some European countries. The radical communist movement, on the contrary, remained in the background in terms of risk activities of its members. In some European countries, especially those without experience with Communist totalitarianism, the ideas of anarchists and communists overlap partially. From the viewpoint of radical Communist groups worth mentioning is a relative success of the Communist Party of Greece, which in both elections to the Greek Parliament exceeded the 5% threshold to gain parliamentary seats (in both elections, it received about 5.5% of the votes and won consistently at 15 mandates).



Logo of the Anarchist Black Cross, a key umbrella movement for international anarchist cooperation.

Militant anarchist movement continued to be internationally interconnected. This strictly informal interconnectedness was manifested in carrying out solidarity actions, when individual attacks have been linked to other undertaken actions or repressions against other anarchists, issuing supporting materials in various European countries, establishing individual cells of wide informal groups, etc.. The activist could learn about individual events through virtual channels. Because of that, their actions could gain international recognition and be seen as a part of a broad anarchist struggle (see, among other things, actions of the Czech militant anarchists). The anarchist movement was often interconnected with radical environmental groups (Animal Liberation Front and a group entitled Earth First!).

**In terms of activation themes**, mainly the idea of combat against the state and its repressive forces persisted, as a reaction to applied repressive measures against anarchists, and the conviction of the need to fight against capitalism. A relatively new and important **theme**, similarly to the case of the extreme right, was the **immigration wave**, and the question of attitude to incoming migrants. Unlike the extreme right, however, the radical left held an entirely different attitude on this topic. In support of their thesis, they also did not hesitate to use violence. In support of refugees, for example, militant anarchists claimed

responsibility for the damage on a building of the Immigration Office in German Bremen in July, as an expression of resistance to the restrictions adopted against immigration and immigrants. Violence could then also be recorded in many anti-migration demonstrations, where either there were clashes between the supporters and opponents of accepting immigrants (e.g. August demonstration in front of the refugee centre in German Heidenau) or a clash between security forces and demonstrators (mostly in reaction to an attack by protesters on buildings of state institutions). In 2015, it was also possible to record increased



The April gathering in Athens. Anarchists called for closing the strictest Greek prison, in which many of their associates are imprisoned. (source: AP Photo)

support, including violent solidarity actions, to the Kurdish liberation movement, both for its fight with the Islamic State and the Turkish government. For example, we can mention the August bomb attack on a car of the Turkish Embassy in Zurich, Switzerland.

In 2015, **Greece** remained the most important country for the anarchist movement. At the beginning of the year, the local anarchists looked up with hopes to the electoral victory party Syriza. Later, however, even they separated from this party, because it did not meet their expectations and ideas. In April, the former **Greek Minister of Finance Janis Varoufakis** from the Syriza party and his wife were verbally **assaulted** in the Athenian restaurant. The attackers accused him of becoming a part of the system of power and threw objects at him. In November, the extremists attacked a member of the New Democracy party in front of the Parliament building. There were also frequent attacks on the offices of MPs and politicians. In February, the newly formed Greek anarchist group called the **Militia Organization of People's Justice** claimed responsibility for **killing a director of Domokos prison**, Makis Galimanis. The murderers fired a total of twenty bullets at him. This attack was one of many, which were directed against the representatives of the prison system, not only in Greece but throughout Europe. Group "Combative Anarchy / FAI-IRF" claimed responsibility for June **arson attacks on the offices of the government party SYRIZA**. They were carried out in response to the rejection of an application for a release of the imprisoned anarchist Nikos Romanos for study purposes and in response to the extension of the arrest of a wife of one of the arrested members of a militant group the Conspiracy of Fire Cells. At the end of November, a **bomb exploded in front of the Greek Business Association** in the centre of Athens. The explosion destroyed several nearby buildings. The responsibility for the attack was claimed by a group entitled the People's Warriors (OLA), which had attacked already in 2013. In November, a homemade explosive device exploded in front of the post office in the village of Pefki. It was previously burgled by anarchists, who stood trial for this act. During the year, the Greek anarchists repeatedly clashed with security forces, at a rallies in support of immigrants (e.g. in the village of Kastania situated near the border with Turkey in October), or during a large demonstration against the adoption of the conditions of international creditors voted for in a referendum, during which the police intervened with tear-gas against a group of about 300 anarchists. In December, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of a police shooting, whose victim was a fifteen-year-old anarchist Alexandros Grigoropoulos<sup>13</sup>, the anarchist protesters threw Molotov cocktails and set

<sup>13</sup> Grigoropoulos together with other youths threw stones at a police vehicle in Exarchia district in Athens in December 2008. One of the police officers disobeyed an instruction of the operation centre not to use a weapon

fire to garbage cans and vehicles. Police officers used a tear-gas against them. The protests were preceded by the declaration of Grigoropoulos' friend Nikos Romanos, who urged the anarchist movement from jail<sup>14</sup> to declare war on the state and capital. He called the last month of 2015 the "**Black December**" full of "blood and fire". This call did not remain without a response; subsequently, several attacks against buildings of state institutions, banks, multinational corporations and sites of action of the Golden Dawn were carried out. Attacks related to the "Black December" did not occur only in Greece but also in other European countries. In Germany, the anarchists set on fire several vehicles in the Suzuki store as a support of the Greek counterparts<sup>15</sup>.



„Snapshot“ from Milanese protests (source: AFP)

**In Italy**, local anarchists and radical environmentalists continued to speak out against the building of a high-speed railway, especially under the auspices of the long-acting movement called **NO TAV**. As a part of this campaign in May, the militant activist intentionally damaged electrical cables on the track

near Bologna, which resulted in the interruption of train traffic. In November, a total of four arson sabotage of electric cables on the line connecting Bologna and Milan took place. Anarchists were also probably responsible for four sabotages on signaling cables on the route between Brussels and Lille at the end of November, which affected not only the connection between these cities but also the railway traffic in Eurotunnel. From the protests carried out by radical anarchists in Italy, the most attention received a **demonstration against the EXPO** held in Milan, which was conceived as an anti-capitalist protest. During the gathering on May 1st, at the opening of the exhibition, the protesters set fire to several vehicles, threw homemade explosives at banks and the headquarters of global business companies and clashed with members of the security forces against whom they used firecrackers, stones, and other objects. The police responded with tear-gas and water cannons. Later, several organizers of violence from the anarchists were charged; a European Arrest Warrant was issued for 5 Greek anarchists. In response, the Greek anarchists shortly occupied the building of the Italian Embassy in Athens.

**Spanish anarchist movement** was mobilized particularly because of ongoing repressive interventions by the police, which were a continuation of previously initiated Operation Pandora. At the turn of October and December, the Spanish police arrested five people and accused them of belonging to a criminal organization with terrorist objectives, support for terrorism and the attacks against banks and corporations in Madrid and Barcelona. The given long-term police operation was a response to previous criminal acts of the Spanish anarchists. These interventions subsequently encouraged local anarchists to activity. Already in June, during an anarchist demonstration against the ongoing repression, some acts of violence were carried out, especially damages to windows of banks, real estate agencies, and other businesses. From smaller actions, the Spanish anarchists claimed responsibility for the

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and shot twice towards the group. Later, the court sentenced him for murder to life imprisonment; the second police officer was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment as an accomplice.

<sup>14</sup> Romanos was actively involved in the anarchist movement. He was convicted of armed robbery.

<sup>15</sup> Suzuki supplied vehicles to the Greek police.

destruction on entrance turnstiles to the Barcelona Metro in May, which they saw as a sign of protest against the high prices of public transport.

Also in **France** and the **UK**, it was possible to record activities of militant anarchists. Targeted attacks against "capitalists" and "those behind the repression" were carried out. For example, the UK could make an example with a November attack against John Hirst, the President of a company focusing on construction and business development of Bristol, during which anarchists broke into his residential complex and deliberately vandalized the garden and parked vehicles<sup>16</sup>. Similarly, anarchists damaged vehicles belonging to one of the managers of the North Wales Prison in October. In France, arson attacks on ten cars that belonged to companies involved in the construction of a prison in Limoges<sup>17</sup> are worth noting. At the beginning of December, anarchists set fire to five cars that belonged to EDF Energy in Toulouse, a company which is engaged in the nuclear industry. Attackers blamed the company that it presents the nuclear core as the solution to global warming.



Arson attacks on police vehicles carried out during operation Destroika in Frankfurt in March. (source:independent.ie)

In the presentation of activities of **German anarchists**, the Destroika project should be mentioned, which was created in connection with the opening of the new headquarters of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. In relation to its ceremonial opening, several demonstrations took place in Frankfurt, during which radical demonstrators from the extreme left set several police cars and garbage cans on fire, damaged the building of Frankfurt's City Hall and clashed with the police units and threw stones and other objects at them. In the Czech Republic, the initiative No Racism also called for participation in these protests. According to the information of the police, there were 230 people injured during the protests, of whom nearly a hundred policemen and about 350 people were detained by the police. In the name of the Destroika initiative, there were also other violent actions. In January, for example, two cars belonging to companies, which are active among others in prisons, were set on fire. Within the aforementioned action of the "Black December", the German anarchists carried out arson attacks against the surface coal mine in the area of Hambacher on the last day of 2015. During a short period, they made several acts of sabotage aimed at interrupting work on this mine. Similarly to previous years, there were also arson attacks on vehicles belonging to the Deutsche Telekom (in Berlin in June) and Siemens (in Berlin in July), which were also linked to other attacks by militant anarchists and general ideas of anarchist struggle.

There was some upheaval of an anarchist movement in **Belgium**, where several militant actions were carried out. For example, an attack in Antwerp in June, in which several police vehicles were put on fire, can be mentioned. More serious damage was also a result of an arson attack on a building associated with the project Greenbizz<sup>18</sup>, which took place near Brussels in June. In August, there was arson attack in the nanotechnology and chemical

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<sup>16</sup> Anarchists claimed responsibility for the attack through a communication, in which they criticized the capitalistic activity of Hirst.

<sup>17</sup> Damage exceeded the sum of one million Euros.

<sup>18</sup> Greenbizz is a project to promote entrepreneurship in the area of „green technologies“.

research center of the Catholic University of Louvain. The perpetrator of this attack has not been identified; some anarchist servers, however, informed about him in a positive manner.

In terms of **activities connected with the Czech environment**, worth mentioning is mainly the **campaign dedicated to prosecuted and detained members of the Network of Revolutionary Cells**. Support for these persons was carried out in the framework of the Anarchist Black Cross initiative, whose main objective rests in the expression of support for anarchists, against whom were taken repressive steps by the state bodies anywhere in the world. Acts of the Network of Revolutionary Cells have been associated with solidarity with imprisoned anarchists outside the Czech Republic and was informed about them in the campaign of the Anarchist Black Cross. Solidarity with members of the Network of Revolutionary Cells was expressed by violent acts (e.g. an arson attack on a building of a bank institution committed in Poland in November), smaller demonstrations (in St. Petersburg, Russia, in June and in Stockholm, Sweden, in August), other organized events (an August concert in Vienna or a concert in Poznan in November) and "solidarity greetings" that were directed to the Czech Republic mainly from European, but also from very distant countries (e.g. USA and Australia). Militant actions committed by local anarchists in 2015 received response abroad; in particular, information about attacks against police vehicles or a company entitled Řízkárna were published by many foreign servers mapping anarchist actions with militant character. Together with earlier actions, these attacks were presented on international anarchist networks as a part of the "Phoenix" project, which is characterized by the incessant desire to direct attacks against hostile targets, as well as revolutionary solidarity, and internationalism. By participating in the Phoenix project, the Czech Republic became one of the other "Member States" - Greece and Chile.

#### **4.3. Extremist movements in Russia and Ukraine**

In **Russia** in 2015, there was an influential **Eurasian movement**, which worked with the support of the Kremlin structures. It tried to profile itself on the continuing Ukrainian crisis and the situation caused by the migration crisis in Europe. It also tried to infiltrate to other countries primarily through the manifestation of the ideas of Alexander Dugin. The Russian pro-Kremlin ultra-right was trying to be active also in the field of international cooperation (e.g. organization of the **International Russian Conservative Forum in St. Petersburg** on 22nd March).

A nationalist and neo-Nazi scene, which was in opposition to the regime, also continued to operate in Russia. On 28th October, the **"Russians"** ("Russkoje") movement, whose leader was the popular ultra-right politician Dmitry Demuschkin, was banned as an extremist group.

Russian extreme right continued to be fragmented. This was also reflected by the fact that on November 4 in Moscow, there were three nationalistic "Russian marches". This led to the elimination of the importance of this mass action, formerly one of the most traditional events of the Russian extreme right with a large number of participants. Approximately thousand supporters of the aforementioned banned movement "Russians" and other neo-Nazi



Russian march organized by a banned group „Russians“ of Dmitry Demuschkin. Neo-Nazi symbols on banners. (source: news.pn)

organizations gathered in Lyublino. Among them were members of the **Wotan Jugend** group (its branch is also known from the Czech Republic from previous years, where its members were tried in 2015). Around 350 people from the imperial ultra-right activist scene demonstrated on the occasion of a "Russian march - for Russian revenge" at the Oktjabrsk field. Another "Russian march for Russian world" around the structures supporting the creation of Novorossia was also held with the participation of about a hundred people.



A banner of allegedly established Czechoslovak unit operating within the International Brigade of the 15th Army of the Donetsk People's Republic (these crimes were committed in 2013).

There were no significant manifestations of left-wing extremism in Russia in 2015. International attention was gained particularly by the trial with anarchist **Ilya Romanov**, who was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in Nizhny Novgorod in August, for the preparation of terrorism and illegal possession of firearms (these crimes were

In **Ukraine** in 2015, there were aggravated tense relations between the government and the forces of the **Right Sector**, which tried to promote their own interests, even by an armed force. In July, the political situation in Mukachevo in the Transcarpathian Ukraine escalated, when gunmen of the Right Sector clashed with local gangs. Czech number plates were found on some vehicles used by fighters of the Right Sector (according to the findings of the security forces of the Czech Republic, however, these were stolen vehicles or number plates). Some right-wing extremists in the Czech Republic and other countries glorified the **Azov** Battalion, which was incorporated into the official Ukrainian structures and is also supported some politicians from established Czech political parties (namely Jaromír Štětina, the Czech Member of Parliament, visited it in 2015). A militant neo-Nazi organization **Misanthropic Division** focused on the Internet propaganda; its Czech branch was particularly active at the beginning of the year.

In the separatist territories, the so-called Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic, extremists from Russia and other countries continued to operate within various units subordinate to these unacknowledged entities. With regard to the lower intensity of the fighting, however, many of them gradually left the area, but others have stayed. According to media reports, a **Czechoslovak unit** was created in the framework of the **International Brigade of the 15th Army** of the Donetsk People's Republic in summer 2015, which carried out mainly diversionary actions. However, the information was not confirmed by independent sources.

In December 2015 in Ukraine, a court banned the **Communist Party of Ukraine** and the **Communist Party of Workers and Farmers**. These parties had already been excluded from the elections. This act sparked a wave of solidarity with the Ukrainian communists within the international communist movement, including the Czech Republic.

## 5. List of used abbreviations

ABC – Anarchist Black Cross  
AČR – Armáda ČR (Army of the Czech Republic)  
BPI – Blok proti islámu (Block against Islam)  
CzDL – Czech Defence League  
ČSVZ – Českoslovenští vojáci v záloze (Czech Soldiers in Ambush)  
DSSS – Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti (Worker's Party of Social Justice)  
DM – Dělnická mládež (Workers's Youth)  
ESSK – Evidenčně statistický systém kriminality (Statistical Recording System of Criminality)  
GI – Generace identity (Generation of Identity)  
GIBS – Generální inspekce bezpečnostních sborů (General Inspectorate of Security Forces)  
IvČRN – Islám v České republice nechceme (We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic)  
KSČ 21 – Komunistická strana česká 21 (Czech Communist Party 21)  
KSČM – Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)  
KSM – Komunistický svaz mládeže (Communist Youth Union)  
LP - Levá perspektiva (Left Perspective)  
MŠP – Ministerstvo spravedlnosti (Ministry of Justice)  
ND – Národní demokracie (National Democracy)  
NO – Národní obroda (National Resurgence)  
NPD – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands  
NPO – návrh na podání obžaloby (proposal for indictment)  
NSZ – Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství (Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office)  
PEGIDA - Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (translated as Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West)  
PMS – Probační a mediační služba (Probation and Mediation Service)  
SMKČ – Svaz mladých komunistů Československa (Czechoslovak Youth Communist Union)  
SocSol – Socialistická solidarita (Socialist Solidarity)  
SPD – Svoboda a přímá demokracie (Freedom and Direct Democracy)  
SRB – Síť revolučních buněk (Network of Revolutionary Cells)  
TZ – Trestní zákoník (Criminal Code)  
ÚNK – Úsvit – Národní koalice (Dawn – National Coalition)  
VAP - Voice of Anarchopacifism  
VP – Vojenská policie (Military Police)  
ZPŘT – Zkrácené přípravné řízení (Shortened preliminary proceedings)