

MINISTERSTVO VNITRA
ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY

REPORT ON EXTREMISM IN THE TERRITORY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 2016

**Ministry of the Interior
Security Policy and Crime Prevention
Department Prague 2017**

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1. Introduction

The Report on extremism and associated phenomena in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2016 (hereinafter referred to as „the Report“) is submitted by the Government Resolution No. 419 of 11 May 2016. The Evaluation of the Conception on Combating Extremism for 2016 and the Conception on Combating Extremism for 2017 are included in separate documents.

The document does not capture all racist and xenophobic manifestations registered in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2015. The Report concentrates on members or sympathizers of extremist groups. Capturing all racist and xenophobic behaviours, actions or statements on a national or a regional level is beyond the scope of both the document and the issue of extremism itself as it is perceived by the Ministry of the Interior. The primary objective of the document is the description of activities of entities, which are considered extremist by the Ministry of the Interior.

The author of this Report is the Ministry of the Interior. The source material was obtained from representatives of the intelligence services, the Police of the Czech Republic, other resorts of the state administration, the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Spectators’ violence, respectively hooliganism, is a separate topic on the agenda of the Ministry of the Interior. The document on extremism does not focus on sects and pseudo-religious organizations since there were no records of significant activities related to a security risk of an infiltration into government structures, political or economic sphere, or threats to democratic structures of the state.

The document is processed annually. It aims to inform the public about developments on the domestic extremist scene on a regular basis. New measures are subsequently being adopted based on the findings, which are included in this document.

The first passage, dedicated to the domestic scene, is based on data provided by the Security Intelligence Services and the Police of the Czech Republic; in particular, experts on extremism from the National Centre against Organized Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigations Service and the Regional Directorates of the Police of the Czech Republic.

The statistics have been provided by the Police of the Czech Republic, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic.

The third part is dedicated to foreign influences affecting the Czech extremist scene. It was processed by experts from the Masaryk University in Brno with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via specifically selected foreign embassies in other European countries.

A list of abbreviations shall be found in the last section.

This document includes photographs, which were taken by officers of the Police of the Czech Republic. Photographs obtained from other sources, e.g., in the foreign scene section, are referenced.

2. Definition of the term extremism

In this document, the term „extremism“ is defined identically to previous annual reports. The last publication of such a comprehensive definition cited in its full extent was in the Report on the Issue of Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2002 adopted by the Government Resolution No. 699 on July 9, 2003.¹ In this context, it is also possible to refer to the established case law in relation to the interpretation of the term „movement“.² The full wording of the definition of extremism is available at <http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/co-je-extremismus.aspx>.

Not all the entities that are included in the Report have engaged in illegal activities in 2016. From a long-term perspective, they nevertheless possess features of extremism defined in previous annual documents.

The Report still uses the concept of extremism; however, the Ministry of the Interior cooperates with institutions that more frequently use the concept of hate (bias) crimes (i.e., offences motivated by hatred, bias, or crimes motivated by collective prejudice). In addition, the Ministry of the Interior believes that the concepts of extremism and hate crimes may be complementary. Therefore, there should be a scope for strengthening the elements of hate (bias) crimes within the law-enforcement and judicial units.

¹ See <http://www.mvcr.cz> (section „Security threats“, subsection „Extremism“ – „Strategy for combating extremism and Annual reports on extremism“).

² In particular the opinion of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court Tpjn 302/2005 (No. 11/2007 Coll.), and also the Supreme Court Resolutions 5 Tdo 79/2006, 5 Tdo 337/2002, 3 Tdo 1174/2004, and Resolution 4 T 98/2009 of the Regional Court in Brno.

3. Report on Extremism in the Territory of the Czech Republic in 2016

3.1. Main events and trends - summary

In 2016, **fragmentation** continued to be characteristic for the **whole extremist spectrum**. A **partial replacement of topics** took place within a part of movements.


An increasingly more visible phenomenon in the context of subversive and extremist groups is the fact that they gradually **overshadow the comprehensive ideological starting points and, on the other hand, accentuate individual specific program points and objectives**. This trend corresponds with the so-called crisis of traditional political parties, which is also evident in other European countries. This situation leads, among other things, to the blurred importance of the division of the extremist scene to right-wing and left-wing, as well as their further division to individual streams. There is an increasing **blur of boundaries between individual groups**, and it is no exception that some otherwise antagonistic groups have identical attitudes in specific cases (for example, a positive relationship with the Russian Federation, rejection of EU and NATO, attitude towards refugee crisis, attitude towards Israel).

In 2015, populist **anti-immigration and anti-Muslim groupings** were on the rise. They were able to reach out to and mobilize advocates in the ranks of the wider public. In 2016, however, there were internal disputes in this spectrum, which resulted in its **fragmentation** and subsequent gradual **decline**. These entities, however, by purposefully causing fear, **detracted support from right-wing extremist groups**. Anti-Muslim and anti-immigration groups managed to polarize the society successfully.

The topic of migration has continued to allow the existence of **domestic militia and paramilitary groups**. These groupings profiled themselves as alternative security forces, public order or state border guards. Some of them have evident sharpened ideological attitudes, which are not in accordance with constitutional and statutory standards and are questioning basic democratic legal principles and xenophobic and hateful elements. In addition to extremist movements, these groups also recruited former members of the pre-1989 security forces. The most active group was the National Militia, personally linked to the party of the National Democracy.

The **most active** from the left-wing extremist spectrum was the **anarchist movement**. It focused on activities to **support activists** who were subject to criminal proceedings, as well as actions and **protests against manifestations of racism and xenophobia**.

In 2016, a total of **308 events** were organized or held with a participation of politically motivated extremist entities. A total of 133 events were hosted by individuals associated with the left-wing extremist movement, 129 events were organized by individuals associated with the right-wing extremist movement. Other anti-immigration and anti-Muslim entities organized a total of 49 events. This represents approximately the same number of events, which were held in 2015 (307 events). While the extreme right has seen a slight increase, the extreme left and the anti-immigration and anti-Muslim movements have experienced a slight decrease in the number of events. In 2016, there were a total of 143 criminal offences with extremist subtext recorded, out of which 99 cases were solved.



LEX – left-wing extremism, PEX – right-wing extremism

3.2. Main security threats and risks for the Czech Republic

- General efforts of extremists to **divide society and weaken the Czech Republic by creating antagonisms** based on ethnic, religious, class, or other keys.
- Further **increase in tensions based on ethnic or religious keys** including demonstrations and manifestations of violence. Local triggering incidents still have the potential to mobilize the public. There is also a **polarization within the majority**, which creates animosity among the followers of various ideological streams.
- A possible **occurrence of radicalized militant individuals or small groups**, which can use violence to promote their interests.
- **Adoption of extremist elements into the political mainstream.**
- A possible **emergence of an extremist political entity with a charismatic leader**, who will be able to unite the extremist scene and reach out to other potential supporters.
- An emergence of **extremist domestic militias**, which can often be illegally armed and aim their manifestations and activities against particular groups of people based on ethnic or religious keys.
- A persistent **questioning of the principles of pluralist democracy and creating of disinformation**. This effort aims to weaken the values associated with Western democracies, disrupt the transatlantic alliance and bring about information and value chaos. The so-called traditional political entities are increasingly less able to offer an alternative to this disruptive extremist influence.

3.3. Right-wing extremism

The **continuing inconsistency** of the extreme right was caused by **long-standing personal disputes** between the leading representatives of individual entities. An intense rivalry persisted between the Workers' Party of Social Justice (hereinafter referred to as „DSSS“) and the National Democracy (hereinafter referred to as „ND“). Both sides managed to cooperate only at the beginning of the year and just at the local level (e.g., in the South Moravian Region). However, with the upcoming regional elections, even the local mutual contacts have diminished.

The **outflow of sympathizers** was evident in both entities, and it was also manifested by **negligible results in regional elections in October**. **Migration** continued to be a topic of interest at the beginning of the year; extreme right-wing entities later moved to a more

vigorous **criticism of and protests against the membership of the Czech Republic in the EU and NATO, and against domestic political representation as a whole.** Another target of manifestations of hatred by right-wing extremists were human rights defenders and the personnel of entities involved in helping refugees.

Some entities, especially the ND in contrast to the current political, social and economic arrangements and foreign political orientation, **promoted an idealized view of the conditions in Russian Federation and the politics of President Vladimir Putin.** Part of this concept was often the approval of the Russian annexation of the Crimea, the expression of support for the so-called separatist republics in Ukraine, and the expression of support for individuals from the Czech Republic who joined the military units operating in the Donbass area. It was possible to trace the consensus between right-wing extremists and radical communists in this area.

The US presidential election was another topic followed, while right-wing extremists expressed **unequivocal support for Donald Trump.**

The **ND party continued to engage in radical manifestations of hatred** against various groups of people based on their political and religious beliefs, racial or ethnic origin, or sexual orientation. Often, **anti-Semitic** elements were characteristic for its activities in the form that has been associated with neo-Nazi activists in the past. ND persistently defined itself against the principles of liberal democracy and referred to itself to as an „anti-system“ entity.



May Day ND event against „traitors“.

The radicality of ND's outcomes compensated for the weak membership base and the lack of prominent personalities in its ranks. **The escalation of its manifestations was mirrored not only in the Internet production but also in public appearances.** On 6 February, there has been an incident at a demonstration organized jointly by the ND and the Movement for Our Culture and Safe Earth, when a supporter of the National Militia fired a shot from a signal gun during a speech of the chairman Adam B. Bartoš. On 26 March, the police seized ND chairman suspected of committing a criminal offence, when he threatened politicians with „the highest

punishment“ during his speech at an anti-immigration and anti-Muslim demonstration. During the police intervention, part of the participants attacked the police, and therefore, four more individuals were seized.

Participation in ND gatherings was influenced by the fact, whether it was organized by the party itself or whether it joined other entities. If the event was held by ND only, there were significantly fewer participants. While the gathering on 6 February had a high attendance rate, only 250 to 300 individuals attended the gathering on 26 March. A similarly low number of supporters was recorded at the May Day gathering of ND. The demonstration in Prague on 17 November was co-organized by the National Militia.

During the year, and especially before the regional elections, the **ND focused on establishing local organizations**. Organizations were, therefore, established in the Carlsbad, Ústí nad Labem, Southern Bohemian, Hradec Králové and Central Bohemian Regions. In reality, only a part of members was active in the Carlsbad, Pilsen, Southern Bohemian, Southern Moravian and Ústí nad Labem Regions. With the development of these structures, **individuals who were previously known for their active involvement in the neo-Nazi movement also joined the party**. In the second half of the year, and especially after the regional elections, the leadership of the party tried to reach out to other activists with the help of the already known individuals to ensure support from the neo-Nazi movement.

A significant milestone was the **November conference** during which disputes in the leadership of the party over cooperation with the neo-Nazi movement culminated. Its opponents accused the chairman Bartoš of allowing the dissemination of neo-Nazi views, and subsequently left the party.

ND has long been unsuccessfully striving to establish international contacts and cooperation, both at the bilateral level, e.g., with People's Party - Our Slovakia of Marián Kotleba, as well as within the framework of pan-European platforms such as the Alliance for Peace and Freedom.

The party also did not submit the full annual financial reports for the years 2014 and 2015 under the Resolution of the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, the Ministry of the Interior elaborated a proposal to initiate proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court to suspend its activity.

In 2016, the DSSS was characterized by moderate and insignificant appearances. Although having a larger membership base compared to ND, it only organized few public gatherings with the attendance of about 150 people. The party lost the wider support of the neo-Nazi movement. Part of its members moved to ND, or started cooperating with ND; part of its members ended their active involvement.

The party of chairman Tomáš Vandas also **did not succeed in the regional elections**. Cooperation with a financially better-fed party the National Socialists – LEV21 did not help either.

DSSS was active as regards its international relationships and partnerships. In particular, its membership in the already mentioned **Alliance for Peace and Freedom** and cooperation with the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), and the People's Party - Our Slovakia of Marián Kotleba can be mentioned. Behind its motivation for membership in the Alliance for Peace and Freedom was undoubtedly its intention to obtain some of the funding that this ultranationalist project claims from the European Union.



DSSS followers expressing support to the German NPD in Prague, 27 February.

Some **attenuation was also recorded by the Workers' Youth** (hereinafter referred to as „DM“), a juvenile organization of the DSSS, during the last year. It has long been working with the Young National Democrats (Junge Nationaldemokraten) under the National Democratic Party of Germany. Young National Democrats regularly participate in events organized by the DSSS, respectively the DM. In December, Hynek Rint became the new chairman of the Workers' Youth, replacing the current chairman Erik Lamprecht.

The only entities, which were associated with the neo-Nazi movement, the **Generation of Identity** and **Pro-Vlast**, continued to operate. The former did not make any significant public appearances during the year. Its membership base was about ten people. In contrast to the Austrian branch of the movement, the domestic version can be described as unsuccessful. It did not receive any support even within the wider neo-Nazi movement. The original Pro-Vlast membership base came from the neo-Nazi group Autonomous Nationalists. Many members were also active in the environment of hooligans. Through its members, Pro-Vlast has been associated with the April graffiti attacks against businesses that have joined the HateFree Zone campaign.

Members of **Soldiers of Odin** paramilitary group were also recruited from the environment of hooligans and the neo-Nazi movement. They organized provocative anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant activities in Teplice. In the second half of the year, practically no activity was recorded. The exception was the October incident involving the death of a Roma citizen in Žatec, where part of Soldiers of Odin attempted to raise public protests and demonstrations against the Roma community.

In contrast to 2015, there was a **higher number of secret White Power Music concerts** recorded (a total of 8). Most of these events were registered in the Southern Moravian and Liberec Regions in IV Q of the year. Concerts were mainly intended for the domestic audience; they were also attended by foreign sympathizers, particularly from Slovakia, Germany, and Hungary.

Persistent topics for right-wing extremists were anti-immigration activities and anti-Muslim appearances in 2016. Due to the gradual „decrepitation“ of the topic, they mostly considered it in a **wider context** – such as the disagreement with the EU, protest against current political representation, opposition against human rights defenders, leftist intellectuals, etc. Most of the other topics (e.g., former intense anti-Roma rhetoric) have receded in the background; however, on the right occasion, they were quickly „dusted“ by the right-wing extremists (see, for example, the aforementioned extreme situation linked to the death of a Roma in Žatec).



Incident in Thunovská street in Prague on 6 February.
Criminalist in the background („a man in a brown jacket“).

The **Internet** was the largest **space for hate speech**. Authors of these statements were often persons, who are not right-wing extremists.

The most significant recorded criminal activity involved **hateful graffiti attacks against businesses participating in the HateFree Zone campaign** (23 and 24 April), and **incidents from public gatherings held on 6 February**, when people from the hooligans community first tried to instigate a conflict with anti-

demonstrators in Thunovská Street in Prague, and then attacked the premises of the Autonomous Social Centre Klinika in Žižkov with stones and pyrotechnics.

The incident in Thunovská Street in Prague was exploited by the so-called alternative media to spread false reports that masked attackers were in fact provocateurs managed by the police. A criminalist present on the spot in civilian, later nicknamed „a man in a brown jacket“, was falsely identified as the coordinator of the alleged „police provocation“. This false report has spread intensely before it has been refuted, and has also been reflected in some media reports, which are considered serious.

3.4. Anti-immigration and anti-Muslim movement

The anti-immigration and anti-Muslim movement **was represented by a mixture of heterogeneous entities**. It has been able to **polarize the Czech society significantly** and contributed to the growing radicalization of opinions. Despite various proclamations about the need to unite all the patriotic forces, **individual anti-immigration groups were unable to cooperate**. There was a **further split** during the year. The reasons were not only the differences of opinion but also personal animosities and competitive struggle before the elections.

A significant event was the **breakup of the coalition Block against Islam** (hereinafter referred to as „BPI“) and the **parliamentary party Dawn – National Coalition** (hereinafter referred to as „ÚNK“) **in April**. The BPI leader Martin Konvička accused the ÚNK of fraudulent behaviour and not fulfilling its commitments. At the beginning of the year, the coalition of both movements made a uniform impression. It developed cooperation with the Saxon populist movement PEGIDA. Individuals associated with these entities promoted the so-called **international anti-Islamic demonstration** or a series of gatherings organized in various European cities on 6 February. Czech demonstrations took place with a relatively high attendance in Prague. The following entities participated in the organization of events: ÚNK + BPI, National Democracy + movement For Our Culture and Safe Country, Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura.



Provocative action of M. Konvička, Prague on 21 August.

to represent the occupation of Prague by the Islamic State. The event caused panic especially in the area of the Old Town Square.

Already in May, **disagreements also occurred within the Block against Islam**. New entities have not gained any public support. The **influence of Martin Konvička** and his supporters was also **marginalized**. He only drew attention to himself through **spectacular happenings in Prague**, i.e., on the occasion of the Soviet occupation on 21 August, and on the anniversary of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September. In the first case, it was a „theater scenario“, which was supposed

The second happening took place in front of the Saudi Arabia’s Embassy, where a mobile toilet, which was supposed to represent the most sacred place of Islam, the Ka’abu

Sanctuary, was installed. The gathering was attended by about 30 individuals and was later dissolved. In July, Konvička and his supporters organized an **event in front of the mosque in Brno**, where besides other provocative activities, a burning of pages of the Koran took place.

The decline in public interest in the topic of migration as well as internal disagreements within the movement has in fact led to its complete disintegration. There has also been a decline in public gatherings of some entities, a drop in attendees and lower participation of ordinary citizens in demonstrations. Events on the occasion of 17 November were only attended by hundreds of activists. Political entities from this spectrum have shifted their orientation to organizing public debates and meetings with citizens.

Increasingly, the issue of migration has been associated with **resistance against the European Union**. Following Brexit, the anti-migration entities begun to accentuate the call for „Czexit“.

In addition to the demonstrations, the movement's activities also included symbolic blockades of refugee facilities, blockades at border crossings, debates with citizens, petition events, leaflet campaigns, etc. **Truly dangerous forms of protests** (arsons to refugee facilities, physical assaults endangering life, etc.) **were not recorded**. Most of the more radical manifestations only appeared in a verbal form – **the Internet was the main space for anti-migration attitudes**.

The possibilities for mobilization on the part of this movement have remained unused due to the absence of capable and charismatic leaders, as well as a large number of personal animosities. **The electoral potential of these entities** (except for Freedom and Direct Democracy – Tomio Okamura) **was negligible**.

Anti-immigration and anti-Muslim groups were given a great space within the so-called alternative media that were trying to spread and support the atmosphere of fear. Among other things, they also exploited selective and purposeful information on refugees, Muslims and their association with terrorism.

3.5. Paramilitary and militia groups

Paramilitary and militia groups (hereinafter referred to as „PMGs“) **tried to create the impression that the Czech security forces are not able to handle the situation** and to protect the territory of the Czech Republic and its citizens. They tried to present them as untrustworthy and made efforts to undermine their activities. **Their status was dependent on the development of the migration crisis**. With the weakening of the topic of migration, their significance also decreased. In 2016, there was **no further radicalization or more intense use of violence on their part recorded**.

The modern era of the PMGs started by the establishment and operation of the **Czechoslovak Soldier in Ambush for Peace** (hereinafter referred to as „ČSVZ“), respectively, formerly the Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush against the War Planned by the NATO Command³. The initiative has broken down by the end of 2015 due to internal disputes

³Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush for Peace represent a registered association; the original Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush against War Planned by the NATO Leadership is an informal initiative. The latter distanced itself from the activities of the registered association.

about further direction and cooperation with political entities. The former „commander“ of the group, Marek Obrtel, together with František Krejča, then a member of the ND, were among the main promoters of cooperation with **this right-wing extremist party**.

Concurrently, the project **National Militia** (hereinafter referred to as „NDB“) was established in the second half of 2015. ND „handed over the agenda“ of the NDB to the newly established National Military Council, whose members were Marek Obrtel, František Krejča, and Nela Lisková.



Domestic militia on anti-Islamic demonstration in Prague, 28 September.

In spite of the media presentations on the functioning of the NDB and its regional groups, in most cases, these were only **virtual shells** that did not perform any activity. **Active were more or less those with links to right-wing extremists or militant individuals.** The number of NDB supporters is estimated around 70 individuals; the number of active members is around 40. The National Militia focused, among others, on former members of security forces active before 1989 as regards the recruitment. Regarding public activities, the NDB co-organized a demonstration in Prague on 17 November, which was attended by about 200 people. In addition, the group organized several shootings for supporters and members, but with a low attendance of about 20 people.

The NDB leadership had **direct contacts with representatives of the separatist republics** in the east of Ukraine. Official appearances and statements by NDB representatives were used for propaganda purposes by the media in the region. On 1 September, Nela Lisková opened the „**Representative Centre of the Donetsk People’s Republic**“ (in reality, it was an association called „Representative Centre of DNR“ registered by the Regional Court in Ostrava). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed the establishment of this would-be consulate and asked the court to abolish the association.

ČSVZ practically did not appear in public, except for the protest against the US Army convoy passing through our territory and the attendance of the NDB demonstration in Prague on 17 November. In 2016, only some original companies were united. Only some of them were active, especially in the Olomouc, Zlín and Moravian-Silesian Regions. The initiative co-operated with the ÚNK and BPI; its members participated in efforts to create an additional militia project entitled **State Defence Guard**. The real operation of the State Defence Guard was not recorded.

The spectrum of militia groups was considerably heterogeneous from the perspective of their activities. Some existed only virtually, some of them had several meetings in restaurants, some had regular training, shooting training was organized. Rarely, there were some attempts to monitor refugees in the streets registered (**ČSVZ, Czechoslovak Patriotic Guard** – hereinafter referred to as ČSVG) or provocative actions (**Ódin Soldiers** in Teplice). Members of some groups (ČSVZ, ČSVG, NDB) served as a security and organizing service in anti-immigration gatherings.

Only a few **individuals or very small groups were able to undergo real**

paramilitary training and follow a certain discipline.

At the national level, the ČSVZ and NDB tried to be influential; however, various **local groupings** were emerging alongside these movements. Some PDSs were purely right-wing extremist (Soldiers of Odin, the Brigade) and operated with the involvement of right-wing extremists (NDB); in the case of ČSVZ, their involvement was minimal. Particularly those individuals, who served in the army in the past (even before 1989), were active in the initiative.

Increased arming of members of these groups has been registered, however, in a legal way. Main representatives called on the members to acquire firearms licence. Some activists also purchased weapons that are not subject to registration.

The pro-Russian orientation of the PDS stemmed from the resistance to the „West“, US, and NATO. It was not confirmed that their activities were influenced or directly controlled by the intelligence services of the Russian Federation. Not even in the case of Nela Lisková, who founded the so-called „Representative Centre of DNR“ in Ostrava, which she presents as a consulate of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic in the Czech Republic.

Some militia groups received **space in the so-called alternative media** to spread their political opinions.

As regards the support of the Russian Federation, its president and the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine, new contacts and alliances have been traced between the supporters of both the right-wing and left-wing extremist movements.

3.6. Left-wing extremism

After partial activation from previous years, there was a **slight stagnation of the anarchist scene, especially its militant part**, in 2016. The anti-authoritarian groups were still **fragmented, and there was no significant figure or collective to unite them. The membership base remained weak.**



Anti-nationalist event with the participation of anarchists in Prague, 6 February.

extremist candidates ahead of the regional elections.

The most significant entities were the **Anarchist Federation, No to Racism Initiative**, and the **Anti-Fascist Action (AFA)**. The **North Bohemian Anarchist Federation** was partially activated during the second half of 2016. Individual groups and collectives have been personally interconnected. They concentrated on organizing concerts, solidarity events, and various happenings. AFA also engaged in monitoring of right-wing

In 2016, there was a significant decrease in the activities of the **Network of Revolutionary Cells**. Only one arson attack on vehicles of the Police of the Czech Republic took place (14 February, Prague, Nad Úpadem, two police vehicles). Anarchists were active

as regards **announcing installation of explosive devices** in the first half of the year. The main target was the Řízkárna restaurant; nevertheless, buildings of the state institutions were the new targets of threats.

The **refugee crisis** in Europe remained the **mobilization factor** for the anarchist scene. Its members **participated in protests against racist and xenophobic manifestations of right-wing extremists and anti-immigration and anti-Muslim movements**. In Prague, about 500 people took part in the public „anti-demonstrations“ on 6 February, and approximately 300 people on 17 November.

On 17 November, attempts for a coordinated blockade of an event organized by the National Militia were registered. In connection with the declining interest in immigration topics, the anarchists' activities in this area have also been dampened.

Wide support across the anarchist spectrum was given to **squatter activities** and „**autonomous social centres**“, especially Klinika („the clinic“). Explosive systems were announced in the premises of Klinika three times. The police, however, did not find any such item in the building. The premises were evacuated on two occasions. During the second bomb announcement, several activists refused to leave the premises and were subsequently detained. In March, the lease contract of the Autonomous Social Centre Klinika expired. The Office for Government Representation in Property Affairs has transferred the property to the Railway Infrastructure Administration. The activists refused to leave the property and continued in their activities.

A part of the anarchist movement reflected the case of the prosecuted anarchists in the so-called Phoenix case. These were, in particular, activists loosely associated within the **Antiphoenix** collective. **A significant impulse was the arrest of and the subsequent accusation of anarchist Lukáš Borl**. Solidarity activities took the form of unannounced demonstrations outside of the remand prison, lectures and concerts with the collection of funds to support prosecuted anarchists. The anarchist movement was not united as regards the activities of the so-called Network of Revolutionary Cells. In general, there was a consensus on the need to support the prosecuted anarchists, but in the matter of the Network of Revolutionary Cells, there appeared opinions rejecting the methods of the so-called rebellious anarchism.

Radical communists continued to be fragmented into many marginal collectives with a small membership base, and their activity stagnated. **The Communist Youth Union and the Union of Young Communists of Czechoslovakia practically did not engage in any activity**.

Some Trotskyist groupings were more active than others. Deepening cooperation of some Trotskyist entities and anarchists have been recorded during the year (e.g., in the pro-refugees activities). The **Socialist Solidarity** leaned toward anarchist groups; on the contrary, the **Left Perspective** leaned toward radically communist groups. The traditional **Anti-capitalist Camp** took place in South Bohemian Region in July.

Some groups from the radically communist spectrum have focused on **supporting the Donbass republics**.

3.7. Statistics of criminal activity with extremist subtext

3.7.1. Introduction

Police statistics are processed on the basis of the **Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium („ESSK“)**. **Statistical data of the Ministry of Justice, which also form the basis for the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office statistics, have a different horizon of reporting than the police statistics.** The decisive element is not the timing when a crime was committed, but rather the time when a prosecutor prepared the indictment, decided on the cessation of the prosecution, etc. The absence of an interconnectedness of these three statistics is a great handicap; however, it is not technically possible to solve this issue at the moment.

Prior 2009, police statistics were governed by the Act No. 36/1960 Coll., on the territorial division of the state as amended. Statistics were, therefore, formerly distinguished into seven regions and the capital of Prague. Since 1st January 2010, the breakdown of statistics is identical to the higher territorial units, and therefore, distinguish 14 regions. This change makes a year on year comparison of data concerning regions before and after 2009 impossible.

The Statistical Recording System of Crime („ESSK“) was developed in the 1970s. Recently, many indicators have been found obsolete and inadequate. Therefore, **a major reconstruction of this system was commenced** in 2016. The reconstruction aims to update the data to current conditions, refine them, simplify their calculation and make them accessible to the general public in a more comprehensible and approachable form.

This reconstruction involves the **transition to a different software. The manner of data flow from the information system of Evidence of Criminal Proceedings to the ESSK is also being changed. Algorithms calculating statistical numbers are also being reviewed.** Reconstruction, assessment, and modification of the system are taking place during its full operation and are refined continuously. The result of this reconstruction in its final form will be the incompatibility of the data with the previous period, especially as regards the indicators of the number of prosecuted persons and criminal offences committed by them.

There has been a fundamental change in the counting system of prosecuted persons. In the past, only the most serious criminal activity was attributed to the prosecuted person. If the perpetrator committed under a single reference number, for example, the offence of murder and concurrently the offence of the negligence of mandatory support, they were counted as a prosecuted person only for the offence of murder. Currently, all the criminal activity will be taken into account in the calculation of the prosecuted person. Statistics will, therefore, show that if we question the number of offenders for total criminal activity, a different number will be given than if we inquire into the number of perpetrators per type of criminal activity, and then we add them up. **One perpetrator will be counted as many times as the number of criminal offences they committed.**

In the past, statistics on crimes committed by the police officers were processed by the Inspectorate of the Police of the Czech Republic, which was later substituted by the General Inspectorate of Security Forces from 1st January 2012. Data is, therefore, provided by the General Inspectorate since 2011.

Within the non-standard statistical outcomes, the Police of the Czech Republic have

been processing statistics related to detected criminal offences with anti-Semitic overtones since 2005⁴. Since 1st January 2005, classifications of extremist crime were extended in the Statistical Recording System of Crime of the Police Presidium of the Czech Republic (ESSK) in terms of codes allowing identification of crimes motivated by religious and ethnic hatred against Jewish people and the Jewish fate, including assaults on buildings of Jewish Communities and their equipment, synagogues and Jewish cemeteries.

Criminal offences motivated by hatred against Roma have been provided in the reports since 2011. It is necessary to add an explanatory commentary to these statistics. There is no distinction between victims of crimes by ethnicity or nationality in police statistics. It is only possible to detect that the victim was a foreigner. On the other hand, criminal offences motivated by racial hatred or hatred against Bohemians, Moravians and Silesians, Polish, Germans, Ukrainians, Vietnamese, Hungarians, Russians and Ruthenians, Roma, Jewish, Arabs, Chinese, and other nationalities, are recorded in the Statistical Recording System of Crime. For a crime motivated by hatred against Roma to be recorded in the police statistics, following conditions must be met: 1) when filling a form about a relevant criminal offence, the police officer must evaluate the act as a crime with extremist overtones; 2) victims should clearly identify that they are Roma or that the crime targeted an object, which has clear ties to the Roma ethnicity (e.g., spraying of a racist inscription on a Roma Holocaust memorial, or a museum of Roma culture, etc.). Crimes against Roma are not included in the statistics if it is not possible to prove that they had anti-Roma overtones (e.g., a car-theft when the perpetrator does not know ethnic origins of its owner). In addition, many Roma individuals do not avow their Roma ethnicity. Figures in such statistics are indicative and have limited predictive value.

3.7.2. National statistics

There was a total of 217.927 criminal offences committed in the territory of the Czech Republic in 2016. Criminal offences with extremist overtones accounted for about 0,07 % of the total amount. The Police of the Czech Republic **detected 143 criminal offences with extremist subtext** in 2016. There was a **decrease** in the detected extremist acts **in the cross-annual comparison by 32**.

From the aforementioned criminal offences, **69,2 %, i.e., 99 were solved** (in 2015, it was 65,7 %, i.e., 114 criminal offences).

Total amount of criminal offences with extremist subtext recorded in the territory of the Czech Republic in the period of 2006 - 2016

Year	Recorded criminal offences	Share in total crime figures (%)	Solved criminal offences	Persons prosecuted and investigated
2006	248	0,07	196	242
2007	196	0,05	119	181
2008	217	0,06	126	195

⁴ In the period prior the expansion of statistics, there was an increase in criminal offending with an anti-Semitic overtones all across Europe. The topic of anti-Semitism became a priority for both the European Union and for international organisations.

2009	265	0,08	186	293
2010	252	0,08	168	231
2011	238	0,08	157	246
2012	173	0,06	116	208
2013	211	0,06	144	198
2014	201	0,07	132	157
2015	175	0,07	114	154
2016	143	0,07	99	x

Source: PČR, 2017

3.7.3. Statistics according to regions

Most criminal offences with extremist subtext were recorded in Prague (34 criminal offences), which represents about 23,8 % of the total amount of such crimes perpetrated in the territory of the Czech Republic. It is followed by Ústí nad Labem Region (19 criminal offences, i.e., 13,3 %), Zlín Region (16 criminal offences, i.e., 11,2 %) and Central Bohemian Region (14 criminal offences, i.e., 9,8 %). On the other hand, the lowest amount of such criminal offences was recorded in Hradec Králové Region (2 criminal offences, i.e., 1,4%).

In the cross-annual comparison, there was a significant decrease in the number of detected criminal offences with extremist subtext in Moravian-Silesian Region (- 14). In comparison with 2015, an increase was recorded in Prague (+ 10).

Criminal activity with extremist subtext according to regions in 2016

Region	Detected criminal offences	Solved criminal offences
Prague	34	27
Central Bohemian	14	5
Southern Bohemian	6	6
Pilsen	9	5
Ústí nad Labem	19	16
Carlsbad	2	2
Southern Moravian	9	4
Moravian-Silesian	12	6
Olomouc	7	2
Zlín	16	15
Vysočina	3	2
Pardubice	4	3
Liberec	8	6
	143	99

Source: PČR, 2017

3.7.4. Statistics by acts

The greatest representation of criminal offences falls under Section 403

(Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms), **Section 404** (Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms), **Section 405** (Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide) of the Criminal Code, No. 40/2009 Coll. These criminal offences represent 47,6 % (68 criminal offences) of the total amount of crimes with extremist subtext. There were 48 cases solved.

Criminal offences under Section 352 (Violence against Group of People and Individuals) **together with criminal offences under Section 355** (Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People) represented **the second most numerous group**. They contributed to the total number of offences with 11,9 % (17 criminal offences). There were 12, respectively 15, cases solved within this category.

Criminal activity with extremist subtext by acts in 2016

Criminal act	Detected	Solved
Grievous Bodily Harm and Bodily Harm (Sections 145, 146a)	7	4
Violence against Group of People and Individuals (Section 352)	17	12
Dangerous Threatening (Section 353)	2	2
Damage to a Thing of Another (Section 228)	3	1
Disorderly Conduct at sports events and public events (Section 358)	11	10
Spraying (Section 228/2)	9	1
Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People (Section 355)	17	15
Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms (Section 356)	9	6
Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms; Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms; Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide (Sections 403, 404, 405)	68	48
Total	143	99

Source: PČR, 2017

3.7.5. Criminal activity motivated by hatred against selected groups of people

There were **28 criminal offences with anti-Semitic subtext recorded in 2016**. In comparison with 2015, it represents a significant decrease (-19). There were 45 offences recorded in 2014 and 15 offences recorded in 2013.

Criminal offences with anti-Semitic subtext represented 19,6 % of the total amount of crimes with extremist subtext in 2016, i.e., a decrease by 7,3 % in comparison with the previous year.

There were **25 criminal offences motivated by hatred against Roma recorded in 2016**. It represents a decrease in comparison with the previous year when 33 criminal offences were registered. 53 offences were detected in 2014. These criminal offences contribute to the total volume of crimes with extremist subtext with 17,4 %.

In 2015, the Police of the Czech Republic recorded **seven criminal offences motivated by hatred against Muslims**. There were five offences recorded in 2015. During the same year, the Police of the Czech Republic also recorded **eight criminal offences**

motivated by hatred against Arabs. In comparison with 2015, it represents an increase by three cases.

3.7.6. Criminal activity perpetrated by members of security forces

In the area of extremism, the General Inspectorate of Security Forces investigated the total of **3 cases**.

In the first case, findings concerning possible manifestations of extremism by a member of the Customs Administration of the Czech Republic were examined based on his very positive attitude to firearms, which he has been allegedly promoting via his Facebook profile. The investigation carried out by the inspectorate did not show that a member of the Customs Administration conducted any behaviour that would fulfill the merits of the case of any of the criminal offences listed in the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Czech Republic. Therefore, the case was only forwarded for information to the General Directorate of Customs for the adoption of its measures.

In the second case, the inspectorate examined possible criminal activity of a civil employee of the Prison Service of the Czech Republic concerning manifestations of sympathy aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms. The employee allegedly favoured some of the prisoners (praise, visits, walks) who spread xenophobic and nationalist views among the others. The investigation by the members of the inspectorate did not find out that this civil employee behaved in the given way, or that he promoted nationalist ideas among the convicts. On the basis of the information given above, the case file was deposited ad acta without any further measures.

In the monitored period, investigation of the members of the Police of the Czech Republic was carried out for the suspicion of committing a criminal offence of Disorderly Conduct under Section 358 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code, who threatened Roma individuals first with physical assault, which did not take place, and then they verbally assaulted them because of their race. The investigation was carried out by the competent police inspectorate body, while the case is still under investigation.

No further cases of illegal behaviour, respectively criminal activities in the field of extremism, were detected by the Inspection in 2016. Five cases were examined in 2015.

3.7.7. Criminal activity perpetrated by members of the Army of the Czech Republic

In 2016, the Military Intelligence did not record an increase in the activities of with extremist subtext. This fact concerns both the right-wing and left-wing extremism.

In 2016, the Military Intelligence focused mainly on the detection of the supporters of right-wing extremism, who sought to enter the service of a professional soldier, and at the same time, they concentrated on monitoring of activities already known members of the defence department who were inclined towards movements aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms, or racial hatred. The common denominator in the area of right-wing extremism was the persistent incoordination of individuals and the absence of a cemented element, that is, the missing leading personality.

Through the existing mechanism, information about right-wing extremists was handed over to the competent authorities of the Ministry of Defence with the minister being informed. In the area of left-wing extremism, significant activities indicating security risks were not registered.

Exploitation of the Internet to spread hatred and extremist ideologies concerning members of the defence department only took place at the level of individuals. It had a character of sympathies rather than active activities in the sense of influencing the environment.

On 20 December, the Military Police was given a case file by the Police of the Czech Republic, which indicated that a professional soldier in Planá nad Lužnicí repeatedly shouted the Nazi greeting accompanied by raising his right hand and verbally and physically assaulted guests in a restaurant during the night of 7 September. The Military Police commenced criminal proceedings for a reasonable suspicion of committing a criminal offence of manifestation of sympathies for a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms, along with a criminal offence of disorderly conduct. The case remains under investigation of the Military Police.

3.7.8. Court statistics

In 2016, the courts issued final verdicts to 61 399 persons (65 569 in 2015, 72 854 in 2014, 77 976 in 2013, 71 471 in 2012, 70 160 in 2011, 69 953 in 2010, 73 752 in 2009, 75 751 in 2008, and 75 728 in 2007), which represents a decrease in comparison with 2015 by 6,36% (4 170 persons). From this number, there were **77 individuals convicted of criminal offences with racial subtext** in 2016. This figure represents only 0,13 % from the total amount of convicted individuals during this year.

In comparison with 2015, there is a record of an increase in the number of offenders convicted of crimes with racial subtext (by 23 persons, i.e. about 42,6 %, while there were 54 persons convicted in 2015, 52 persons in 2014, 71 persons in 2013, 83 in 2012; 111 in 2011; 96 in 2010; 103 in 2009; 97 in 2008 and 72 in 2007). From the given data it is evident, that the share of these offences on the total amount of convictions in the Czech Republic remains relatively low despite the slight increase. In absolute numbers, it oscillates between approximately 50 to 100 offenders in the period of the previous eight years.

In 2016, perpetrators were convicted of the following criminal offences⁵:

Criminal offence	Provision of the Criminal Code (CC)	Number of persons
		2016, (CC 40/2009)
Murder	Section 140	2
Grievous Bodily Harm	Section 145	3
Bodily Harm	Section 146	4
Breaking and Entering	Section 178	2

⁵ The total is higher than 77, because one person may be (and often is) convicted for more criminal offences.

Damage to a Thing of Another	Section 228	8
Public Menace	Section 272	4
Menace under Influence of Addictive Substance	Section 274	2
Violence against Public Official	Section 325	1
Threatening with Intention to Affect Public Official	Section 326	2
Violence against Group of People and Individuals	Section 352	12
Dangerous Threatening	Section 353	5
Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People	Section 355	17
Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms	Section 356	5
Spreading of Alarming News	Section 357	1
Disorderly Conduct	Section 358	27
Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms; Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms	Sections 403, 404	44
Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide	Section 405	2

In 2016, perpetrators of such delicts were **most often convicted of support and promotion of movements aimed at suppression of human rights and freedoms** under Sections 403 and 404 of the Criminal Code – 44 persons. These are followed by offenders convicted for Disorderly Conduct with racial subtext under Section 358 of the Criminal Code – 27 persons. The third, most common delicts fall under Section 355 of the Criminal Code – Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People and Section 356 of the Criminal Code – Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms – 22 persons.

Nine individuals were sentenced to imprisonment for criminal offences with racial subtext. Three of the individuals convicted of crimes with racial subtext were identified **recidivists**. Three perpetrators were sentenced to imprisonment with a maximum custodial sentence of 1 year; 4 perpetrators were sentenced to **imprisonment with a custodial sentence** ranging from 1 to 5 years; 2 perpetrators were sentenced to imprisonment with a custodial sentence ranging from 5 to 15 years. **A sentence of imprisonment, with a conditional suspension of the sentence, was given to 55** individuals in 2016. Alternative community service sentence was given in 12 cases. **One perpetrator was given the sentence of banishment. Five youth offenders and three female offenders** were convicted of this offence.

3.7.9. Statistics of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office

Overview of criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic and other hatred in the period of **1995 - 2016**

Criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic and other hatred	Total of prosecuted persons (figures in brackets represent the procedure of shortened preliminary criminal proceedings)	Total of accused persons (figures in brackets represent the procedure of shortened preliminary criminal proceedings)
1995	508	461
1996	616	552
1997	569	495
1998	535	439
1999	580	510
2000	535	451
2001	529	369
2002	467 (+51)	435 (+50)
2003	325 (+44)	286 (+44)
2004	351 (+48)	326 (+47)
2005	294 (+46)	264 (+45)
2006	221 (+52)	192 (+51)
2007	204 (+36)	197 (+36)
2008	200 (+41)	185 (+40)
2009	194 (+34)	183 (+32)
2010	225 (+63)	213 (+58)
2011	218 (+66)	209 (+59)
2012	224 (+65)	213 (+61)
2013	120 (+81)	115 (+77)
2014	139 (+45)	129 (+43)
2015	130 (+29)	115 (+22)
2016	82 (+33)	79 (+30)

Similarly to previous years, the share of criminal offences committed for racial, nationalist or other hatred motives on the total volume of crime is minimal. **In 2016, it is possible to record a significant decrease in the number of prosecuted and accused persons** for this criminal activity. This is a major decrease because there were 95 persons prosecuted in 2016 (- 35 in comparison with 2015, - 129 in comparison with 2012) and 92 persons accused (- 23 in comparison with 2015, - 121 in comparison with 2012). This trend was introduced already in 2013 when there was a radical drop in monitored data (almost by half compared to 2010 – 2012).

Also in 2016, criminal offences committed for racial, nationalist and other hatred motives were **dealt with in a simpler form of proceedings - a shortened preliminary proceedings**. In comparison with 2015, it is possible to see a slight increase in the number of persons, who have been subjected to shortened preliminary proceedings (+4 in comparison with 2015), while the total of people, against whom a proposal for punishment was submitted in 2016, was 30 (+8 in comparison with 2015).

Data on the numbers of prosecuted and accused persons for criminal offences motivated by racial, ethnic and other hatred from 1995 to 2015

CZ	Sec. 196/2 old CC		Sec. 196/3 old CC		Sec. 198 old CC		Sec. 198a old CC		Sec. 219/2g old CC		Sec. 221/2b old CC	
	Sec. 352/2 CC		Sec. 352/3 CC		Sec. 355 CC		Sec. 356 CC		Sec. 140/3g CC		Sec. 146/2e CC	
	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused
1995	177	162	18	17	112	108	28	22	0	0	13	12
1996	210	179	18	17	74	66	30	29	1	1	90	82
1997	150	119	29	19	107	103	25	20	0	0	56	55
1998	126	111	3	0	124	90	7	6	3	2	40	36
1999	139	123	24	24	103	91	12	11	2	2	42	42
2000	98	84	24	24	150	129	19	14	0	0	22	13
2001	95	92	0	0	127	118	19	16	0	0	28	27
2002	85	81	3	3	105	98	4	3	2	2	21	20
2003	64	56	0	0	81	77	8	7	0	0	28	27
2004	67	63	8	8	105	101	5	5	1	0	21	21
2005	74	67	0	0	85	78	3	2	3	3	14	14
2006	48	45	0	0	58	50	3	1	0	0	11	11
2007	33	31	0	0	37	35	24	24	0	0	24	24
2008	31	30	0	0	36	35	7	7	1	1	5	5
2009	33	32	6	6	19	19	7	4	0	0	19	19
2010	46	44	40	37	39	38	6	4	0	0	7	7
2011	41	39	38	37	35	35	5	5	1	1	17	16
2012	41	40	29	28	34	31	8	7	0	0	23	22
2013	15	15	5	5	27	25	2	2	0	0	21	21
2014	13	12	3	3	23	18	6	6	2	2	8	8
2015	17	15	5	5	25	24	4	3	0	0	6	5
2016	17	17	6	6	17	17	7	5	0	0	3	3

CZ	Sec. 222/2b old CC		Sec. 235/2f old CC		Sec. 257/2b old CC		Sec. 260 old CC		Sec. 261old CC		Sec. 261a old CC	
	Sec. 145/2f CC		Sec. 175/2f CC		Sec. 228/3b CC		Sec. 403 CC		Sec. 404 CC		Sec. 405 CC	
	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused	prosecuted	accused
1995	23	23	0	0	6	5	13	11	118	101	0	0
1996	42	41	1	1	27	25	30	27	93	84	0	0
1997	45	43	5	5	18	15	29	18	105	98	0	0
1998	28	28	6	6	16	16	27	15	155	129	0	0
1999	30	28	1	0	16	16	52	37	159	136	0	0
2000	12	12	0	0	7	6	79	67	124	102	0	0
2001	6	6	3	3	2	2	51	41	198	164	1	0
2002	24	24	2	2	3	3	75	67	143	132	1	1
2003	13	13	0	0	6	4	28	17	96	84	1	1
2004	9	5	4	4	1	1	31	25	96	90	3	3
2005	7	7	0	0	2	2	23	18	72	65	1	1
2006	3	3	0	0	2	2	16	11	78	69	2	0
2007	3	3	0	0	5	5	14	12	63	62	1	1
2008	9	9	0	0	2	2	29	29	72	61	8	6
2009	21	21	0	0	1	1	25	24	66	60	4	4
2010	1	1	1	0	1	1	39	38	42	40	2	2
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	15	62	57	4	4
2012	2	2	2	2	1	0	27	27	52	49	5	5
2013	3	3	0	0	1	1	18	18	27	24	1	1
2014	3	3	1	1	3	3	15	15	57	53	5	5
2015	2	2	0	0	3	3	8	8	57	47	3	3
2016	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	0	27	26	1	1

The decrease in the number of prosecuted and accused persons in 2016 involved, in particular, the **criminal offence of Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms under Section 404 of the Criminal Code**. In 2016, there was a significant decrease in the number of prosecuted and accused persons compared to 2015 (- 30 prosecuted persons and – 21 accused persons in comparison with 2015) for this type of crime. Despite the decline, however, it is still the most common offence in the monitored category.

The decrease can also be observed in the case of the **offence of Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People** under Section 355 of the Criminal Code (- 8 prosecuted persons and – 7 accused persons in comparison with 2015). The offence of Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms under Section 403 even indicates zero value (- 8 prosecuted persons and – 8 accused persons in comparison with 2015). Zero values are also recorded, as in the previous year, for the offence of Murder under Section 140 paragraph 3 point g) of the Criminal Code and the offence of Extortion under Section 175 paragraph 2 point f) of the Criminal Code. Numbers up to three prosecuted and accused persons are recorded in the case of the offence of Grievous Bodily Harm under Section 145 paragraph 2 point f) of the Criminal Code, Damage to a Thing of Another under Section 228 paragraph 3 point b) of the Criminal Code, Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide under Section 405 of the Criminal Code

and Bodily Harm under Section 146 of the Criminal Code.

A slight increase was recorded as regards **Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms** under Section 356 of the Criminal Code (+3 prosecuted persons and + 2 accused persons in comparison with 2015).

As regards criminal offence of **Violence Against Group of People and Individuals under Section 352 paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code**, there has been a certain increase, with still very low absolute figures (always + 2 for both prosecuted and accused persons). Almost identical data with 2015 can be recorded in the case of a criminal offence of Violence Against Group of People and Individuals under Section 352 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code.

Even though the number of prosecuted and accused persons has decreased in comparison with previous years, this type of crime cannot be underestimated, especially with regard to the global social situation that can contribute to the radicalization of certain groups.

Analytical data

The most common information submitted by the lower public prosecutor's offices in the sense of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Order of General Nature No. 10/2011, on information, as amended, are cases of the so-called **heiling, presentation of illicit symbols on clothing or sprayed on buildings, respectively public presentation of illicit tattoos, hate speech published on the Internet, racially motivated insults**. Similarly to 2015, there were no attacks with racial motivation resulting in death in 2016. There were no arson attacks on Roma families. Unlike in previous years, there were no anti-Roma marches and demonstrations in 2016. On the other hand, **increase in verbal attacks, often in cyberspace**, against Muslims, immigrants, and persons with a positive attitude towards them, can be registered. However, these verbal attacks did not transform into more serious physical assaults.

Overview of selected extremist, racial and xenophobic criminal acts monitored by the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office in 2016:

- **Anti-Semitic manifestations**

Criminal proceedings, in this case, involved publications and speeches by which the accused has defamed the Jewish nation, questioned the Holocaust and incited hatred against refugees. In April 2016, criminal proceedings for the offence of Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People under Section 355 paragraph 1 point a), b), paragraph 2 point b) of the Criminal Code, Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms under Section 356 paragraph 1, 3 point a) of the Criminal Code, and Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide under Section 405 of the Criminal Code were instigated.

In another criminal case, the same accused person along with another person placed a table with the text „Her death United the Czech nation and urgently showed the necessity of solving the Jewish question. The Jewish question has not yet been satisfactorily resolved.“ at the symbolic grave of Anežka Hrušová in Polná in order to defame the Jewish nation and raise a wave of hatred. Subsequently, they published a communiqué on the website of ND, in

which they stated that the Hilsnerijad is an eloquent testimony to the then healthy state of the national community, instinctively opposed to the Jewish exaltation, domination, and threat. Defendants were found guilty of committing offences of Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People under Section 355 paragraph 1 point a), paragraph 2 point b) of the Criminal Code, and Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or of Suppression their Rights and Freedoms under Section 356 paragraph 1, 3 point a) of the Criminal Code. In the case of the accused L. Z. (due to his regret), the punishment was dropped, the accused A. B. was given a conditional sentence of twelve months with a probation period of two years. The judgment is not final.

- **Racially motivated attack by a member of the Police of the Czech Republic**

The accused attacked with fists the victim P. J. while shouting racist insults (i.e., „Gypsies don't belong here“, „you black fuckhead“, „begone where you came from“, etc.), then he threw him to the ground causing him a fracture to a forefinger, and then kicked him. The accused was charged with the offence of Bodily Harm under Section 146 paragraph 1, 2 point e) of the Criminal Code, and Disorderly Conduct under Section 358 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code in October 2016.

- **Preparation for fighting within the ranks of the so-called Islamic State in Syria**

The accused (of Czech origin) converted based on self-study to Islam and began to sympathize with the so-called Islamic State, intending to travel to Syria and join its fighters. Along the border with Syria, he booked a motor vehicle he wanted to use for a journey to Syria, contact the Islamic State fighters, and join their ranks. In February 2016, he flew to Istanbul, where he was detained by the Turkish authorities, and he was returned. After the instigation of criminal proceedings, he confessed to everything, including to intention to fight alongside the Islamic State, and if ordered, he was also prepared to make executions. During December 2016, an indictment for a criminal offence of Preparation of Terrorist Attack under Section 20 paragraph 1 and Section 311 paragraph 1 point a), paragraph 3 point a), b) of the Criminal Code was issued. The accused committed the act entirely by himself, and he was not in contact with any other person or a group.

- **Heiling Austrian football fan**

An Austrian citizen was heiling at a match of the European Champion League held on 8 December 2016 between FC Viktoria Plzeň and Austria Vienna, and after being asked by the police patrol to stop with the explanation that such behaviour is prohibited in the Czech Republic, he started heiling again while calling Sieg Heil. The suspect was detained, and shortened preliminary proceedings were held. Through a criminal order, which came into force the same day, he was found guilty of the criminal offence of Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms under Section 404 of the Criminal Code, and the expulsion order has been imposed on him for three years.

This case is cited as an example of a quick and effective solution to this type of criminal activity.

In conclusion, as in 2015, hate speech which was previously focused on Roma citizens was partly „reoriented“ to Muslims and immigrants (or Muslim immigrants) in 2016, and was also directed against persons, whose attitude towards accepting and assisting refugees is positive. For the time being, there were only „verbal“ manifestations; physical assaults against Muslims and immigrants have not been recorded, which is probably related to the minimal

presence of both groups in the territory of the Czech Republic. These attacks, however, cannot be ruled out in the future because of hate moods in a particular part of the society.

3.7.10. Statistics of the Probation and Mediation Service

Of the total number of cases, which were handled by centres of the Probation and Mediation Service of the Czech Republic („PMS“) since its establishment, it is evident that the proportion of cases of the PMS related to extremist motivated crimes is, in a long-term, low. Since 2002, it relates to about 0, 2 % to 0,7 % of the total number of newly recorded files in the given year. **In 2016, the share of these case files on the total volume is 0,2 %.** It represents the same share as in the previous year.

A number of criminal offences with extremist subtext in individual judicial regions in the period of 2012-2016:

Number of case files* / Judicial regions <small>* including transferred files</small>	2014 total of case files	ex. subtext	(%)	2015 total of case files	ex. subtext	(%)	2016 total of case files	ex. subtext	(%)
Prague	2 593	12	0,5	2 841	13	0,5	2 748	8	0,3
Central Bohemian	3 793	5	0,1	3 604	6	0,2	3 539	8	0,2
Southern Bohemian	2 211	4	0,2	2 277	7	0,3	2 066	4	0,2
Western Bohemian	3 038	4	0,1	3 014	6	0,2	2 885	3	0,1
Nothern Bohemian	5 619	18	0,3	5 373	7	0,1	5 371	19	0,4
Eastern Bohemian	3 000	4	0,1	2 809	0	0,0	2 757	1	0,0
Southern Moravian	4 966	8	0,2	4 853	7	0,1	4 588	13	0,3
Northern Moravian	6 317	4	0,1	5 965	11	0,2	5 833	4	0,1
Czech Republic	31 537	59	0,2	30 736	57	0,2	29 787	60	0,2

Source: PMS ČR

In terms of criminal law classification, most of the files dealt with by the PMS in 2016 **concerned the criminal offence of Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Group of People** under Section 355 of the Criminal Code. These case files accounted for about 33 % of all recorded cases associated with extremist motivated criminal offences.

Furthermore, it was a criminal act of Violence Against Group of People and Individuals under Section 352 and Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms under Section 404 of the Criminal Code. In 2016, these accounted for 30 % and 24 % out of all recorded cases associated with extremist motivated criminal offences.

Other criminal offences (Sections 256, 403 and 406 of the Criminal Code) appeared in the records of the PMS minimally.

4. Foreign influences affecting the Czech extremist scene

Manifestations of extremism are no longer merely the national affairs of individual states. For reasons of easier communication (primarily via the Internet), the politically-extremist movements are becoming significantly internationalized. This cross-border impact is manifested by the cooperation of individual groups, taking over activities of allied foreign organizations, mutual support (including expressions of solidarity with suppressed extremists), creating Czech branches of international networks, etc. An essential part of monitoring of extremism at the national level must, therefore, also be the analysis of manifestations of extremism abroad.

In 2016, various manifestations of extremism could be recorded abroad within both the extreme right and extreme left. The main and defining topic, however, remained the refugee crisis and other associated elements (mainly hatred towards Islam and Muslims). Therefore, it is necessary to pay the greatest attention to these phenomena and to monitor their concepts within extremist structures. The development in Russia and Ukraine remained in the background; nevertheless, the Czech extreme political groups continued to maintain contacts with the region (Russia's strong influence on the part of both the extreme right and left therefore continued).

4. 1. European extreme right

In 2016, activities of the extreme right and its supporters were closely monitored and assessed by the state as well as NGOs and the media. The escalated attitude of these ideological groups towards the migration wave remained the most important and most debated topic in 2016. Together with the resentment towards refugees, the second (but inherently related) ideological stream of the European extreme right was the hatred towards Islam and Muslims. These two topics indicated the main direction of this political stream, which also managed to consolidate it internationally. Other typical topics of the radical right receded into the background in 2016, which was certainly helped by the fact that right-wing extremist entities could feel considerable support from the wider public as regards the issues of immigration and Islam (similarly to other countries as regards the anti-Roma rhetoric in the past).

The topic of the rise of the extreme right and increasing attacks arising from the ideology of right-wing extremism was particularly discussed **in Germany** in 2016. Therefore, a gradation of manifestations of hatred had again been recorded, including a number of isolated attacks on foreigners as well as deliberate arson attacks on accommodation facilities for incoming migrants. As an example of the increased tensions due to the migration crisis can serve the escalated situation in the East German city of Bautzen (located near the Czech border), where unknown offenders ignited a hostel in the centre of the town, which was intended for refugees, in February. Already at that time,



Burning accommodation facility for refugees in Bautzen (source: ČTK).

some of the local people glorified the arson attack while some tried to prevent the firefighters from extinguishing the fire (when visiting this city, the German President Gaucks later reacted to this incident).

In September, street clashes between radicals and local refugees, which further deepened hateful attitudes, took place. According to the incomplete statistics from 2016, there were 921 attacks against migrants in Germany in 2016, while 857 of these attacks had a motive associated with right-wing extremist attitudes of the perpetrator or perpetrators (such motive was not possible to exclude in cases of the remaining 64 attacks). In the case of criminal offences directed at housing facilities for migrants, the most common were the offences of damage to a thing of another (371) and promotion of movements aimed at suppression of human rights and freedoms (211). In more than 150 cases, these were violent criminal offences, including arson (66 cases) and attacks with the use of explosives (4 cases). Even though the total number of these unlawful acts has decreased compared to 2015 (1031 in 2015), their quantity (and partly also quality) continued to burden German security forces.

In connection with the continuing rise of the extreme right and persistent militancy of its supporters, the German police have taken several measures, due to which many attacks were prevented. In January, three extremists (two males and one female) were accused of planning bomb attacks on migrant housing facilities and Islamic centres. Detectives have gathered evidence that the suspects were searching for instructions on how to build explosive devices on the Internet under the name of Oldschool Society. In March, the German police carried out extensive raids against cells of the banned neo-Nazi organization Weisse Wölfe (White Wolves) Terrorcrew. The organization has been physically attacking its opponents and police officers, and planned attacks on migrant housing facilities; the programme also included the introduction of a dictatorial regime in the style of the Third Reich. The German police continued to fight manifestations of hatred on the Internet. At the end of January, local authorities disconnected one of the neo-Nazi websites entitled Altermedia. This measure was supplemented by police raids at several locations in Germany and also in Spain; two people who administered the websites were detained (three more individuals who contributed to the websites were also investigated). According to the Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizièr, the portal allowed the spread of racist and xenophobic opinions, advocated attacks on foreigners, justified the acts of the Nazi regime and denied the Holocaust. However, in connection with these police raids, several incidents took place. One of the most serious cases was the case of the Bavarian town of Georgensgmünd about 40 kilometres from Nuremberg, where a 39-year-old right-wing extremist attacked the police when they came to capture dozens of his weapons. He injured four police officers. The man affiliated with the extreme right-wing movement „Citizens of the Reich“⁶ was later arrested.

In 2016, two significant trials continued in Germany: the Beate Zschäpe trial and the trial on the dissolution of the National Democratic Party of Germany. Beate Zschäpe, whose group entitled the National-Socialist Underground (NSU) murdered ten people from 2000 to 2007, spoke in court for the first time in three years in September. She stated that she had identified herself with a part of national-socialist ideas in the past, however, today she no longer judges people according to their origins and political opinions, but according to their behaviour; she also said that she no longer sympathizes with nationalist ideas. At the same time, she has condemned the attacks for whose preparation and organization she is accused of. However, the final judgment, in this case, was still not pronounced in 2016. The process with

⁶ Supporters of the extreme right-wing movement Citizens of the Reich do not recognize the current German state and deny legitimacy of its institutions. They claim that the Nazi Third Reich did not cease to exist. This is not a unified group, but a conglomerate of organizations: the Exile Government of German Reich, the German Police Aid – Deutsche Polizei Hilfswerk, and others.

the National Democratic Party of Germany on its dissolution, on the other hand, has reached the final stage (the decision was made in January 2017, and the party was not dissolved on the grounds that it did not pose a direct threat to German democracy).

Nevertheless, it can be said that 2016 was not very successful for the party when it received only tenths of a percent of the vote in the provincial election. A certain exception was the provincial election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the party won 3 % of the



Kotleba accompanying a „train patrol“. Their deployment was justified by the People’s Party – Our Slovakia as an effort to increase security after an incident, when a young man attacked a woman on a train. According to Kotleba, the patrols are the first step towards the introduction of the domestic militia. It is supposed to operate where the police are failing (source: TV Markíza).

votes. However, this result can also be considered a failure because the party received 6 % in the previous election in 2011 and thus also gained seats in the Chamber of Deputies. From other court trials, in summer, German courts sentenced a man who stabbed Henriette Reker last fall to 14 years of imprisonment. Then a candidate running for a mayor of Cologne was severely

injured during the attack (carried out because of her positive attitude towards refugees). She eventually recovered and won the local election a day after the attack.

The success of the People’s Party - Our Slovakia in the parliamentary elections in March, which is chaired by Marián Kotleba, can be considered the main event in the field of the **Slovak extreme right**. This party gained 8 % of votes (i.e., by 6,5 % more votes than in the elections in 2012) and gained 14 out of 150 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The success of the party (and the rise of the right-wing extremist movement in general) was later addressed by the state authorities. On the one hand, it was possible to register thoughts on the possible submission of a proposal for dissolution of the People’s Party - Our Slovakia, when the General Prosecutors Office began to investigate its activities.⁷ In addition, Slovak MEPs approved measures to prevent further progress of extremism in Slovakia. This was represented by, for example, the change in the provisions as regards criminal proceedings; therefore, the Specialized Criminal Court would decide on extremist and racially motivated crimes, or an initiative leading to the establishment of a specialized expert field on extremism. At the same time, there were other amendments to the criminal code in the relationship to the crimes of extremism (this category is already explicitly included in the Slovak Criminal Code). A special regulation was also directed against the so-called train patrols, when the Slovak Parliament passed a law in October, according to which only the police or persons authorized by the carrier or operator of the railway infrastructure will supervise the public order and protection of passengers on trains. A number of people linked to this party has also been prosecuted (e.g., the police have started criminal prosecution of MEP Peter Krupa, because of his derogatory, racist and xenophobic commentary on social networks, which were directed against Roma citizens and Jews). However, these measures did not, for the time being, have any impact on the popularity of the People’s Party - Our Slovakia (the reason may be the partial mitigation of the radical rhetoric of its leading representatives; the party, nevertheless, can still be described as extremist). The party maintained relations with partners in the Czech Republic in 2016, especially with the DSSS and DM. From about the middle of

⁷ A predecessor of this entity, a party called Slovak Civitas, was dissolved by the court in 2006 because its political activity was contrary to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

the year, the Action Group – Vzbor Kysuce, which was known for its paramilitary activities, scaled down its activities. Its leader Marián Magát started to carry out individual activities, particularly on the Internet. In October, his dialogue with the commander of the Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush, Ivan Kratochvíl from the Czech Republic, was published.

The rise of the right-wing extremist movements was also discussed **in Hungary** in 2016. The response was already triggered by the February demonstration of neo-Nazi groups (e.g., Pax Hungarica and Hungaria Skins) that gathered at the Buda castle on the occasion of the anniversary of an unsuccessful attempt of German and Hungarian soldiers to break the Soviet army's encroachment in February 1945. At this event entitled The Day of Honour, Hungarian and German anthems with lyrics used prior 1945 were played, which triggered discussions on the restriction of groups openly supporting Fascist and Nazi regimes. Among the most serious incidents was the shooting of a police officer by one of the key Hungarian neo-Nazi István Györkös in 2016. He shot a member of the counterterrorism unit of the Hungarian police, who was planning a house search on his property (for suspicion of illegal possession of weapons) in the town of Böny in October.

In spite of his advanced age (75 years), Györkös continued to be active in the neo-Nazi scene, and in recent years, he has organized several training camps for neo-Nazis from Hungary and Germany. In addition, he was allegedly monitored by the Hungarian security forces for his alleged link to the Russian military intelligence GRU. Following this murder, the counterterrorism unit of the Hungarian police detained 12 individuals suspected of involvement in the extreme right movement Hungarian National Front and the neo-Nazi organization Front Line. During these raids, explosives and various firearms, including pistols and submachine guns, were secured by the police. Consequently, the Hungarian police accused two men of preparing for the assassination of Prime Minister Orban. In response to this incident, the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior also decided to examine activities of paramilitary organizations in Hungary and their political ties (also due to the proliferation of attacks by right-wing extremists on enemy objects, and the creation of self-proclaimed militia). In January 2016, the Hungarian Supreme Court confirmed life sentences for three offenders who committed a series of anti-Roma attacks in the period of 2008 to 2009 (resulting in the deaths of six people, including one child).

In terms of risky activities, the situation was relatively calm **in Poland** in 2016. The reason may be, among other things, that the local extreme right did not express itself significantly against the rule of the political party Law and Justice, whose ideological programme is much closer than of the previous government led by the Civil Platform. The Independence March held in Warsaw in November, which was accompanied by violence and hate speech in recent years, also took place without any significant problems. This is despite the fact that on this day, a total of three gatherings took place in Warsaw: a nationalist independence march (attended by about 75.000 people according to the police), anti-fascist demonstration with the attendance of about 900 people, and anti-government demonstration organized by the Committee for the Defence of Democracy (attended by about 10.000 people according to the police; the organizers, however, estimated the attendance to 60.000 people). A significant response within the extreme right left the step of the Facebook social network, which shortly before the mentioned November march blocked profiles of right-wing extremist nationalist groups (e.g., the National Radical Camp - Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny or the All-Polish Youth - Młodzież Wszechpolska). At the beginning of 2017, a more significant attention was paid to the unrest in the city of Elk directed against foreigners, which was triggered by the New Year's Eve's death of a young Pole during a confrontation with employees of a restaurant run by non-native inhabitants of Poland (the victim, who had been convicted of violent crimes in the past, attempted to leave Prince Kebab restaurant without

paying for consumed food, while also stealing two bottles; the chef and his assistant ran after him in order to stop him and fatally injured him with a knife in a battle). Already in February, Polish militant right-wing extremists were detained in Sweden, where they allegedly prepared an attack on an asylum shelter.

The most serious violent act in the United Kingdom was the murder of Labour MEP Jo Cox in June 2016. Her murderer shouted nationalist slogans during the shooting, and the subsequent investigation showed that he had been involved in the activities of some right-wing extremist groups. The perpetrator, Thomais Mair, was found guilty in autumn and the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of conditional release. It is also worth noting that a neo-Nazi organization named the National Action was banned in December, which, among other things, supported Maira even after his act, and was included on the list of terrorist organizations. This is the first right-wing extremist organization to be banned as a terrorist organization under the British Terrorist Act of 2000 (and the third „domestic British“ organization, which was banned in this manner; the previous two being linked to radical Islamism). The reason for banning this group was that the authorities found it to be a racist, anti-Semitic and homophobic organization that raises hatred, celebrates violence, and promotes disgusting ideology. Some British right-wing extremists tried to use the current political situation during 2016 (increasing resistance to Islam and immigration on the one hand, and the internal crisis of the United Kingdom Independence Party – UKIP), and to establish a newly organized unit that would also succeed in political competition.

Public disturbances triggered by right-wing extremists were also recorded **in Greece**, where, for example, sympathizers of the Golden Dawn⁸ invoked clashes with people helping the refugees. Around sixty supporters of the Golden Dawn then attacked one of the refugee camps during several nights in November. They used inflamed bottles and stones. They have caused material damage and injuries to some of the refugees. For the Greek security forces, however, the challenge was mainly represented by attacks of anarchist groups. Violence from right-wing extremists in 2016 had a lower intensity than in previous years.

Street demonstrations that encountered conflicts between individual ideological groups were also recorded **in Finland**. During an event, which was organized by a group called the Finnish Resistance Movement, a passer-by who expressed disagreement with the ideology of the movement was attacked by a supporter of the extreme right. The injured twenty-eight-year-old man died a week later. The police subsequently detained the suspected activist of the Finnish Resistance Movement and the court found him guilty of the offence grievous bodily harm resulting in death in December.

This incident has caused considerable public concern in Finland and has also led to the




In October 2015, an initiative Soldiers of Odin was founded in the city of Kemi. First, it spread across Scandinavia, and later it reached other countries (including the Czech Republic). The founders officially distanced themselves from extremism; however, association with the neo-Nazi scene can be registered in some countries.

⁸ During 2016, substantial criminal proceedings with 69 persons linked to this party (including 18 MPs) continued; this proces was referred to as the biggest trial of fascist crimes since the time of the Nuremberg tribunal by the prosecution.

banning of some extremist groups.

In April, attention was again given (and again in January 2017) to the Norwegian right-wing extremist and terrorist Anders Breivik⁹. He sued the Norwegian authorities for alleged inhuman and degrading treatment as regards his custodial sentence. The court of the first instance upheld his accusation in part and stated that the method of his detention was contrary to the third article of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: „No one should be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.“ At the same time, Breivik remained faithful to his ideology even during the proceedings, and he was hailing at the court showing his political beliefs. The Norwegian authorities have appealed against this decision, which will be decided in 2017.

In Russia, the division of extreme right into the pro-Putin and anti-Putin part persisted. Right-wing extremists organized the traditional Russian March in several cities on 4 November. One of the participants of the march in Moscow was also carrying the Czech flag. It was an expression of solidarity among the Slavic nations, and other participants were carrying flags of other states with the dominant Slavic population. In 2016, a number of violent acts against immigrants committed by members of various extreme right streams were carried out in Russia.



Symbolic indication of individual directions of Russian extreme right (source: The Moscow Times).

Current Russian laws understand the concept of extremism quite widely. The concept of extremism can also be applied to the opposition activities of various ideological streams. In this way, it is possible to counteract the manifestations of political or civil dissatisfaction (e.g., individuals convicted of extremist activity cannot stand in the elections). There was a significant increase in the number of convicted individuals under the so-called anti-extremist sections.

⁹ In July, the Norwegians commemorated the fifth anniversary of the Breivik terrorist attacks in the Oslo government district and Utøya Island, where 77 people died.

In Ukraine, a part of the neo-Nazi organization Misanthropic Division has transformed into a new Division Phoenix. It was also active in setting up foreign affiliates, at least in virtual space. Members of several Ukrainian right-wing extremist organizations attended the National March in Kiev on 14 October (the number of participants is estimated at around 5 thousand).

In the separatist Donetsk Peoples' Republic in the east of Ukraine, there was a mixed group of Czech and Slovak volunteers, whose existence was popularized by a reportage in Slovak Deník N magazine.

4.2. European extreme left

The militant left-wing extremist groups remained active in the European environment in 2016 when mainly radical anarchists were behind many violent attacks and posed a considerable internal threat to some European countries (mainly Greece). On the contrary, the radical communist movement in terms of the riskiness of its members, remained in the background and no radical communist party succeeded in the elections. At the same time, it should be remembered that in some European countries (mainly in those without the experience of communist totalitarianism), anarchist and communist ideas partly overlap.

The militant anarchist movement was internationally interconnected. This informal interconnection was manifested mainly by the organization of solidarity actions (individual attacks were linked to other actions or repressions against other anarchists), publication of supporting materials in various European countries, the establishment of individual cells of wider informal groups (among the main groups still belonged the Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front or Conspiracy of Fire Cells). Activists could learn about individual events via virtual channels, allowing their actions to gain international recognition and to be seen as a part of a broad anarchist struggle (see also some actions of Czech militant anarchists). At the same time, it was also possible to record some joint international events. For example, the Anarchist Summer Camp held in the north of Austria in August 2016, aimed to „bring together individuals and groups across the borders and strengthen cooperation within the left-wing and anarchist movement“ (it was also attended by supporters of the Anarchist Federation from the Czech Republic).

In terms of the activation topics, the idea of fighting against the state and its repressions (as a reaction to the applied repressive measures against the anarchists), and the conviction of the need to fight against capitalism persisted. A significant issue was the immigration wave in 2016. In this connection, it was possible to record attacks against individuals and groups, which had negative attitudes towards migrants (e.g., Greek anarchists attacked a member of the Golden Dawn, George Germenis, in November and subsequently claimed responsibility for this attack while linking it to his hateful rhetoric against migrants). Anarchists through some of their acts responded to state measures aimed at people coming to Europe from other continents (e.g., British and French anarchists have engaged in violent clashes with French police officers, who have cleared the so-called jungle – an unofficial refugee camp near Calais).

By far the most serious situation in 2016 was **in Greece**, where local anarchists committed several dozens of violent acts. A number of „solidarity attacks“ have been carried out on banks, state offices (primarily offices of the security forces), post offices, buildings of

political parties (besides the Golden Dawn, for example, the PASOK party), headquarters of media corporations or companies involved in the arms and security industries. As an example of one of the most serious incidents, we can mention the grenade attack on the building of the French Embassy in Athens in November. The perpetrators threw a grenade from a moving motorcycle, and one police officer was injured during the attack. Responsibility for this attack was claimed by an anarchist group called the Organization of Revolutionary Self-Defence, which also claimed responsibility for a similar attack on the Mexican Embassy in August. According to this group, France stands in the „front line of the predatory capitalist war against the planet“, and it is a key member of NATO. Activists also linked the attack with the clearance of the refugee camp in Calais. A group entitled „Green Nemesis“ stated in December, that it had managed to inject chlorine and hydrochloric acid into some foods made by multinational corporations (Nestlé, Coca-Cola, Hellmann’s). Some of these foods were subsequently withdrawn from the sale, and the affected companies were caused considerable financial damage.

Similarly to previous years, it was possible to record militant demonstrations with violent clashes between the anarchists and the police in Greece. A higher number of serious public unrest occurred, for example, on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of Alexis Grigoropoulos on 6 December (a young man killed by the police in 2008).¹⁰ In response to the detention of three individuals suspected of involvement in violent clashes during the mentioned demonstration, the anarchists subsequently destroyed three trolleybuses of the municipal transport in Athens (first, they stopped the buses, ordered the people to get off and then set fire to the vehicles).



Violent incidents during the visit of the US President Obama, which were largely participated by anarchist groups (source: AP).

During 2016, it was also possible to record an increased number of attacks against individuals involved in the judicial proceedings against imprisoned or prosecuted anarchists in Greece (in July, members of the militant anarchist group were given significant sentences of imprisonment). At the beginning of June, a letter bomb was sent to a judge, who refused the appeal of the wife of one of the significant members of the Conspiracy of Fire Cells. A similar home-made letter bomb (containing nails and razor blades) was sent to another judge at the of July. In October, there was an attack on the house and other property of a public prosecutor, who was blamed by the anarchist from corruption and excessive hardness in the case of the previously mentioned wife of one of the members of Conspiracy of Fire Cells (the attack did not cause any injuries; however, it caused considerable material damage). This attack was successful despite the enhanced security currently enjoyed by the people concerned in Greece. Militant anarchists explicitly claimed responsibility only for the last attack but they also informed about the previous two attacks in a positive way and, according to the state authorities, it is possible to assume that these attacks were also perpetrated by the anarchist groups.

In addition to Greece, violent attacks of radical anarchists were also recorded in other

¹⁰ On the occasion of this anniversary, the German anarchists threw an inflamed bottle with ten litres of gasoline to the police station in Alexanderplatz in Berlin.

European countries. However, it is necessary to mention that these attacks did not reach such frequencies as in Greece.

Among the incidents **in Italy**, for example, the attack by a flammable bottle on the headquarters of the Rotodyne company in Saronno (located north of Milan) at the end of January can be mentioned. As a reason, the Italian anarchists stated claimed a protest against the actions of this company in the armaments industry. In February, they claimed responsibility for placing a bomb in front of the court in Civitavecchia district. In September, the Italian police detained several individuals suspected from the preparation and execution of violent anarchist attacks (and carried out a series of house searches). This police intervention has triggered significant responses in the anarchist (and not only Italian) environment, where other violent actions (e.g., seven vehicles of the Italian National Post in Trento were set on fire, or a vehicle of ENI energy company was set on fire in Genoa in the middle of November).

From events of **German anarchists** we can mention, for example, the ignition of 9 vehicles in German Mülheim an der Ruhr in the middle of February as a protest against these „toxic machines“ that destroy the environment. One of the most serious incidents was the ignition of 18 military vehicles of the German army in Bremen in November, which caused damage of 15 million Euros. In relation to the German extreme left, it is also worth mentioning that during 2016, the Spanish police arrested anarchists suspected of bank robbery in Aachen, Germany, which took place in November 2014 (these individuals were later handed over to Germany and charged by the German authorities). In connection with this event, several Dutch anarchists were also detained and handed over to prosecution in Germany. In the Netherlands, Spain and other countries, it was possible to record „solidarity actions“ with the detained perpetrators as a reaction to these arrests (i.e., destruction of 8 cash machines in the Hague in July).



Intervention of firefighters in „Hamburg Messe“, the site of the G20 Summit in 2017, after the attack by German anarchists (source: Bild).

In connection with the German anarchist environment, the November **establishment of an initiative against the G-20 meeting representatives**, which is supposed to take place in Hamburg in July 2017, under the slogan „Attack the G-20 Summit“, „Create chaos in Hamburg“ and „Destroy the European fortress“, is also worth mentioning. Several violent attacks already took place within this campaign during 2016. At the end of November, German anarchists set fire (with burning tires) to one of the entrances to the building in which the meeting was to take place. In

connection with this initiative, the assets of Thales or Deutsche Telecom company was also damaged. Given initiative then quickly gained international character when information about it appeared on international forums of militant anarchism, and other violent actions were also committed.

For example, the attack by Greek anarchists on the building of a private security agency from the end of November (this action was supposed to function as a tribute to the creation of this initiative as well as trigger further resistance actions against the G-20 Summit).

Similarly, it was possible to record sporadic attacks of supporters of anarchist ideas in the Great Britain, which local objectives did not differ from those in other parts of Europe. An

example of such action (relatively specific from the perspective of modus operandi) may be the deliberate damage to the water supply, which has resulted in flooding several properties in one of the London's richest suburbs.

Limited (from the perspective of frequency) arson attacks against enemy objects have also been reported in other European countries (see, for example, arson attacks on six vehicles in July and destruction of two vehicles of a private security agency in the same both in Helsinki). A certain success in the fight against militant anarchism was gained by the Polish police, which arrested three anarchists in May and later charged them with illegal possession of explosives and attempts to use them against the police vehicle (this arrest also prompted an international response and manifestations of solidarity, also in the Czech Republic).

As regards **activities connected with the Czech environment**, the international campaign dedicated to the prosecuted and detained anarchists, as well as the process with Igor Ševcov (charged with an attack on the residence of the Minister of Defence Martin Stropnický, who was later acquitted of the act) was persistent. Support to these people was carried out under the initiative Anarchist Black Cross, whose main goal, in general, is to express support to anarchists who have been repressed by state authorities anywhere in the world (also the activities of the Network of Revolutionary Cells have been linked to solidarity with imprisoned anarchists beyond the borders of the Czech Republic and information about them were given within the campaign of the Anarchist Black Cross). Solidarity with Czech criminally prosecuted anarchists was expressed mainly by minor demonstrations in 2016 (e.g., in front of the Czech Embassy in Moscow in May), organizing concerts (e.g., in Edinburgh in November), leaflets (in St. Petersburg in June) and „solidarity greetings“ (e.g., via posted banners, which could be recorded in Minsk or Athens). One of the most serious responses was spraying on the Czech Embassy in Athens by a local anarchist, who this expressed resistance to the Czech criminal proceedings with their companions. Some other militant actions committed by Czech anarchist in 2016 gained response abroad, when information about them was published on many foreign servers mapping anarchist actions of a militant character.



The Czech Embassy in Athens after an attack by the Greek Anarchists (source: lidovky.cz).

5. List of used abbreviations

- BPI** – Blok proti islámu (*Block against Islam*)
- ČSVZ** – Českoslovenští vojáci v záloze (*Czechoslovak Soldiers in Ambush*)
- ČSVG** - Československá vlastenecká garda (*Czechoslovak Patriotic Guard*)
- DSSS** – Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti (*Workers' Party of Social Justice*)
- DM** – Dělnická mládež (*Workers' Youth*)
- ESSK** – Evidenčně statistický systém kriminality (*Statistical Recording System of Crime*)
- ND** – Národní demokracie (*National Democracy*)
- NDB** – Národní domobrana (*National Militia*)
- NPD** – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (*National Democratic Party Germany*)
- NPO** – *Proposal for indictment*
- NSZ** – Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství (*Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office*)
- PMG** - Paramilitární a domobranecké skupiny (*Paramilitary and militia groups*)
- PEGIDA** - Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (*Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West*)
- PMS** – Probační a mediační služba (*Probation and Mediation Service*)
- TZ** – Trestní zákoník (*Criminal Code*)
- ÚNK** – Úsvit – Národní koalice (*Dawn – National Coalition*)
- ZPŘT** – Zkrácené přípravné řízení (*Shortened preliminary proceedings*)